Interactionist Moral Character by Lutman, Cameron
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 
2017+ University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 
2020 
Interactionist Moral Character 
Cameron Lutman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1 
University of Wollongong 
Copyright Warning 
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University 
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, 
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe 
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court 
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the 
conversion of material into digital or electronic form. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the University of Wollongong. 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 













Dr. Keith Horton 
Prof. Daniel D. Hutto 
 
 
This thesis is presented as part of the requirement for the conferral of the degree: 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 




University of Wollongong 







The goal of this thesis is to develop and advance the interactionist approach 
to moral character in philosophy. Interactionism recognizes the important 
contribution that both personal and situational factors make to character, but 
places its main focus on the dynamic interaction between person and 
situation. Interactionism has emerged in recent years as a promising account 
of character that could provide a way forward out of the debate between virtue 
ethicists and situationists. This thesis seeks to contribute to this project by 
pursuing three primary goals. The first is to develop the core theoretical 
framework of interactionism in greater detail by synthesizing ideas from both 
psychology and philosophy. The second goal is to defend interactionism 
against a number of potential objections and challenges, in particular 
methodological concerns about the psychological evidence supporting 
interactionism, and worries that interactionism falls prey to the Causal-
Constitutive Fallacy objection familiar from the philosophy of mind. The 
third and final goal is to explore some implications of interactionism for other 
areas of philosophy, namely for well-being and environmental virtue ethics. 
Ultimately, the thesis illustrates that interactionism stands as a rich, 
empirically adequate moral psychology of character that does justice to the 
importance of situational and personal variables, while emphasizing the 
dynamic exchanges between agent and environment. Additionally, in 
demonstrating implications for other areas of philosophy, the thesis also 
demonstrates the broader appeal and usefulness of interactionism, and 
highlights potentially fruitful future lines of research. In developing 
interactionism further, defending it from objections, and extending it into new 
areas, this thesis will have made a valuable contribution to the current 
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Statement of Choice of Thesis by Compilation  
This thesis is presented in journal article compilation style, in accordance 
University of Wollongong’s thesis by compilation guidelines. All papers 
presented in this thesis have been submitted for review to journals, and the 
full details of each submission are provided in the list below. I have chosen 
to prepare my thesis as a compilation as I wanted to investigate a variety of 
topics and issues relating to interactionism, and felt that the compilation 
format would better suit the breadth of topics I wanted to research than a 
traditional thesis would. I am the sole author of all the papers, and all material 
presented in the thesis is written by me unless otherwise referenced or 
acknowledged.  
Given the thesis by compilation approach, some of the key background 
arguments will be discussed in a number of the papers. I have chosen to leave 
the papers intact though, in order to preserve the integrity of their structures 
and arguments, and in order to give the reader a clear picture of the complete 
papers as they were prepared and submitted. Thus, aside from inserting some 
internal references to highlight connections between the papers, the papers 
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General Introduction  
 
I. Introduction  
The focus of this thesis is the nature of moral character and virtue, a topic of 
both longstanding historical interest, and intense recent debate. My central 
purpose is to argue in favour of an interactionist approach to moral character 
and virtue. Interactionism, as an account of character, focuses on the dynamic 
interactions between agent and situation. It recognises an important role for 
the personal features of the agents, the environment features of the situation, 
and the ways in which they shape and influence each other. Interactionism 
has a fairly long history in psychology, but has only recently received explicit 
attention and development in philosophy. These recent efforts have helped to 
highlight the potential and promise of interactionism, and illustrated that it 
can stand as an appealing alternative to both traditional virtue ethics, and 
situationism. As this thesis will argue, there is good reason to think debates 
over the nature of character in philosophy should be resolved in favour of 
interactionism, just as earlier debates in psychology were similarly concluded 
in interactionist terms. This thesis will ultimately seek to support 
interactionism as a compelling moral psychology of character, defend it 
against potential objections, and explore some of its implications for other 
areas of philosophical inquiry.  
The purpose of this brief introductory chapter is to set the scene for the 
topic and establish the aims for the papers to follow. I will begin by laying 
out the central goals and aims of the research, and by highlighting the 
contribution it will make to current research. I will then sketch out some of 
the relevant background on philosophical and psychological work on 
character, in order to establish the state-of-play in the field, and the 
foundations that the work in the thesis is built on. In the final section I will 
then present an outline of the thesis that both describes the content of the 
subsequent chapters, and that also highlights the connections between the 
papers, and the ways in which they contribute to the overall aims of the thesis. 
In doing so, I hope to illustrate the cohesiveness of this compilation of papers, 
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and how they work in unison towards accomplishing the central research goal 
of advancing the interactionist approach in philosophy.  
 
II. Research Aims   
The central research question addressed by this thesis is: does interactionism 
present an appealing account of moral character? The central goal of the thesis 
is to develop and advance the interactionist approach to character in 
philosophy, and thereby support a positive response to this research question. 
In order to consider this question, and to work towards this goal, the thesis 
has three main aims. The first aim is to further the development of the 
interactionist position in philosophy. This will involves drawing on both 
philosophy and psychology to further flesh-out the interactionist account of 
character. It will also involve highlighting the advantages of interactionism, 
and illustrating the need for an interactionist approach to character as a useful 
way of moving on from some of the recent debates about character and virtue 
in philosophy.  
The second aim of the thesis is to refine the interactionist account of 
character, and to address potential issues and objections. These include both 
theoretical worries, such as potential metaphysical issues with the 
interactionist approach, and also methodological objections, such as concerns 
about the evidential basis for interactionism. In addressing such issues, I 
intend to show how interactionism can overcome some prominent objections, 
and thereby shore up interactionism’s foundations, and further demonstrate 
its attractiveness as an account of character.   
The third and final aim of the thesis is to apply the interactionist framework 
to topics and questions beyond pure moral psychology, and thereby explore 
some of the interesting implications of the interactionist approach. In 
particular, I investigate the connections between virtue and well-being 
through an interactionist lens, and also consider the implications of 
interactionism for environmental virtue ethics. These two studies will serve 
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as illustrative examples of the fruitful contributions that interactionism can 
make to a range of philosophical topics.  
Work on moral character in particular, and moral psychology in general, 
has received significant attention, research, and debate in philosophy in recent 
years. It has emerged as a leading area of inquiry within the discipline. 
Furthermore, contemporary work in moral psychology has implications for 
an array of areas, including research on health and well-being, political 
philosophy, education, environmental philosophy, and legal theory. Research 
on moral psychology thus has broad relevance for a range of topics, and can 
contribute much to a variety of philosophical endeavours. As this thesis will 
argue, interactionism holds great promise and appeal as an approach to 
character, and can make an important contribution to contemporary work in 
philosophical moral psychology. In developing the interactionist position, 
and exploring its connections with other topics, this thesis will seek to make 
a valuable contribution to contemporary work on character and virtue; a 
contribution that is also relevant to research in a range of other areas.   
 
III. Methodology 
As a field of study, moral psychology “investigates the psychological 
properties of moral agents,” including cognitive, affective, and motivational 
capacities (Doris 2002, p. 3). Moral psychology is investigated by both 
philosophers and psychologists, and has become an important research area 
in both disciplines. The methodological approach of this thesis will be to 
conduct research in moral psychology using the tools of analytic philosophy. 
I will investigate and analyse a range of key concepts, ideas, and arguments 
in moral psychology, in particular those relating to moral character and virtue. 
I will also evaluate a range of competing moral psychological theories, in 
order to determine if interactionism is a viable and attractive approach to the 
moral psychology of character.  
With moral psychology being of interest to both philosophers and 
psychologists, there is also much to be gained from engagement and 
collaboration between the two disciplines. Until recently, such engagement 
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was not very widespread, with philosophers and psychologists largely 
keeping to their own fields. Over the last two decades though, engagement 
between philosophers and psychologists has increased dramatically, 
producing many positive research outcomes. At present, many philosophers 
working on moral psychology recognise the benefits of engaging with 
empirical evidence from psychology and other fields to inform their work.  
My thesis research will aim to continue in the tradition of this recent shift 
towards empirical engagement. I will draw on a range of psychological 
research to support my claims, while also investigating and critiquing the use 
of empirical evidence by a number of other authors. I will thus aim to conduct 
my research on moral psychology in the spirit of the kind of “methodological 
naturalism” discussed by Alfano (2013, pp. 4-6), as I will propose an account 
of character that aims to both give the best fit with the empirical evidence, 
while also doing justice to our philosophical intuitions. In doing so, I hope to 
demonstrate interactionism’s advantages as an account of character, by 
showing that it is both empirically adequate and theoretically appealing.  
 
IV. Background 
I now want to sketch some of the background and recent developments that 
are relevant to my research. I’ll preface this background section by noting that 
it is not intended to be exhaustive. The relevant background material for each 
topic I consider is discussed in more detail in the papers themselves, so I will 
not attempt to cover everything at this stage. Instead, I will just aim to give a 
brief outline of the present theoretical terrain, in order to set up the arguments 
to come in the remainder of the thesis.  
As I noted at the beginning, my primary interest in this thesis is with moral 
character and virtue. Philosophical interest in virtue is ancient and 
multifaceted, and has received important contributions from a range of 
different approaches and traditions. Rather than attempt to survey all of this 
though, I will take my starting point as the revival of interest in virtue in the 
latter half of the Twentieth Century. While virtue had been a topic of 
significant importance in classical antiquity, by the Twentieth Century, moral 
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philosophy was primarily driven by Kantianism and Utilitarianism, and thus 
more concerned with duty, obligation, and consequences, than with virtue. 
During the second half of the century though, a range of philosophers, 
including Anscombe (1958), Foot (1978), MacIntyre (1981), and Williams 
(1985, 1993), contributed to a resurgence of interest in virtue, and virtue 
ethics is now a leading topic of research within contemporary philosophy.  
As Doris (2002, p. 3) notes though, this resurgence of interest in virtue 
within philosophy was taking place at the same time as research in 
psychology was raising serious questions about the models of virtue normally 
endorsed by philosophers. A range of experimental evidence, such as 
Milgram’s (1963, 1974) work on obedience, Darley and Batson’s (1973) 
study on helping behaviour, and work on the “bystander effect” (Darley & 
Latane 1968; Latane & Darley 1970), cast doubts on traditional models of 
personality and character traits, which conceptualised traits as robustly 
influential, and consistent across a variety of different situations. Such 
evidence contributed to the development of the situationist approach in 
psychology, which posited that the features of the situation, and not the 
features of the person, were the more important drivers of behaviour. 
Psychological situationists challenged the conventional focus on personality 
traits in psychology, and argued in favour of a shift towards focusing on 
situations.  
In the 1990s, philosophers started to draw on empirical evidence and the 
situationist tradition in psychology to formulate situationist arguments of 
their own. Flanagan (1991) was an early source of these kinds of ideas, before 
they were developed in greater detail by Doris (1998, 2002) and Harman 
(1999). Doris (2002, pp. 22-23) argued against “globalist” accounts of 
character, and challenged the idea that character traits were cross-situationally 
consistent, although he allowed that they could be stable over time. Harman 
(1999) at points put things in even stronger terms, arguing that the empirical 
evidence can be taken to suggest we do not have character traits at all (at least 
as they are normally conceived). Situationists developed these arguments to 
present a challenge to virtue ethics, and in particular the Aristotelian approach 
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to virtue ethics: if empirical evidence reveals conventional accounts of virtue 
to be inaccurate, and virtue ethicists endorse such accounts, then their models 
of virtue are empirically inadequate. Put in stronger terms, the psychological 
realism of virtue ethics has been undermined, and it may not be practical or 
even possible to become the kinds of people that virtue ethics suggests we 
should aspire to be.  
Virtue ethicists adopted a variety of strategies for answering this response. 
Some, such as Sreenivasan (2002) and Sabini and Silver (2005), took issue 
with either the evidence used by situationists, or the interpretation of that 
evidence and the conclusions drawn about virtue ethics. Many took a different 
approach and argued that virtue was supposed to be rare, and so the empirical 
evidence illustrating the rarity of virtue did not create an issue for virtue 
ethics, and should not cause us to abandon our aspirations towards virtue (see, 
e.g., Miller 2003; Kamtekar 2004; Kristjansson 2008). In turn, others 
responded to these arguments, and developed new situationist arguments, to 
show that virtue ethics could not so easily escape this challenge unscathed 
(Merritt, Doris & Harman 2010; Alfano 2013). Rather than causing a decisive 
shift towards situationism, the situationist challenge has instead resulted in a 
substantial debate (the character-situation debate), that has seen significant 
attention and discussion, and that remains ongoing.  
In addition to the contributions from both Aristotelians and situationists, 
the character-situation debate has also seen the development of a range of 
alternative approaches to character. In my view, the most notable of these is 
interactionism, as seen in the works of philosophers such as Alfano (2013, 
2016) and Skorburg (2017, 2019). Given that interactionism is the focus of 
the thesis, I will have much more to say about it in the coming chapters, and 
I will present its core features in Chapter 1. In addition to interactionism 
though, philosophers developed other alternative proposals about the nature 
of character. For example, Merritt (2000) presented a Humean approach to 
virtue, and argued that social relationships and contexts make a crucial 
contribution to sustaining virtue, an account that thus has some points of 
overlap with interactionism. Similarly, Slingerland (2011) argued in favour 
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of a Confucian approach to virtue, which included a variety of strategies for 
managing situational influences. The character-situation debate is thus not 
just home to two rival camps, but to an array of different positions.  
Alongside these developments of alternative approaches like 
interactionism, the debate continues to see arguments made in favour of both 
situationism and traditional virtue ethics. Recent publications, such as West’s 
(2018) defense of virtue ethics, and Vargy’s (2018) argument in favour of an 
“embodied situationism,” illustrate the ongoing nature of the debate, and the 
fact that it has not received a clear resolution. As I will argue in more detail 
in Chapter 1, it is my contention that interactionism possesses the best 
framework for pursuing future work on character, and for moving on from 
the character-situation debate.  
While the character-situation debate has been primarily concerned with the 
nature of virtue and the drivers of moral behaviour, it has also branched out 
into other areas, and a number of theorists have drawn on debates over 
character to inform research in other areas. For example, while a lot of the 
debate has concerned itself with moral character (which will also be my focus 
in this thesis), others have also investigated its implications for intellectual 
character and virtue epistemology. Alfano (2012, 2013) has developed 
situationist arguments in relation to virtue epistemology, and the topic has 
also received attention from Iizuka (2020), King (2014), and Olin and Doris 
(2014). Similarly, some of those working on character, including Skorburg 
(2017), Howell (2016), and Alfano and Skorburg (2016), have explored the 
connections between their accounts and the E cognition literature in the 
philosophy of mind (I will explore these works in more detail in Chapter 2). 
Further afield, the implications of the debate have also been considered in 
various areas of applied ethics, including business ethics (Solomon 2003) and 
military ethics (Cartagena 2017). Finally, there has also been research on the 
implications of the character-situation debate for thinking about well-being, 
and for environmental ethics, which I will investigate in Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively. Research such as this shows the ability of virtue theory and 
moral psychology to contribute to a range of other areas of inquiry.  
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In sum, moral psychology has become a key research area in both 
psychology and philosophy, and the character-situation debate has become an 
influential topic within contemporary philosophy. As I have discussed in this 
section, debate over the nature of character is ongoing, and research in this 
area has also branched out to inform a variety of other issues and debates. It 
is thus my intention in this thesis to make a useful contribution to this rich 
and developing field of research.  
 
V. Précis  
Chapter 1 will begin the thesis by presenting the core features and claims of 
interactionism in order to establish a framework that supports the rest of the 
chapters to follow. In this chapter, I provide some further background on the 
character-situation debate, before presenting overviews of interactionism in 
both psychology and philosophy. Drawing on ideas from both disciplines, I 
then synthesise a core set of interactionist claims in order to clarify and flesh-
out my account, before highlighting some of its advantages as an account of 
the moral psychology of character. The final section of the chapter then 
emphasises the need for interactionism in philosophy by addressing some 
examples of recent work that supports either a traditional virtue ethical 
approach to character, or a situationist one. I then argue against such accounts, 
and in favour of interactionism being a better way forward for research on 
character and virtue.  
In developing a clear account of the central ideas and claims of 
interactionism, Chapter 1 is the thesis chapter most concerned with meeting 
the first thesis aim outlined earlier in this introduction. It seeks to clarify the 
interactionist position, and to develop a core framework that informs the rest 
of the chapters in the thesis. Chapter 1 also considers and counters an 
objection relating to the need for interactionism, and thereby also contributes 
to the second thesis aim.  
Chapter 2 builds on the framework established in Chapter 1 to explore 
some of the metaphysical dimensions of interactionism. In particular, the 
chapter considers whether interactionism is vulnerable to the Causal-
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Constitutive Fallacy (C-C Fallacy) objection that has received significant 
attention in the philosophy of mind. I consider some recent work on character 
that makes extension claims about virtue; that is, that under the right 
circumstances, virtue can extend beyond the agent, such that external factors 
partially constitute the agent’s virtue. I then note how this exposes such 
accounts to the C-C Fallacy objection, before going on to argue that 
interactionism does not need to make extension claims, as they do not offer 
any substantial benefits to a descriptive account of moral psychology. I thus 
conclude that interactionism is better off avoiding extension claims, as they 
are unnecessary, and they leave the interactionist open to the C-C Fallacy 
objection.  
In showing how interactionism can avoid this potentially concerning 
objection, Chapter 2 works towards the second aim of thesis, by both refining 
my interactionist account, and dealing with potential concerns. Chapter 2 will 
also make a contribution to the first aim of the thesis by introducing new ideas 
and elements of interactionist theory, and thereby help to further develop the 
central account.  
Chapter 3 continues this trend of defending interactionism from 
objections, but this time from concerns relating to the empirical evidence that 
has informed interactionism. As noted earlier, psychological evidence has 
been one of the primary drivers of both the situationist challenge to virtue 
ethics, and also of other recent developments in virtue theory, such as the 
emergence of interactionism. The so-called “replication crisis” in psychology 
though, has raised doubts about psychological methodology and a range of 
psychological evidence, including some of the evidence that has informed 
recent philosophical work on character. Chapter 3 explores some of the 
implications of this crisis for philosophical accounts of character. In this 
chapter, I review some of the key issues emerging from the crisis, and survey 
the evidence relating to character and virtue. Drawing on this evidence, I 
argue that interactionism remains the best fit with the empirical evidence, and 
the best option for pursuing future research on character. The chapter 
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concludes with some more general implications of the replication crisis for 
future work on moral psychology.  
Like Chapter 2, Chapter 3 also primarily works towards the second aim of 
the thesis. If the evidence supporting interactionism has been undermined, 
then this is a very serious issue, as it could thus necessitate a drastic overhaul 
of my approach. Chapter 3’s defense of interactionism from this challenge is 
thus crucial for supporting the entire thesis project. Additionally, Chapter 3 
also again introduces some new elements of interactionist theory, and thus 
contributes to the first aim of the thesis as well.  
Having now established the core account of interactionism, and defended 
it from potential objections, Chapter 4 shifts gears to consider 
interactionism’s broader implications, namely for thinking about the 
connections between virtue and well-being. In this chapter, I consider 
perfectionist accounts of well-being, and the application of the situationist 
challenge to perfectionism. I then introduce interactionism, and argue that it 
can defend a suitably revised perfectionism (Interactionist Perfectionism) 
from the situationist challenge. This chapter thus contributes to the third main 
aim of the thesis, as it explores the broader implications of interactionism, 
and shows how it can make a valuable contribution to research on well-being.  
Chapter 5 also explores the implications of interactionism, but this time 
for environmental virtue ethics (EVE). After surveying some of the 
background on EVE, I then consider the threat that situationism poses to EVE, 
drawing particularly on the work of Kasperbauer (2014). I then argue that 
interactionism could potentially save EVE from this challenge, before 
considering Kasperbauer’s argument against such an interactionist move. 
Drawing on some of the relevant empirical work, I then present arguments 
against Kasperbauer’s account, and show that an interactionist EVE is able to 
overcome the situationist challenge. In the final section of the paper I then 
explore some of the connections between interactionism and EVE in greater 
detail, and highlight some of the potential benefits from engagement between 
the two traditions. Chapter 5 also seeks to contribute to the third aim of the 
thesis by showing interactionism’s relevance to environmental ethics, and by 
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illustrating how it can save EVE from the serious threat posed by 
situationism. This paper also helps to further highlight the significance of the 
thesis research, especially given the widespread interest in environmental 
ethics in response to pressing global environmental concerns.  
Finally, the General Conclusion chapter at the end of the thesis will seek 
to reinforce the main findings and arguments of the other chapters, and to tie 
together the central themes and ideas. This chapter will also explore some 
future directions and further implications based on the thesis research, 
including the further development of interactionism’s moral psychology, the 
exploration of additional normative implications of interactionism, and some 
further implications for other topics such as the relationship between narrative 
and virtue, and the connections between the E cognition literature and ethical 
theory. In doing so, I hope to both further illustrate the appeal of 
interactionism, and to highlight the relevance and significance of my thesis 
research for a range of philosophical topics.  
Now that I’ve presented my plan for the thesis, I hope to have highlighted 
both the cohesiveness of the compilation of papers, and the sense of logical 
progression between the papers. The thesis can be seen as proceeding in three 
stages, corresponding to the three main aims I set out earlier. The first stage 
(Chapter 1) lays out the core of the interactionist approach and highlights its 
advantages. The second stage (Chapters 2 and 3) then refines the framework 
and defend it from objections, and the third phase (Chapters 4 and 5) then 
extends the framework to consider implications for other areas of inquiry, and 
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A Way Out of the Character Wars: Interactionism as 
the Best Way Forward 
 
Abstract 
 The recent debate between virtue ethicists and situationists over the nature 
of character has received significant attention, but thus far there has been no 
clear resolution. This paper aims to advance the cause of interactionism as an 
approach to moral character, and as a way forward out of the character-
situation debate. It begins by briefly reviewing the character-situation debate 
to set the scene. After this, I consider interactionism in both psychology and 
philosophy, before synthesising a core set of interactionist claims based on 
this analysis. I will then highlight some of the advantages of interactionism 
as a descriptive moral psychology. Finally, I will consider an objection 
relating to the present state of work on character, and the need for an 
interactionist shift. In doing so, this paper will help to clarify and develop the 
interactionist perspective, and further motivate a shift towards this way of 
approaching research on character and moral psychology. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent work in the philosophy of character and virtue has been centrally 
concerned with the debate between virtue ethicists and situationists. This 
debate, focusing on the nature of character and the importance of situational 
factors, has seen numerous strategies, moves, and accounts deployed, but with 
no clear outcome. In light of this stalemate, some have sought to develop 
alternative approaches to character to move us past the conflict between 
Aristotelians and situationists. The most promising of the alternatives is 
interactionism, an approach to character that recognises the importance of 
both personal and situational factors, but which focuses on the dynamic 
interactions between them.  
25 
 
The paper has two main aims: 1) To bring together and synthesise various 
threads from both philosophy and psychology to present a clear picture of 
philosophical interactionism in a more detailed way than has previously been 
done in the literature; and 2) To illustrate the appeal and advantages of such 
an approach, and defend it against objections and rival accounts. I will begin 
by briefly reviewing the character-situation debate to set the scene. I will then 
turn to consider interactionism in both psychology and philosophy, before 
synthesising a core set of interactionist claims based on this analysis. I will 
then highlight some of the advantages of interactionism as a descriptive moral 
psychology. Finally, I will consider an objection relating to the present state 
of work on character, and the need for an interactionist shift. In doing so this 
paper will help to clarify and develop the interactionist perspective, and 
further motivate a shift towards this way of approaching research on character 
and moral psychology.  
 
1.2 The Character-Situation Debate  
I will begin by reviewing some of the debates and issues in recent work on 
moral character, in particular the situationist challenge and the debates that 
have arisen from it. This will lay out the current landscape to show the need 
for an alternative, interactionist approach to character. Before considering this 
recent philosophical work though, we should start with its primary 
inspiration: the person-situation debate in psychology. This debate, which 
began in the first half of the Twentieth Century, was centred on the issue of 
whether personal or situational factors were more important for 
understanding behaviour. This conflict was primarily driven by situationists 
challenging prevailing ideas about personality and character. This situationist 
assault was motivated by a variety of empirical evidence and studies that 
raised concerns over conventional trait theories of personality. As Krahe 
(1992, p. 20) notes, these conventional theories conceptualised traits as being 
responsible for differences between individuals in their responses and 
behaviour, and also speculated that the possession of trait dispositions would 
result in a reasonable degree of cross-situational consistency. McAdams 
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(2006, p. 139) makes a similar point, when he notes that trait theories make 
the “critical assumption” that “people do indeed show some general 
consistency in their behaviour across situations and over time.” Such 
personality trait approaches thus emphasise the central role that personal 
factors play in driving and explaining behaviour, and also attribute a high 
degree of temporal stability and cross-situational consistency to traits.1 Prior 
to the development of situationism, such views had been highly influential in 
personality psychology.  
In contrast to such person-centred views of personality, situationist 
psychologists presented a very different view of personality and the sources 
of human behaviour.  An important early inspiration for situationist 
approaches was Hartshorne and May’s (1928) extensive investigation into 
honesty and dishonesty amongst a large group of school children (over 
10,000), which challenged ideas about cross-situational consistency. Later 
experiments contributed to the development of the situationist account by 
presenting further challenges to cross-situational consistency and traditional 
views of personality traits. Some examples of such experiments include: 
Milgram’s (1963, 1974) infamous studies on obedience; Darley and Latane’s 
(1968, 1970) research on the “diffusion of responsibility” and the “bystander 
effect;” Isen and Levin’s (1972) studies on helping behaviour; Darley and 
Batson’s (1973) Princeton Theological Seminary study on helping behaviour; 
and the “Stanford Prison Experiment” conducted by Philip Zimbardo and 
colleagues (Zimbardo et al 1973; Haney, Banks & Zimbardo 1973). In 
addition to these experiments, Walter Mischel’s (1968) landmark book 
Personality and Assessment also played a critical role in the development of 
the situationist perspective, by arguing that there was little evidence to 
support notions of cross-situational consistency, as behaviour instead seemed 
to be a lot more situation specific.  
 
1 As the terms suggest, stability refers to a trait producing the same or similar results in 
similar situations over time. In contrast, consistency refers to a trait producing the same or 
similar behavior across varying situations that activate that trait.  
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Research such as this suggested that traditional accounts of personality 
overemphasised the importance of personal factors, while neglecting the 
important role that situational factors play in determining behaviour. The 
most important situationist claim is thus that “behaviour is highly situation 
specific, not cross-situationally consistent” (Krahe 1992, p. 29). Additionally, 
situationists also tended to hold that individual differences within a situation 
have more to do with “measurement error rather than broad internal 
dispositions,” and that “there is little consistency in behaviour” because 
“situational factors are seen as the most powerful determinants of behaviour” 
(Krahe 1992, p. 29). The situationist approach thus directly challenged 
traditional trait- and person-focused views of personality, and suggested the 
need for an overhaul in how we view personality and behaviour.  
Turning now to philosophy, situationists have drawn on this empirical 
evidence from social psychology to challenge traditional ideas about 
character, and in particular, the accounts of character supported by virtue 
ethics. The situationist position was primarily initiated in philosophy by John 
Doris and Gilbert Harman, beginning in the late 1990s. Harman advances a 
particularly strong form of situationism, at points even suggesting that we 
have no reason to suppose that people have character traits at all (1999). He 
does clarify, however, that he means character traits as they are ordinarily 
conceived, so he is taking issue specifically with traditional ideas about traits. 
Despite this clarification though, Harman is more strongly opposed to notions 
of character than other situationists. 
In contrast to Harman, Doris specifically targets what he calls “globalist” 
conceptions of character. Globalist accounts of character posit that traits are 
both consistent and stable, and that these traits form together into an 
integrated association of traits (Doris 2002, p. 23). Doris and other 
situationists argue that globalist conceptions of character are empirically 
inadequate. This is because, if the globalist account was true, we would 
expect to see “pervasive behavioural consistency” (Merritt, Doris and 
Harman 2010, p. 357). Systematic observation from empirical studies fails to 
reveal such consistency, which suggests that the globalist picture is 
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inaccurate. Doris contends that virtue ethics, in particular, Aristotelian virtue 
ethics, entails a globalist account of character, and is thereby subject to this 
challenge of empirical inadequacy. This raises concerns about the underlying 
moral psychology of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Most worryingly, the evidence 
presented by situationists could suggest that becoming virtuous is not a goal 
that can be realised by human agents. 
Unsurprisingly, this challenge to virtue ethics was met with a range of 
spirited replies. One of the most popular strategies for responding to 
situationism is the rarity response, or rarity reply. In simple terms, the rarity 
response holds that situationists have misconstrued the descriptive claims of 
virtue ethics. According to most virtue ethical approaches, virtue is not 
supposed to be common, and is actually meant to be rare. Empirical evidence 
illustrating the rarity of virtue is thus not damaging to virtue ethics, and 
instead actually supports the descriptive aspect of virtue ethical theories. The 
rarity response thus makes a fairly simple compatibility move: the empirical 
evidence used by the situationists to threaten virtue ethics is actually fully 
compatible with it – virtue ethicists can readily accept that very few people 
are virtuous. 
While this approach might at first seem effective at illustrating the 
empirical adequacy of virtue ethics, there are a number of issues that arise 
when deploying this strategy. For example, both Doris (1998, p. 512) and 
Alfano (2013b, p. 244) have argued that the rarity response sacrifices some 
of the explanatory and predictive power that the virtues are supposed to have 
when it comes to human psychology and behaviour. Alfano (2013b, p. 244) 
also notes that this strategy creates issues with moral schizophrenia and 
theoretical mediation for virtue ethicists, an issue that they have often thought 
their theory avoids. Finally, Doris (1998, p. 512) also argues that the rarity 
response creates problems for the practical emphasis of virtue ethics on 
character development and education, as it shifts the focus more to “reflection 




None of these arguments are fatal to virtue ethics, and indeed seem to at 
worst suggest that the rarity response strategy sacrifices some advantages that 
virtue ethics has traditionally enjoyed (or thought itself to enjoy) over its rival 
normative approaches. Despite this though, virtue ethicists may be 
legitimately concerned that if virtue is so fleetingly rare that it is achieved by 
almost no one, then approaches to ethics centred on virtue may lose some of 
their motivational force and practical usefulness. This is particularly 
problematic for a virtue ethicist, given the practical spirit of Aristotelianism. 
Luckily for virtue ethicists, there is some good news on this front, as there is 
empirical evidence that suggest that situationists push their case too far, as 
personal factors are more important than situationists often allow. 
 For example, there has been evidence to support the consistency of 
character from studies that focus on patterns of behaviour rather than 
individual actions. This is sometimes referred to as the “aggregation solution” 
(Alfano 2016, p. 129). Most of the classic situationist experiments are focused 
on one-off actions. There is thus a chance that the behaviour of a subject in 
such an experiment may be “out of character” or unrepresentative of the way 
they generally act. Epstein (1983, p. 368) notes that when data are 
“aggregated over occasions and situations,” we observe much greater 
reliability and consistency in their behaviour. There is also evidence to 
support the fact that while there is a ceiling on the correlation between 
personal factors and particular behaviours, which Mischel (1968) placed at 
.30, there is also a ceiling for the correlation between situational factors and 
personal behaviour, of around .40 (Funder & Ozer 1983). This suggests that 
personal factors and situational factors play a roughly similar role in 
influencing behaviour. There is thus good empirical support that situations 
are not the dominant, primary determinants of behaviour, as personal factors 
also have an important role to play.  
While such evidence does support the importance of character and counter 
an extreme situationist position, it also doesn’t rule out the importance of 
situational factors to character and behaviour. At this juncture two things are 
worth noting. First, there has been no clear resolution to the character-
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situation debate, and the conflict is ongoing. Second, in light of this ongoing 
debate, there is a need for an alternative approach that can offer a new way 
forward for work on character and virtue. In the next section I will bring 
together ideas from both psychology and philosophy to present interactionism 




1.3.1 Interactionism in Psychology2 
As I noted in the previous section, the situationist assault presented a strong 
challenge to traditional personality trait theorists in psychology. This created 
a “crisis of confidence” among personality researchers (Krahe 1992, p. 38). 
While a number of strategies for addressing this challenge were developed, 
the most ambitious and promising of these was the development of 
interactionism. Interactionism is an approach to personality that views the 
behaviour of individuals as “resulting from the reciprocal interaction between 
personal qualities and the features of the situation” (Krahe 1992, p. 37). This 
was not an altogether new approach, as earlier theorists had endorsed 
interactionist views about personality, which can be seen, for example, in 
Lewin’s (1936) famous formula that B= f(P,S) (with B representing 
behaviour, P representing the person, and S representing the situation). The 
growing rivalry between trait theorists and situationists theorists though had 
led to a shift in attention away from interactions, as the two rival approaches 
were seen as presenting “competing, essentially incompatible, explanations 
of behaviour” (Krahe 1992, p. 37).  
In response to this, a number of theorists worked to revive the interactionist 
approach to personality, as a way of moving past the person-situation debate. 
Interactionists challenged the debate between personality theorists and 
 
2 In Chapter 2 I will consider potential issues with the psychological evidence supporting 
interactionism relating to the replication crisis, and illustrate how interactionism can 
overcome these issues.  
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situationists on the basis that the “person vs situation issue was a pseudo 
issue” (Endler 1973, p. 301). This debate was particularly problematic, 
because it placed greater importance on determining whether personality 
factors or situational factors were more important, rather than being 
concerned with “how personality variables and situational factors interact in 
affecting behaviour” (Endler 1973, p. 301). Interactionism quickly developed 
into a “widely accepted platform for empirical research in a variety of 
personality domains” (Krahe 1992, p. 38), to the extent that by 1989, Pervin 
(1989, p. 357) declared that despite differences over specific details, “most 
psychologists now consider themselves interactionists.” The interactionist 
approach in psychology has continued to develop and remains a prominent 
and influential approach to personality (McAdams 2006, pp. 144-152).  
Krahe (1992, pp. 70-71) lays out the core claims of what she calls the 
“modern interactionist” perspective. She notes that there are differences 
among interactionists about the specific details of interactionist theory, but 
argues that the “consensual core” of interactionism involves the following 
four claims: 
1. Actual behaviour is a function of a continuous process of 
multidirectional interaction or feedback between the individual and 
the situations he or she encounters. 
2. The individual is an intentional, active agent in this interaction 
process. 
3. On the person side of the interaction, cognitive and motivational 
factors are essential determinants of behaviour.  
4. On the situation side, the psychological meaning of situations for the 
individual is the most important determining factor (Krahe 1992, pp. 
70-71).3  
 
3 While interactionist approaches in psychology share a commitment to these general 
claims, a distinction is sometimes made between two different branches of interactionism: 
mechanical interactionism and dynamic interactionism. Given my focus on developing the 
interactionist position in philosophy, and that dynamic interactionism is more important for 
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Most of the discussion of interactionism in psychology so far has been quite 
general, in that it has concerned interactionism as a broad theory of 
personality. One might wonder how relevant this makes psychological 
interactionism to my project of further developing interactionism in 
philosophy as an approach to character. Both psychologists and philosophers 
see character and personality as closely related, with character being a subset 
of personality that has normative dimensions. Character and personality are 
also generally conceptualised as both crucially involving traits and 
dispositions. Given this close relationship between personality and character, 
there is good reason to see general psychological theory about personality as 
being relevant to how we view and think about character.  
Additionally, psychological theory does explicitly address character in 
interactionist terms. For example, Hill and Lapsley (2009, p. 245) argue that 
in the case of moral personality, a “stable behavioural signature emerges at 
the intersection of person by context interactions.” There is also a range of 
empirical evidence that explicitly gives support to an interactionist view of 
character. The study conducted by Romer, Gruder and Lizzadro (1986), for 
example, shows support for an interactionist view of prosocial behaviour, by 
illustrating how personal features (prosocial goals) and situational factors 
interact to produce helping behaviour. There is also a variety of empirical 
support for the interactionist nature of bravery and heroism (see, e.g., Walker, 
Frimer & Dunlop 2010; Jayawickreme & Di Stefano 2012).  
In emphasising the centrality of continuous reciprocal exchanges between 
agent and environment, interactionism challenges any kind of hard separation 
or dichotomy between person and situation. As Magnusson (1999, p. 219) 
writes: “the individual is an active, purposeful part of an integrated, complex, 
dynamic, and adaptive person-environment system.” Reynolds et al. (2010, 
p. 461) make a similar point when they note that “the person and the situation 
are an irreducible ‘whole’ that must be studied as the one continuously 
interdependent unit.” This interdependence of person and situation is even 
 
the theoretical framework of interactionism in psychology (Krahe 1992, p. 79), I will focus 
more on dynamic approaches to interactionism. 
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discussed by Walter Mischel, who was one of the initial drivers of the 
situationist position in psychology, but whose work (in particular his 
“cognitive-affective personality system,” or CAPS, account developed with 
various colleagues) has since moved in a more interactionist direction 
(Mischel 2009; Reynolds et al. 2010; McAdams 2006). Mischel (2009, p. 
289) has written that with recent developments in psychology and other 
sciences, the best options for pursuing personality and social psychology are 
those that “bridge the classic partitioning most unnatural and destructive to 
the building of a cumulative science of the individual – the one that splits the 
person apart from the situation, treating each as an independent cause of 
behaviour.” Interactionism thus stresses that we don’t consider the person as 
an isolated, atomic individual separate from the situation, and that we also 
don’t view situations as discrete entities that overwhelm personal factors to 
drive behaviour. Instead, person and situation are constantly exchanging and 
transacting with one another, and these ongoing reciprocal interactions are a 
vital part of character and moral behaviour.  
In the previous section I introduced the concepts of consistency and 
stability in relation to personality and character. For interactionism, a third 
concept is also important: coherence. Coherence is a different way of 
conceptualising consistency, which incorporates the psychological meaning 
and interpretation of the individual (Krahe 1992, p. 15). Both the nominal or 
objective features of the situation, and the psychological features of the 
situation – that is, how the situation affects the person and how it is perceived 
by them – are important to this account of consistency (Mehl et.al 2015, p. 
632). Coherence allows for “both stability and change of behaviour so long 
as they follow a systematic and hence individually predictable pattern” 
(Krahe 1992, p. 16). Someone’s personality and character can thus be said to 
be coherent if their patterns of behaviour “may be seen to be orderly and 
intelligible, with respect to the sort of person they are hypothesised to be” 
(Mehl et al. 2015, p. 632). Interactionism’s emphasis on coherence thus 
differs from the situationist view of consistency, which is only concerned with 
objective situations (Krahe 1992, p. 213). Further to this, when we use 
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coherence as our model for consistency, we can observe greater individual 
consistency in character and action than if we only incorporate the objective 
features of situations (see, e.g., Krahe 1992; Snow 2010).  
 
1.3.2 Interactionism in Philosophy 
As was noted earlier, the move towards greater empirical engagement in 
philosophical moral psychology in recent years has led to new debates, as 
traditional approaches to character and virtue have been questioned and 
challenged in light of empirical evidence. In response to this evidence and the 
recent debates, a number of philosophers have attempted to develop new 
approaches to character that draw on psychological evidence to address some 
of the empirically-motivated concerns relating to established approaches and 
traditions in philosophy. Inspired by the advantages and success of 
interactionism in psychology, some philosophers have recently begun to 
develop interactionist approaches to character, and this represents a promising 
new research agenda.  
I want to note at the outset that not all of the work discussed in this section 
specifically labels itself as ‘interactionist.’ To date, there has been very little 
work in philosophical moral psychology that has described itself as 
interactionist, with the exception of a couple of the authors discussed below. 
Nevertheless, the work of a number of recent authors writing about character 
has been pushing in what is essentially an interactionist direction, in that they 
assign important roles to both personal and situational factors, rather than 
strongly emphasising one side over the other (as both traditional virtue ethics 
and situationism do). Additionally, there is work in a number of areas and 
traditions outside of modern research on moral character that is also largely 
in sympathy with an interactionist approach, and I will sketch out some of 
these connections in this section. My intent will thus be to identify a number 
of different threads and trends in philosophical theory that can contribute to 
the development of a general interactionist conception of character, which I 
will pursue in the next section by combining ideas from psychology and 
philosophy.    
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The greatest driver of interactionism in philosophy has been Mark Alfano. 
He argues that “character should be recast in interactionist terms, as partly 
due to features of the agent, partly due to features of the situation, and partly 
due to the interaction between them” (Alfano 2016, pp. 130-131). Alfano also 
discusses particular kinds of interactive processes, such as the phenomenon 
he refers to as “factitious virtue.” Factitious virtue involves the simulation of 
a virtue through “self-fulfilling prophecies,” in which the public attributions 
of a particular trait to an agent can actually contribute to the agent’s 
possession of that trait (Alfano 2013a, pp. 82-83). Put simply, if I think of 
myself as honest, and other people also describe me as honest and convey 
expectations about my honesty, this can play a role in making me an honest 
person. Factors beyond the individual, specifically the other people they are 
interacting with, thus become crucially involved in the agent’s character 
through these ongoing social transactions. As a result, if these social supports 
were removed, I would no longer have that trait, or at least not possess it in 
the same way, making such interactions a critical part of my character. 
As a result of the importance of these kinds of interactive processes, 
Alfano (2014, p. 73) has gone on to argue that we need to reconsider the 
metaphysics of virtue, in particular the question of “what are the bearers of 
virtues?”4 Alfano (2014, p. 73) argues for an “embodied, embedded, and 
extended answer to this question,” which challenges the traditional view that 
a “virtue is a monadic property of an individual agent.” Instead, and as a result 
of the empirical evidence illustrating the importance of external factors to 
character, we should recast virtue as involving a “triadic relation among a 
person, a social milieu, and an asocial environment” (Alfano 2014, p. 82). 
Under this relational model, the agent’s moral agency and character are 
posited to extend beyond the individual to include external factors (Alfano 
2014, p. 84). One of the most critical features of this account is that it makes 
character and virtue multiply realisable: the division of labour between the 
three sets of factors (personal, social, and asocial environmental) can vary 
 




from person to person. For example, one individual’s courage could be 
primarily due to traditional personal factors, such as “habituation and 
reflection on reasons,” while another person’s courage may have more to do 
with external factors, such as “noticing others’ signalling of expectations” 
(Alfano 2014, p. 84). The result is that bodily, social and environmental 
factors can offer additional support and reinforcement to character, but can 
also, conversely, undermine and challenge character in new and surprising 
ways (Alfano 2014, p. 84). This fundamentally relational and interactionist 
view of virtue presents a very different model of character and virtue than the 
individual-focused models of traditional virtue ethics.  
Alfano has refined these ideas about the metaphysics of character and 
virtue in a recent paper with Skorburg (2016). In this paper, the authors 
provide a distinction between different ways in which character can crucially 
involve interaction with external factors. In cases in which character is 
strongly causally dependent on external factors such as social influences, then 
it can be said to be embedded. Embedded character is further defined as being 
largely asymmetrical and unidirectional, such as when the agent receives a 
large amount of input from the environment, but is not able to change or 
influence the environment themselves (Alfano & Skorburg 2016). Extended 
character goes further than this: rather than being merely causally dependent 
on external factors, extended character is partially constituted by these 
external factors. Cases of extension involve tightly coupled, reciprocal 
feedback loops between the agent and their environment, and these 
interactions are more symmetrical and multidirectional than in embedded 
character. When these conditions are met, Alfano and Skorburg (2016) argue 
that we are justified in describing character as being partially constituted by 
external factors, and thus as being extended.5 
Skorburg (2017) also endorses an interactionist view of character. He 
discusses the conflict between personality trait theorists and situationists as 
creating a problematic dichotomy, and endorses the resolution of this debate 
 




through a move to interactionism (Skorburg 2017, p. 463). Echoing his work 
with Alfano, Skorburg (2017, p. 463) emphasises the importance of “ongoing 
feedback loops” and how they make person and situation interdependent. He 
also discusses how psychological evidence reveals the ways in which people 
actively choose and shape the situations they encounter, and argues that such 
engagements play a central role in personality and character dispositions 
(Skorburg 2017, p. 462). These kinds of multidirectional interactions 
challenge “strict distinctions between agents and environments,” and 
highlight the importance of taking an interactionist approach to character 
(Skorburg 2017, p. 462).  
Howell’s (2016) account of extended virtue is also part of this growing 
move towards interactionism in philosophy. Howell (2016, p. 147) argues 
against what he calls “skindividualism,” which is the view that “the person 
does not extend beyond her or his skin,” and that an agent’s virtue or character 
trait “must involve a disposition that is wholly grounded by features inside 
the person’s skin.” Howell (2016, p. 148) recommends that we reject this 
view of virtue, and instead adopt an extended account of virtue, in which “our 
virtues are undergirded by systems beyond our skin.” He further argues that 
such a view presents a powerful way of countering situationism, as 
situationist evidence highlights the importance of environmental factors, 
which can be readily accepted by an extended account of virtue (Howell 2016, 
pp. 154-157). While Howell describes his account as extended virtue, its 
emphasis on the interdependence of personal and situational factors means 
that it is largely in sympathy with an interactionist approach.6 
Another important source of inspiration for the shift towards 
interactionism in work on character are extended, embodied, embedded and 
enactivist approaches in the philosophy of mind (often referred to as “4E 
 
6 For further examples of accounts of character that are not explicitly interactionist, but 
which share some points of sympathy, see Merritt’s (2000) Humean account of virtue, and 
Slingerland’s (2011) Confucian model of character.  
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Cognition”).7 These approaches have received enormous attention in the 
literature over the last several decades, and they continue to develop and 
grow. While the label of “4E” groups together a large range of different 
accounts, not all of which are compatible with each other, they nevertheless 
share a commitment to opposing accounts of mind that are strongly 
cognitivist (Menary 2010, p. 459). Furthermore, as the various “e” labels 
suggest, these approaches emphasise the importance to cognition of an 
agent’s body, and the interaction between an agent and their natural and social 
environment. Such accounts thus share a degree of overlap with interactionist 
approaches to character, as is noted by Skorburg (2017).  
The philosophical work discussed in this section highlights a growing 
trend in philosophy towards approaches to character that eschew the 
dichotomy between individualist virtue ethics and situationism. These 
accounts recognise the important role that situational factors play in 
influencing moral agents, but they also do not take an eliminativist or strongly 
reductionist view about the role of character traits and personal factors in 
moral behaviour. Both personal and situational factors are important by the 
lights of these accounts, but what is also crucial is that we draw attention to 
the ways in which person and situation interact and influence each other in 
ongoing reciprocal exchanges. This kind of interactionist approach, while 
new in philosophy, represents a promising new research agenda for 
philosophical work on moral character.   
 
1.3.3 Core Principles of Interactionism  
The previous two sub-sections have considered some central ideas about 
interactionism from both psychological and philosophical theory. In this sub-
section I will attempt to combine these two strands and distil the central 
 
7 For some examples of these approaches in the philosophy of mind, see, e.g., Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch (1991); Clark & Chalmers (1998); Lakoff & Johnson (1999); 
Gallagher (2006); Thompson (2007); Chemero (2009); Clark (2008); Wheeler (2005); 
Rowlands (2010); Hutto & Myin (2013; 2017); Menary (2007); Noe (2009); and Stewart, 
Gapenne and Di Paolo (2010).  
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themes and ideas that emerge. Given that interactionism in philosophy has 
taken inspiration from psychological interactionism, it is unsurprising that 
there is a large degree of overlap between the two. From this, we can draw 
five critical claims that form the core of a framework for interactionist moral 
character. The five central claims are: 
1. Interactionism recognises the importance of situational inputs, but 
doesn’t endorse situationism or eliminativism about character. 
2. Personal factors are also important, but need to be considered 
alongside situational factors and the interactions between the two.  
3. Moral character crucially depends on interactions between person 
and situation.  
4. Interactionism challenges any kind of hard separation or split 
between person and situation – person and situation are 
interdependent.   
5. Character and virtue are multiply realisable.   
Interactionism recognises the importance of situational inputs, but doesn’t 
endorse situationism or eliminativism about character  
As I noted earlier, there is compelling empirical evidence attesting to the 
power of situations.  There are powerful social influences, such as bystander 
effects that diffuse our sense of responsibility (Darley & Latane 1968; Latane 
& Darley 1970), and also social pressures to conform to expectations, as can 
be seen in Milgram’s work on obedience and in the Stanford Prison 
experiment (Zimbardo et al. 1973; Haney, Banks & Zimbardo 1973). As 
Alfano (2014, p. 78-79) notes, there is also strong evidence for the influence 
that asocial environmental influences can have on behaviour, such as the 
impact of lighting levels on honesty (Zhong, Bohns & Gino 2010), or the 
influence of ambient sound levels on helping behaviour and aggressiveness 
(Donnerstein & Wilson 1976).  
While this evidence shows the importance of situational factors, it doesn’t 
show that they are the only determinants of behaviour, or that personal 
attributes play no role. There are limits to the power of situations, and the 
precise impact of a situation is also dependent upon the specific individual 
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interacting with that situation. We thus shouldn’t take evidence of the power 
of situations as requiring us to take a strongly situationist view that reduces 
or even eliminates the role of personal factors and character. Instead, we 
should acknowledge that while it is important to recognise the importance of 
situational forces, it must always be with an eye to their involvement in 
interactions with personal factors in the production of behaviour.  
 
Personal factors are also important but need to be considered alongside 
situational factors and the interactions between the two.   
While situational factors are undeniably important, interactionism also 
recognises the importance of the features of the individual agent. To begin 
with, there is good evidence to support the role of personal factors in 
behaviour. For example, studies focused on patterns of behaviour over time 
find greater consistency in character compared to one-shot studies focused on 
a particular action or scenario (Epstein 1983). Psychologists have also noted 
the parity of traits and situations: while personal features do not entirely 
explain behaviour, situational factors don’t either. The correlation between 
personal factors and a particular behavioural outcome seems to be roughly on 
par with the correlation between situational factors and behavioural outcomes 
(Funder & Ozer 1983).   
The importance of individual factors can also be seen in the focus in the 
psychological literature on the meaning of a situation to the individual and 
how they have interpreted it. This makes understanding the unique features 
of the individual important to understanding their behaviour and how they 
engage with the situation, as we can’t just look at the objective features of the 
situation itself. The ways in which individuals select, manage, and shape the 
situations they encounter also illustrates their active role in driving behaviour. 
As was the case with the claim about situational factors, it is also important 
to note that support for personal factors doesn’t warrant an extreme view 
focused on individuals separated from situations and environments. 
Interactionism recognises the role of personal factors, but emphasises that 
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they are bound up with and in constant exchange with situational forces in 
ongoing interactions.  
 
Moral character crucially depends on interactions between person and 
situation 
The third core claim is that person-situation interactions play a crucial role in 
determining behaviour. While it is important to consider both personal 
attributes and situational features, the interaction between the two represents 
a third, vital part of the equation for understanding moral character. Crucially, 
a robustly interactionist account of character like the one I am putting forward 
posits that agent-environment interactions play the central role in character. 
As Endler (1983, p. 160) notes: “behaviour is a function of a continuous 
multidirectional process of person-by-situation interactions.” Interactionism 
thus doesn’t just involve recognising the importance of personal and 
situational factors, but also makes the interaction between the two its focus. 
This last point is important, as we want to avoid a hollow variety of 
interactionism that incorporates personal and situational factors without 
giving proper recognition to the ways in which they reciprocally influence 
and shape each other in ongoing processes. As Endler and Parker (1992, p. 
178) note, many psychological researchers pay “lip-service” to interactionism 
by endorsing it as an approach to personality. In practice though, many 
researchers are only taking a “pseudo-interactional” approach that doesn’t 
give proper attention to the dynamic interplay of personal and situational 
factors, and instead either remain one-sided in their approach, or treat person 
and situation as largely separate (Endler & Parker 1992, pp. 185-186). 
Similarly, philosophers on both sides of the debate between virtue ethicists 
and situationism have made concessions to the importance of the opposing 
side. Despite this, there is little work being done that is robustly interactionist, 
as most work still treats person and situation as static and separate, rather than 
as dynamically and interdependently connected. Advancing the cause of 
robust interactionism as a unique and promising approach to character is the 




Interactionism challenges any kind of hard separation or split between person 
and situation – person and situation are interdependent   
Both psychologists and philosophers argue that the interactionist approach 
challenges any kind of hard separation or split between the person and the 
situation. Rather than conceptualising person and situation as separate, 
discrete units, interactionism posits that they are fundamentally enmeshed. 
Throughout this paper I have noted the emphasis interactionism places on 
multidirectional, reciprocal connections between person and situation. People 
enter into or choose situations, these situations have an impact on them, 
people are then able to influence the situation, and so on (Endler 1983, p. 
160). This kind of close interdependence makes it difficult to pull agent and 
environment apart, and highlights the importance of not only considering both 
personal and situational variables, but also how they are constantly 
influencing and affecting each other.  
 
Character and virtue are multiply realisable 
The enormous variety of possible agent-environment interactions means that 
the levels of input from various factors (personal, social, environmental) can 
vary between cases. As such, character traits can be realised in different ways. 
For example, Krahe (1992, pp. 120-122) discusses how empirical work on 
prosocial behaviour shows varied patterns of personal and environmental 
input underlying helping behaviour. Varying types of moral personality can 
have a disposition or tendency to help, with some being more dependent on 
situational support (such as social incentives or compensation), and other 
people requiring less situational support (Krahe 1992, p. 122). Similarly, 
Walker, Frimer and Dunlop (2010, p. 907) note that exemplary moral 
behaviour such as bravery and long-term caring relationships can arise from 
different kinds of character, “reflecting divergent person x situation 
interactions,” again with some people showing strong individual features, 
while other agents are more dependent on external factors. This illustrates 
some ways in which character traits like kindness and bravery can be realised 
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in different ways, with varying amounts of environmental input. This is claim 
is also advanced in philosophy by Alfano (2014, p. 84), who argues that if we 
reconceive virtue as involving dispositions that extend beyond the individual 
to include external components (both social and asocial environmental 
influences), then virtue can be instantiated in a multitude of different ways 
(Alfano 2014, p. 84).  
 
1.4 Advantages of Interactionism  
The situationist challenge has resulted in greater expectations regarding 
accounts of character and virtue. We no longer simply want such accounts to 
be normatively attractive, we also want them to be descriptively compelling 
and compatible with the best available empirical evidence. Historically, most 
major ethical traditions have aimed for some degree of descriptive adequacy, 
but rarely with significant empirical engagement. This was, of course, largely 
due to the dearth of relevant evidence prior to the second half of the Twentieth 
Century. In more recent times though, there has been an explosion of 
psychological, neuroscientific, and other empirical evidence relevant to ethics 
and moral psychology. This evidence has raised new challenges and concerns, 
highlighted gaps in existing philosophical accounts of moral psychology, and 
created possibilities for new developments and avenues of research. The 
situationist challenge represents an excellent example of this.  
In light of these developments, philosophers became more concerned with 
empirical engagement; with ensuring that the descriptive claims that figure in 
their ethical theories are compatible with the best available empirical 
evidence about human psychology. An early and influential formulation of 
this commitment was Flanagan’s (1991, p. 32) Principle of Minimal 
Psychological Realism, which states that: “make sure when constructing a 
moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision 
processing, and behaviour described are possible, or are perceived to be 
possible, for creatures like us.” Now, in the wake of the character-situation 
debate, philosophers on both sides accept the importance of empirical 
adequacy and psychological realism. Snow (2010, p. 2) for example, argues 
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that the fact that virtue ethics was “largely divorced from empirical 
psychology” in the past is what left it open to the situationist challenge, and 
that virtue ethicists need to address this by becoming more empirically 
engaged. 
What we thus now want from an account of character is for it to be both 
normatively appealing and descriptively accurate. Alfano (2013a, pp. 4-6) 
describes this methodological outlook nicely when he endorses an approach 
to ethics that attempts to “systematically explain[s] as much as possible of 
two bodies of evidence: the relevant scientific data and theories, and 
philosophical intuitions and theories about moral conduct.” It is my 
contention that interactionism can satisfy these requirements.  
My focus in this paper is on supporting interactionism as a compelling and 
empirically adequate descriptive moral psychology of character. Before 
moving on to present evidence in support of this goal, I first want to quickly 
touch on interactionism’s normative dimensions. Given its differences from 
conventional accounts of character, a shift towards interactionism will 
undoubtedly raise normative questions, about, for example, whether traits 
supported by external factors should properly count as moral virtues; or about 
the implications of interactionism for moral responsibility.8 More pointedly, 
one might object that interactionism’s account of character has shifted too far 
from our predominant moral frameworks, such that we might not want to 
count it as a theory of character at all. As I have already noted though, 
interactionism preserves a crucial role for personal factors and traits, and in 
doing so does justice to the strong and widespread moral intuitions that we 
have about the importance of character and virtue. Moreover, if I am right in 
suggesting that interactionism provides the best (or at least a very 
competitive) descriptive account of character, then the many normative 
questions and implications it raises can be seen, not as objections or worries, 
but as avenues for pursuing the development of a normative accompaniment 
to interactionism’s descriptive moral psychology. I thus see no reason why 
 
8 In Chapters 4 and 5 I will consider further implications of interactionism, namely for well-
being and environmental ethics respectively.  
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interactionism couldn’t meet Alfano’s requirement that an account of 
character fits with our philosophical theories about morality.  
Let’s now turn to the reasons supporting interactionism’s appeal as a 
descriptive moral psychology of character. To begin with, we can note that a 
move towards interactionism in philosophy would be a logical next step that 
mirrors the progression of research on personality and character in 
psychology. As I discussed earlier, the development of theories of personality 
and moral behaviour in psychology has seen a progression that began with a 
strongly person- and traits-focused view, which was then challenged by the 
situationist perspective, before an irenic conclusion in favour of 
interactionism was reached, which is now the dominant framework for 
understanding personality and character in psychology. Given that the 
situationist challenge and the character-situation debate have been inspired 
by psychological theory and empirical work, it seems logical to follow 
psychology’s lead and also resolve the debate via a shift towards 
interactionism. In shifting towards interactionism, we will be getting 
philosophical theories about character and virtue synced up with the dominant 
view in psychology, which will enhance their descriptive accuracy and 
empirical adequacy.  
In addition, there is good reason to think that interactionism has greater 
explanatory power than its rivals, which would give it a compelling edge as a 
descriptive moral psychology of character. The primary reason for this is that 
interactionism does justice to the full range of psychological evidence in a 
way that its rivals don’t. It acknowledges the importance of personal factors, 
which is supported by the evidence for the greater consistency we see in 
character when aggregating across situations (Epstein 1983) and when we 
base consistency on the psychological features of the situation rather than the 
objective features (Krahe 1992; Mehl et al. 2015). While virtue ethicists 
happily acknowledge such evidence as supporting their frameworks, this 
evidence for the importance of personal factors is absent from or downplayed 
by situationist accounts, and thus represents a flaw in their framework; a flaw 
not present in interactionism.  
46 
 
We can make a similar move in the opposite direction. Interactionism also 
recognises the influence of situational variables. This includes both the kinds 
of social situational factors seen in ‘classic’ situationist experiments and the 
more recent DIAMONDS model (Rauthmann et al. 2014), and also the kinds 
of asocial environmental influences mentioned previously in Section 1.3. The 
importance of these variables is something interactionists and situationists 
can agree on, but is not properly recognised by conventional virtue ethical 
accounts of character. While situationists may have overstated their case at 
points, there is still significant evidence for a range of efficacious situational 
phenomena, so for virtue ethicists to downplay or ignore this evidence creates 
issues for their descriptive account. In this instance then, interactionism fares 
better than traditional virtue ethics.   
Lastly, interactionism performs far better than both of its two main rivals 
when it comes to highlighting the importance of interactions. In treating the 
issue as a debate between two sets of factors (the personal and the situational) 
and in focusing on one at the expense of the other, both virtue ethics and 
situationism fail to recognise the interdependence of person and situation, and 
the dynamic interplay between them. Alfano (2013a, p. 77) argues that 
because, taken on their own, neither personal or situational factors provide a 
full explanation of behaviour, then “what neither explains independently must 
be attributed to their interaction, to a third factor, or to randomness.” 
Considering interactions is thus doubly useful: it can help to fill in the gaps 
in our explanatory picture that aren’t covered by either personal or situational 
factors; and it can help to explain the surprising ways in which personal and 
situational factors can reciprocally shape and influence each other. In not 
giving proper consideration to interactions, virtue ethical and situationist 
theories are thus missing a crucial part of the story of how character and moral 
behaviour work.  
Additionally, interactionism also gains further explanatory power from its 
claim that character traits are multiply realisable. This is because 
interactionism is able to account for an enormous range of cases, including 
cases that virtue ethical accounts struggle with, and cases that situationist 
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have trouble explaining. For example, it can account for the people in social 
psychology experiments who seemingly succumb to situational pressures, as 
these agents may rely heavily on external input for their character. When such 
support is removed, the agent’s character trait is crippled, which explains poor 
behaviour and a lack of consistency. Virtue ethical accounts have a much 
harder time explaining these cases, especially if the external influences are 
asocial in nature.  In positing that character traits can crucially involve both 
social and environmental supports, interactionism provides a much more 
compelling explanatory story. Similarly, interactionism can also explain the 
character of moral exemplars who remain virtuous despite a lack of external 
support and enormous situational pressures. Situationists allow for the 
existence of such characters, but also fail to give an adequate explanation for 
such examples. Due to its multiple realisability claim, interactionism does not 
have this issue, as such exemplars fit within its framework. This provides 
further support for interactionism’s greater explanatory power than its virtue 
ethical and situationist rivals.  
In sum then, we can see that interactionism has much promise for 
providing the kind of psychologically realistic framework that philosophers 
now desire in a theory of character. It presents a logical resolution to the 
character-situation debate in philosophy that mirrors the interactionist 
resolution of the person-situation debate in psychology. Adopting 
interactionism would thereby get philosophy synced up with the dominant 
approach to character and personality in psychology. Interactionism does 
justice to the widest range of empirical evidence and possesses great 
explanatory power. Interactionism thus seems to be the best option for 
pursuing philosophical work on the moral psychology of character and virtue.  
 
1.5 Isn’t Everyone an Interactionist?   
I now want to consider an objection to my approach in this paper. The worry 
goes something like this: interactionism is indeed an appealing approach to 
character, so appealing that it has now been recognised as the best available 
option. As Mehl et al. (2015, p. 632) put it: “everyone’s an interactionist.” 
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And if everyone is already an interactionist, then there is no real need for 
papers like this that aim to clarify and further develop the interactionist 
position and show its advantages over its rivals, because everyone has already 
accepted it as the canonical solution to the debate. In short: why I am urging 
a bigger shift towards interactionism if everyone is already an interactionist?  
I think this picture of the current state of affairs does not apply to 
philosophy for two reasons. The first of these is the lack of interactionist 
research in philosophy. As I noted earlier in the paper, there has been limited 
work on interactionism in philosophy, apart from the notable exceptions 
discussed in Section 1.3. While interest in interactionism is growing, it is still 
far from developing into a widespread research paradigm, despite its 
empirical backing and appeal as an account of character. If everyone was an 
interactionist, and it was an obvious and widely accepted solution to the 
character-situation debate, then we would surely see intense and voluminous 
research on the subject. This is not the case.  
The second reason is that not only has there not been a widespread shift to 
a new interactionist paradigm, but philosophers also continue to work on 
character within the character vs. situation paradigm. Philosophers continue 
to support both traditional virtue ethics, and strong forms of situationism, 
without considering interactionism as a viable alternative to these approaches. 
Some of this work does have sympathies with interactionism, but doesn’t 
consider the possibilities for developing a fully fleshed-out interactionism. 
Some examples will help to illustrate this. In a recent paper, Vargy (2018) 
argues in support of what he calls “embodied situationism (ES).” Like other 
situationists, Vargy opposes the view that most people have global character 
traits, and instead places an emphasis on situational influences. In particular, 
Vargy (2018. Pp. 272-275) is concerned with the ways in which seemingly 
irrelevant situational influences, such as room temperature, ambient light 
level, and tactile experiences; can induce “bodily experiential states that 
influence morally relevant reasoning and behaviour.” Vargy takes it as key 
point of difference between his ES account and conventional situationism that 
his account draws on embodied cognition and neuroscience, in addition to 
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social psychology. It is worth noting though that while Vargy introduces some 
new ideas relating to embodiment into situationism, his incorporation of non-
relevant asocial situational influences into his framework is also present in 
prior work in the area, particularly that of Alfano (2013a). Nevertheless, 
Vargy (2018, pp. 278-279) thinks that his ES account provides a compelling 
brand of situationism that presents a strong challenge to conventional models 
of character, especially since they struggle to explain the ability of irrelevant 
environmental influences to bypass our moral reasoning.  
While I am in agreement with Vargy that irrelevant asocial influences can 
play an important role in behaviour, there are some issues with his approach. 
The first is the lack of consideration of the evidence supporting the role of 
personal determinants in behaviour. As previously discussed, situationists 
have had a tendency to overstate their case, and to downplay the role of 
personal factors, and Vargy’s account is no exception. He does note that there 
are possibilities for improving our characters by resisting and exploiting 
situational influences, and to develop local character traits. Yet he doesn’t 
consider the greater consistency observed in personal dispositions through 
aggregation and focusing on the psychological features of the situation. Given 
that Vargy (2018, p. 283) also acknowledges that our actions are not entirely 
explained by situational influences, it seems problematic to downplay and 
ignore the role of personal influences, given the evidence that they also have 
an important part to play.  
This brings us to the second, and even more problematic issue, which is 
the absence of interactions from Vargy’s framework. If situational factors 
don’t explain all behaviour, and personal influences also have limitations (as 
Vargy also argues), then the interactions between the two represent an 
important part of the explanatory picture that is missing from Vargy’s 
account. Despite some new elements and innovations then, Vargy’s account 
is still getting us bogged down in the old quagmire of persons vs. situations, 
instead of focusing on dynamic person x situation exchanges. This is thus a 
clear example of recent philosophical work on character that is not 
interactionist in nature, and illustrates the need for further work on 
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interactionism and its relationship to rival approaches like Vargy’s ES 
account.  
On the other side of the debate, there has also been recent support for virtue 
ethics. In a recent paper, West (2018) attempts to use the CAPS theory of 
personality to defend the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics. On the CAPS 
model, traits are treated as clusters of cognitive-affective units, which include 
things like feelings, expectations, values, goals, beliefs and desires. These can 
then be activated in response to internal or external stimuli (West 2018, p. 
86). Crucially, the CAPS view of traits also focuses on the psychological 
meaning of situations rather than the purely objective features. As a result, 
West argues that CAPS can help to defend virtue ethics, as it shows that 
character is more consistent (understood in terms of coherence) than 
situationists allow. Furthermore, West (2018, p. 88) also points to the work 
of other advocates of the CAPS approach, such as Snow, as illustrating ways 
in which the CAPS framework can help to guide us to turn local traits into 
more global ones. In short, West (2018, p. 89) argues that CAPS can help to 
defend virtue ethics because there is good evidence for CAPS traits, and that 
these traits can be seen as the “raw materials of virtue.” As such, even if virtue 
is relatively rare, if CAPS traits are widespread, and can be developed into 
virtues, then there is still much hope for a traditional virtue ethical approach 
to character and moral development.  
Just as was the case with Vargy, I have points of sympathy and overlap 
with West’s account, in particular its emphasis on the psychological features 
of situations and considering consistency in terms of coherence. Further to 
this, West (2018, p. 94) acknowledges the interactionist nature of the CAPS 
model, and explicitly endorses an “interactionist picture of human agency.” 
What then are the significant differences between West and the interactionist 
account I am developing? A key part of the issue is that West doesn’t go far 
enough in an interactionist direction. His account features very little 
discussion of the importance of interactions; in fact, he only brings 
interactionism into his discussion to defend against the objection that CAPS 
traits don’t explain enough behaviour. His point is that critics sometimes seem 
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to suggest that virtue ethicists need traits to explain most or all behaviour. 
Against this, he argues that all virtue ethics needs is for traits to “figure 
significantly in the explanation of action,” and that, past this, virtue ethicists 
can accept that situational factors and the interaction between the two can also 
play a role (West 2018, p. 94, emphasis in original). The issue with this 
though, is that the view of traits that West is espousing is a more traditional 
one that is troubled by the empirical evidence.  
The key issue in regard to the model of traits here is the issue of ‘reasons-
responsiveness’ or ‘sensitivity to reasons.’ Alfano (2013a, pp. 78-79) has 
argued that the CAPS view of traits is unsuitable to defend virtue ethics 
because of this issue. As a result of the focus of the CAPS model on the 
psychological features of a situation, CAPS traits are “individuated 
internally,” such that someone could be counted as having a particular trait, 
such as compassion, on the CAPS model if they reliably act in compassionate 
ways in situations in which they have interpreted the situation as calling for a 
compassionate response (Alfano 2013a, pp. 78-79). In contrast to this, to have 
the virtue of compassion would require one to be reliably disposed to act 
compassionately in any situation that calls for a compassionate response, 
rather than just situations the agent has construed as requiring compassion. 
The virtue thus requires the agent to respond or be sensitive to the right reason 
in a situation; in short, that they respond to the nominal or objective features 
of the situation, rather than the merely psychological ones (Alfano 2013a, pp. 
78-79). This is the key point of separation between an interactionist approach 
to traits, like the CAPS model, and the more traditional globalist account 
featured in virtue ethics.  
This is significant, because much of the sting of the situationist attack 
relates to this issue. Given the evidence for the influence of irrelevant asocial 
situational influences, the virtue ethicist’s reason-responsive trait model is 
troubled, because these influences are “non-reasons” that don’t give the agent 
any actual reason for action, but are nevertheless surprisingly influential 
(Alfano 2013a, pp. 43-44). West is aware of this issue, and attempts to counter 
it by arguing that even if non-reasons don’t supply a specific reason for action, 
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they don’t “bypass practical reasoning altogether.” This is because non-
reasons can affect what we focus or don’t focus on. West (2018, p. 101) 
argues that our “patterns of attention and construal” relate to our values and 
beliefs, and reflect our character.  
To suggest that something like the impact of the ambient lighting level on 
my actions reflects my values and character seems a bit of a stretch, and it 
doesn’t receive enough support from West.  We can highlight this by looking 
at the example of priming effects. In many cases of priming, the priming 
stimuli (such as a particular temperature or tactile effect) are present in an 
initial situation, but their impact on the agent’s actions (during the 
experimental measurement) takes places in a second, later situation, in which 
the stimuli are no longer present. As such, there isn’t even a possibility of 
responding to the stimuli as relevant reasons, as they are not even present at 
the point of reasoning and action (Vargy 2018, p. 277). It thus seems highly 
doubtful that such influences could be considered situational features that 
provide reasons for action, and West’s attempt to defend a globalist, reasons-
responsive view of traits is still troubled by situational non-reasons. West’s 
attempt to combine the CAPS framework with a traditional virtue ethical view 
of traits is thus not able to overcome this crucial gap between the two when it 
comes to the issue of reasons-responsiveness.9 
Ultimately then, despite some positive steps towards interactionism, West 
doesn’t go far enough. He continues to rely on a globalist model of traits and 
virtues that isn’t fully compatible with the CAPS framework he wants to 
adopt, and he unsuccessfully attempts to force the combination in regard to 
sensitivity to reasons and the influence of non-reasons. Additionally, West 
also doesn’t discuss interactions specifically in any detail, or assign them a 
robust role to play in his model of traits and character. Given both the 
 
9 West (2018, p. 101) does note that we can potentially become aware of non-reasons and 
the specific impacts they have on us, and thereby perhaps work to counteract or avoid those 
impacts. While I agree with him on this point, he doesn’t say enough about why these 
factors, even if they can be detected, present morally significant and compelling reasons for 
action, rather than “merely causal influences on moral conduct” (Alfano 2013a, p. 44).  
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importance of interactions to character and behaviour, and the interactionist 
nature of the CAPS framework West draws on, it thus seems that he would 
be better off embracing a fully-fledged interactionist approach like the one 
outlined in this paper, rather than still trying to defend a more conventional 
virtue ethical model of traits and character. 
These examples show that while some have claimed that philosophers 
have already followed psychology’s lead and that now ‘everyone is an 
interactionist,’ this is not the case. While there has been developing support 
for interactionism in philosophy, as I discussed in Section 1.3, this is not yet 
widespread. Vargy’s paper illustrates that there is still recent, and strong 
support for a more conventional situationist view; one that doesn’t properly 
recognise the importance of interactions. In addition, even when there is 
philosophical acknowledgement of interactionism, it often doesn’t go far 
enough, and still hangs on to problematic features of virtue ethical approaches 
to character, as was seen in West’s account. What is thus needed is a more 
decisive and thoroughgoing shift towards interactionism about character and 
virtue in philosophy.  
 
1.6 Conclusion  
This paper has attempted to further the cause of interactionism in philosophy 
by expanding upon its key details and features, and by illustrating some of its 
advantages over rival approaches. I began by reviewing key features of both 
psychological and philosophical interactionist theories, and the evidence 
supporting them, before synthesising these strands into a series of core claims. 
I then argued that interactionism presents a moral psychology that is highly 
competitive with, and perhaps even superior to its situationist and virtue 
ethical rivals, due to its greater explanatory power and better fit with 
contemporary psychology and cognitive science. As a result of this appeal, 
interactionism warrants further investigation into both its moral psychology, 
and also its implications for normative ethics, and how it could fit into broader 
normative schemes. Thus far, despite some notable exceptions, there has not 
been significant and sustained work on developing this project. It is thus my 
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hope that this paper will have both shown the need for, and great potential 
benefits of, further exploration of interactionist approaches to character and 
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Chapter 2  




Interactionism has emerged as a promising approach to moral character in the 
wake of the situationist challenge and the character-situation debate. This 
paper will consider whether interactionism is troubled by a familiar problem 
from the philosophy of mind: the coupling-constitution or causal-constitution 
fallacy (C-C fallacy). In relation to character, this issue pertains to whether 
the external factors featured in interactionist models are partly constitutive of 
the agent’s character, or whether they merely play a causal role. In contrast 
to some other interactionist theorists, I argue that interactionism doesn’t need 
to make distinctions regarding causation and constitution, and would be better 
off without attempting to do so. Making such claims would only add 
metaphysical baggage to interactionism that won’t aid in its goal of providing 
an empirically adequate moral psychology of character. Interactionists are 
thus better off evading the C-C fallacy challenge, rather than attempting to 
meet it head-on.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Interactionism has emerged as a promising approach to moral character in the 
wake of the situationist challenge and the character-situation debate. This 
paper will consider whether interactionism is troubled by a familiar problem 
from the philosophy of mind: the coupling-constitution or causal-constitution 
fallacy (C-C fallacy). 1 In relation to character, this issue pertains to whether 
 
1 This paper will discuss and draw on the 4E cognition literature, but only insofar as it 
relates to the moral psychology of character. My intention is not to make a contribution to 
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the external factors featured in interactionist models are partly constitutive of 
the agent’s character, or whether they merely play a causal role. In contrast 
to some other interactionist theorists, I argue that interactionism doesn’t need 
to make distinctions regarding causation and constitution, and would be better 
off without attempting to do so. Making such claims would only add 
metaphysical baggage to interactionism that won’t aid in its goal of providing 
an empirically adequate moral psychology of character. Interactionists are 
thus better off evading the C-C fallacy challenge, rather than attempting to 
meet it head-on.2  
 
2.2 The Character-Situation Debate and the Emergence of 
Interactionism 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there has been significant recent debate 
in both philosophy and psychology over the nature of character and virtue. 
This debate has been discussed at length in the literature, so I will only 
provide a quick review here.3 Within philosophy, this debate was sparked by 
philosophical situationists such as John Doris (1998; 2002) and Gilbert 
Harman (1999; 2000), who were echoing concerns and arguments raised 
much earlier in the piece by psychological situationists. Their central 
contention was that empirical evidence from psychology suggested that 
situational factors, not personal ones, were more important determiners of 
moral behavior, and that the accounts of character traditionally put forward 
by virtue ethicists were thus empirically inadequate. This challenge was met 
with a range of replies, such as the popular rarity response strategy, which 
posits that virtue is supposed to be a rare phenomenon for most virtue ethical 
 
the debates surrounding 4E cognition, but instead to simply draw on the resources from the 
debates to address related issues in the moral psychology of character.  
2 Thank you to an anonymous referee from The Journal of Philosophical Research for 
drawing my attention to Sneddon’s (2011) book Like-Minded: Externalism and Moral 
Psychology, which considers the same themes as this paper.  
3 See Alfano (2013b) for a more detailed summary of the debate.  
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accounts, and they are thus not undermined by the empirical evidence 
marshalled by situationists that illustrates the rarity of virtue (Kamtekar 
2004).4 Responses such as these have then been addressed by situationists, 
for example, Alfano’s (2013b, p.244) argument that the rarity response 
sacrifices some of the appeal of virtue ethical moral psychology, most notably 
by giving up much of the explanatory and predictive power that the virtues 
are supposed to have. 
The upshot of all this is that the debate over the nature of character and 
virtue has received no clear resolution, and remains a live area of research 
inquiry within philosophy. As the debate has progressed, alternatives to 
situationism and Aristotelian virtue ethics have emerged. A number of 
philosophers have sought to develop accounts that reconceptualise virtue in 
ways that are both more empirically adequate than virtue ethics, and which 
present a more robust account of virtue than situationism. Of these, the most 
promising is interactionism. Like situationism, interactionism has taken 
inspiration from an earlier trend in psychology. In psychology, interactionism 
emerged as a resolution to the debates between personality psychologists and 
situationist social psychologists, with interactionists arguing that “the 
personality vs situation issue was a pseudo issue” (Endler 1973, p. 301).  
Interactionist psychologists posit that “actual behaviour is a function of a 
continuous process of multidirectional interaction or feedback between the 
individual and the situations he or she encounters” (Krahe 1992, p. 70).  As 
an account of behaviour then, interactionism stresses the dynamic interplay 
of personal and situational variables, rather than focusing predominantly on 
one or the other. Crucially, such interactions are not static or one-way, but are 
reciprocal and mutually influencing. As a result, the “individual is an 
intentional, active agent in this interaction process” (Krahe 1992, p. 70). 
Interactionism thus differs from its situationist and virtue ethical rivals in 
assigning an important place to both personal and situational factors, and in 
making its focus the interaction between them.  
 
4 A range of other strategies for responding to situationism have also been proposed. See, 
e.g., Snow (2010), Russell (2009), and Sreenivasan (2002).  
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As an account of character traits, interactionism holds that traits are more 
consistent than situationists allege. This is because interactionists view 
consistency in terms of coherence, which involves considering not just the 
objective features of a situation, but also the psychological features of the 
situation: how the meaning of the situation is actively interpreted by the 
individual (Krahe 1992, p. 15). When consistency is understood as coherence, 
greater trait consistency is observed (see, e.g., Krahe 1992; Snow 2010; Mehl 
et al. 2015). While interactionism does hold that traits are more consistent 
than situationist models, it is not a return to the robustly individual traits of 
traditional virtue ethics models either. For the interactionist, traits are 
enmeshed in ongoing and dynamic exchanges between agent and 
environment, and are dependent on such interactions and environmental 
inputs, not only for the development and cultivation of traits, but also for 
sustaining and supporting those traits.  
In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued in favour of an 
interactionist approach to character. A prominent example of this trend has 
been the work of Alfano (2013a, 2014, 2016; Alfano & Skorburg 2016), who 
has argued in favour of an interactionist view that conceives character as 
“partly due to features of the agent, partly due to features of the situation, and 
partly due to the interaction between the two” (Alfano 2016, pp. 130-131). 
This shift towards interactionism can also be seen in Skorburg (2017; 2019). 
In contrast, Howell (2016) also aims at reconceptualising virtue in more 
empirically adequate terms, but focuses exclusively on developing an 
extended approach to virtue, without incorporating interactionism. Both 
Alfano and Skorburg have also incorporated extension claims into their 
development of interactionist accounts of character. What is critical for my 
subsequent discussion and argument is that in introducing extension claims 
into their projects for reconceptualising virtue, these theorists are adding in 
extra metaphysical steps that are unnecessary and potentially harmful. As I’ve 
noted, interactionism is a promising approach to developing a more 
empirically adequate moral psychology of character, but its account of 
environmentally-dependent traits can be handled purely in causal terms, 
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without the need for further claims about constitutive extension. The 
remainder of this paper will be concerned with the issues that arise from this 
shift towards extension, and with arguing in favour of avoiding such claims 
in pursuit of an interactionist approach to character.  
 
2.3 Interactionism, 4E Cognition, and the C-C Fallacy  
A number of the prominent supporters for interactionist and extended 
approaches to character have drawn connections between their accounts and 
what they see as sympathetic approaches in the philosophy of mind literature. 
Howell (2016, pp. 148-150) for example, discusses the extended mind 
literature in relation to his own account of extended persons and extended 
virtues. While noting that the “individuation criteria for persons are apt to be 
quite different from those for minds,” he does think that the argument for 
extended minds suggests an analogous argument for extended virtues, and 
notes that if certain mental states, like memories, can be extended, then “it 
would seem that in principle states like virtues can be extended as well” 
(Howell 2016, pp. 148-149). Similarly, Alfano and Skorburg (2016) also aim 
to bring together work on the extended mind hypothesis and work on virtue 
and situationism. They write that if virtues and vices involve “dispositions to 
token a suite of occurrent mental states,” then if “those mental states are 
sometimes extended, perhaps the dispositions to have them are too” (Alfano 
& Skorburg 2016, p. 465). Proponents of interactionist character thus see 
clear connections between their accounts of character and accounts of mind 
like the extended mind hypothesis.  
Approaches like the extended mind account fall under the broader heading 
of “4E cognition.” The category is so named due to the numerous “e” terms 
for the accounts grouped under it: embedded, embodied, extended, and 
enactive. As these varied terms suggest, a diversity of approaches are grouped 
under the 4E cognition label, not all of which see eye-to-eye. While these 
approaches differ in the precise nature and magnitude of their claims, they 
nevertheless share a commitment to opposing accounts of mind that are 
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strongly cognitivist or internalist (Menary 2010, p. 459). Furthermore, as the 
various “e” labels suggest, these approaches emphasise the importance to 
cognition of an agent’s body, and the interaction between an agent and their 
natural and social environment. Since the 1990s, 4E cognition has grown and 
diversified, and become one of the most active and influential developments 
in the philosophy of mind in recent years.  
Given that many 4E cognition accounts challenge strongly individualist 
approaches to cognition, and instead emphasise the importance of external 
factors and interactions between organism and environment, it is not hard to 
see the similarities between 4E cognition and interactionist approaches to 
character. As Skorburg (2017, pp. 464-465) notes, both the person-situation 
debate and the development of 4E cognition have similar narratives, in that 
both start “with a dichotomy which is eventually eschewed in favour of an 
interactionist conclusion with a gradient of positions in between.” The 
connections between interactionist character and 4E cognition suggest the 
potential for a mutually beneficial exchange of insights and ideas between the 
largely disparate fields of research (Skorburg 2017). These parallels also 
suggest potential problems though, in that certain challenges and criticisms 
of 4E cognition accounts could also be directed at interactionism. In 
particular, metaphysical concerns about causation and constitution raised in 
relation to 4E cognition accounts could also be deployed in the field of 
character. For example, Howell (2016, p. 157), after establishing his account 
of extended virtue, notes that “By now a common objection is screaming to 
be heard,” by which he means that the proponent of extended virtue might be 
thought to be “committing a particularly egregious version” of the coupling-
constitution fallacy. While other criticisms of 4E cognition may also apply to 
interactionism, the coupling-constitution fallacy has received the most 
attention from character theorists, and seems to be the most serious issue, and 
will thus be my focus in this paper.  
The coupling-constitution fallacy or causal-constitution fallacy 
(henceforth C-C fallacy) is a well-known criticism directed at 4E cognition 
accounts in the philosophy of mind. The essence of the fallacy is that a 
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mistaken inference is made from a case of causal coupling to a case of partial 
constitution. More specifically, the criticism is that proponents of extended 
cognition (and certain other kinds of 4E cognition accounts) make a 
problematic move from claiming that certain external objects or processes are 
causally coupled to a cognitive agent, to then claiming that this object or 
process is actually partially constitutive of the agent’s cognition (Adams & 
Aizawa 2010, pp. 67-68). Adams and Aizawa (2010, p. 68), the primary 
architects of the C-C fallacy challenge to extended cognition, describe the 
issue in the following way: 
“The fallacious pattern is to draw attention to cases, real or imagined, 
in which some object or process is coupled in some fashion to some 
cognitive agent. From this, one slides to the conclusion that the object 
or process constitutes part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus or 
cognitive processing. …Yet coupling relations are distinct from 
constitutive relations, and the fact that object or process X is coupled 
to object or process Y does not entail that X is part of Y.”  
The challenge is thus to provide a convincing argument for moving from 
causal coupling to constitutive extension, which Adams and Aizawa (2008, 
p. 91) contend that proponents of extended cognition and related approaches 
fail to do. This is not to rule out the importance of external factors entirely: 
cognitive processes and systems may involve environmental interactions, but 
this doesn’t entail the process extends to include these external factors 
(Adams & Aizawa 2008, p. 91). The C-C fallacy is thus a specific 
metaphysical challenge about the nature of the role played by external factors 
in cognition.   
A variety of responses have been made to the C-C fallacy in the philosophy 
of mind. One strategy is to specify appropriate criteria for distinguishing 
between causation and constitution, and to illustrate how external factors can 
meet the criteria for constitution, thereby justifying the claim of extension. 
Heersmink (2015) for example, develops eight criteria for adjudicating 
between cases of coupling and cases of constitution, and similarly, Palermos 
(2014, p. 34) advocates for necessary and sufficient conditions for 
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constitutive extension based on “ongoing feedback loops.” Conversely, 
critics of the extended mind thesis have argued for alternative criteria for 
determining constitution, and posited that external factors cannot meet these 
criteria, ruling out the possibility of extension. Adams and Aizawa (2010, pp. 
68-69) argue that “a mark of the cognitive” is needed for determining what 
makes a “process a cognitive process rather than a noncognitive process,” and 
propose “intrinsic, non-derived content” as such a criterion. Furthermore, 
Adams and Aizawa (2008, 2010) contend that extended cognition theorists 
cannot demonstrate that extracranial resources can meet such a criterion, or 
provide their own compelling alternative criteria.  
Numerous other arguments and moves have been made in relation to the 
C-C fallacy.5 I will not delve into the details of these various arguments and 
counter-arguments relating to the C-C fallacy at this point. As will become 
clear later, this is not necessary for my strategy for addressing the C-C fallacy 
in relation to interactionism. Instead, what I want to convey at this point is 
that the C-C fallacy presents a challenge to 4E cognition that has been taken 
seriously by proponents of such accounts, and that debate over this challenge 
is ongoing, with no clear and canonical solution.  
In relation to character, the parallel C-C fallacy claim is that proponents of 
interactionist and extended accounts of character are mistakenly claiming that 
certain external factors can partially constitute an agent’s character, when in 
fact they are merely causally coupled to the agent’s character or traits. This 
has been anticipated as an objection by Howell (2016) and by Alfano and 
Skorburg (2016). As I have just noted though, answering this objection is no 
small task: the C-C fallacy has been the subject of much debate without a 
clear resolution. The interactionist thus has their work cut out for them in 








2.4 Attempts to Address the C-C Fallacy in Work on 
Character  
In this section I will consider the way in which Howell (2016) and Alfano and 
Skorburg (2016) have attempted to address the C-C fallacy in relation to 
character and highlight some flaws in their strategies. My purpose will be to 
both emphasise that interactionists see the C-C fallacy as a challenge that 
needs to be answered, and that their attempts to answer it are troubled by a 
number of problems. In the remainder of the paper I will then argue in favour 
of an alternative strategy focused on evading and dissolving the C-C fallacy 
objection to interactionism, rather than attempting to meet it on its own terms.  
 
2.4.1 Howell 
Let’s begin by looking at Howell’s (2016) account of extended virtue and 
how he addresses the C-C fallacy in relation to it. Howell (2016, p. 147) 
opposes what he calls “skindividualism,” which is the view that the 
boundaries of the person do not extend beyond their skin, and neither do the 
grounds for their character dispositions. As an alternative to this view, Howell 
(2016) proposes an extended account of persons and virtues, in which factors 
outside the skin of the agent can serve as part of the grounds for their character 
and personhood. Howell (2016, pp. 148-150) discusses this account as being 
a parallel to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Howell accepts that the 
empirical evidence of the power of situational factors creates problems for 
traditional virtue ethics, but disagrees with the situationist conclusion that we 
need to focus on situations rather than traits. Further, he disagrees with the 
move by situationists like Doris and Harman to eliminate or reduce the role 
for traits in their moral psychological frameworks (Howell 2016, p. 154). 
Instead, he proposes that we reconceptualise virtue in extended terms. By 
incorporating external factors into its model of character, the extended virtue 
framework is able to both account for the empirical evidence, and preserve a 
reasonably robust sense of character. While Howell is not explicitly 
interactionist, he is still trying to achieve a similar goal of reconceptualising 
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virtue in order to better account for the dynamic interplay of factors in 
character and behaviour, and his account is thus closer to interactionism than 
it is to situationism.  
Given the radical nature of this view, metaphysical issues are bound to 
arise, which Howell attempts to address. Early in his discussion, Howell 
(2016, pp. 151-152) highlights that while the extended virtue account is 
related to the extended mind approach, they are not the same, and the claim 
of extended virtues doesn’t depend on the hypothesis of extended minds. As 
a result, criticisms of the extended mind approach to cognition may not apply 
to the extended virtue approach to character. Howell (2016, p. 151) writes 
that “The general reason is that minds are not persons, and persons, not minds, 
are the bearers of virtue. Arguments against extended minds, then, aren’t 
necessarily arguments against extended persons and extended virtues.” 
Howell thus thinks that his account may avoid certain criticisms directed at 
the extended mind, like Adams & Aizawa’s (2010) intrinsic content 
requirement, and Rupert’s concerns about drawing the bounds of cognition, 
because it is focused on persons, not minds, and thus such attacks may not 
apply.  
Could the same be said of the C-C fallacy? May the extended virtues 
account simply avoid the issue? Howell thinks not. As noted earlier, Howell 
acknowledges that questions of causation and constitution still arise, but 
argues that his account is able to deal with them. He argues that unlike cases 
of extended cognition, our ways of differentiating and individuating persons 
do not depend on “cognitive scientific individuation criteria,” but instead on 
“the norms governing persons and the ascriptions of personality” (Howell 
2016, p. 158). As a result, things are part of a person when they play a role in 
someone’s “disposition to behave and feel in certain ways,” and there is no 
good reason to suggest that something has to be within the skin of an agent to 
play such a role (Howell 2016, p. 158). Additionally, Howell also notes how 
his extended persons accounts fares better with the empirical evidence and 
the situationist critique than skindividualism does, suggesting that it provides 
a better account of personality and character (Howell 2016, p. 158). Howell 
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(2016, p. 158) thinks that as a result of these points, his account presents a 
compelling case for “constitution instead of mere coupling.”  
Despite thinking that the C-C fallacy doesn’t stand as an objection to his 
account of extended persons and virtues, Howell (2016, p. 159) nevertheless 
thinks that it does raise the important question of determining the criteria for 
constitutive extension. He notes the great difficulty of such a task, but thinks 
a step in the right direction is to focus on the functional roles that dispositions 
play, as this can give us insight into whether the grounds for the disposition 
can be counted as part of the agent. By functional role Howell (2016, p. 159) 
is referring to things like the explanatory role that dispositions can have in 
explaining people and their behaviour. Additionally, he is also concerned with 
the predictive role that dispositions can play, and the evaluative role they play 
in making normative judgements about a person. If a disposition plays such 
roles then it might qualify for being a character trait or virtue, and there 
doesn’t seem to be a good reason why the disposition being partially grounded 
in features external to the agent should disqualify it from counting as one of 
their character traits (Howell 2016, p. 159). As such, if external factors are 
contributing to functional roles like this, Howell thinks they could be 
considered as partially constituting an agent’s character.  
It is unclear why this is the case. Howell emphasises that the external 
factors need to be playing important roles in the agent’s traits and 
dispositions, but doesn’t do enough to clarify why this makes them partially 
constitutive rather than just causally coupled. The external factors could still 
form part of the grounds for an agent’s disposition if they were figured into 
the disposition as stimulus conditions, and could thereby still be involved in 
the explanatory, predictive and evaluative roles of the disposition. 
Additionally, one might wonder why the constitution claim is needed at all if 
it isn’t contributing to the empirical adequacy or explanatory and predictive 
power of the account. Howell’s account thus needs more development if it is 
to justify the necessity of a causal-constitutive distinction, and to better 
illustrate how the constitution claim is justified.  
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This marks an important point of separation between an interactionist 
account of character and Howell’s extended one. Both approaches emphasise 
the importance of external factors and agent-environment interactions. 
Howell’s version though, crucially involves a claim of constitutive extension. 
Interactionism need not make such a claim. As I stated at the beginning of 
this paper, and as I will argue in the next section, this constitution claim is 
unnecessary, and actively unhelpful, as it exposes the account of character to 
additional issues and criticisms from the philosophy of mind.   
 
2.4.2 Alfano and Skorburg 
Alfano and Skorburg (2016) endorse an interactionist approach to character, 
and are precise about the scope and nature of their metaphysical claims: 
sometimes character is embedded, sometimes it is extended, and sometimes 
it might be neither. They intend for these embedding and extension claims to 
roughly mirror their namesakes from the philosophy of mind; that is, 
embedded character involves strong causal coupling, while extended 
character involves the claim that external factors partially constitute the 
agent’s character (Alfano & Skorburg 2016, pp. 467-468). There is thus a 
clear distinction made between causal coupling and constitution, which is 
why the C-C fallacy again arises as a potential challenge for their account to 
overcome.  
Alfano and Skorburg (2016) make reference to the importance of 
functional integration for determining both cases of embedding and 
extension. They note that a critical part of the functional integration of the 
agent into their environment is the role of “ongoing feedback loops” between 
the agent and environmental factors (Alfano and Skorburg 2016, p. 468). How 
are we to determine between cases of embedding and extension then? Alfano 
and Skorburg (2016, pp. 467-468) write that: 
“When the bonds holding them [the moral agent] in that context are 
tight and modally robust, perhaps it makes sense to think of their 
character as extending out into the social environment. When the 
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bonds holding them in that context are relatively looser and less 
modally robust, perhaps it makes sense to think of them as merely 
embedded in the social context, with some properties that are 
metaphysically independent of it.”  
What acts as the distinguishing criterion for separating cases of causation 
from constitution for Alfano and Skorburg is thus the importance of the 
ongoing interactions involved. If the feedback loops between agent and 
environment are highly reciprocal, consistent and reliable, then character can 
be thought to be constitutively extended, rather than just causally coupled in 
an embedded fashion (Alfano & Skorburg 2016, p. 471).  
The authors point to the case of friendship as a paradigmatic example of 
constitutively extended character. They argue that the tightly coupled, reliable 
and modally robust nature of the feedback loops between close friends 
support the view that in such cases, the friends partially constitute each 
other’s character (Alfano & Skorburg 2016, pp. 475). In contrast, they also 
identify a case that they think qualifies for embedding, but not extension: 
stereotype threat in relation to intellectual character.6 Put very briefly, the 
concept of stereotype threat refers to the situational pressures that stereotypes 
can have on individuals, pressuring them to conform to the stereotypes 
relating to their social or racial group. In regard to intellectual character, 
stereotype threat can result in decreased intellectual and academic 
performance when there are negative stereotypes relating to a particular 
group. For example, stereotypes of black students underperforming can 
decrease the performance of black students, as it can act as an additional 
source of pressure and stress, which has been illustrated in a number of studies 
(Alfano & Skorburg 2016, pp. 469-470). Alfano and Skorburg (2016, p. 471) 
argue that stereotype threat presents a case of embedded intellectual 
character, as the agent’s character may “depend on the stereotypes, 
 
6 While I am focusing on moral character, I agree with Alfano and Skorburg that this 
discussion of the metaphysics of character applies equally well to intellectual character as it 
does to moral character.  
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expectations, noises, worries, distractions, and anxieties in the social 
environment.” Such a case thus qualifies for embedding because of the fairly 
tight and reliable feedback loops between the agent and the environment, but 
falls short of the requirements for extension. This is because the relationship 
is largely asymmetrical: there is strong and reliable input from the 
environment to the agent, but the feedback from the agent to the environment 
is significantly less strong (Alfano & Skorburg 2016, p. 471). Another aspect 
of Alfano and Skorburg’s criteria for distinguishing between causation and 
constitution is thus that constitution requires multidirectional, symmetrical 
and highly reciprocal interactions between agent and environment, while 
more unidirectional and asymmetrical interactions would only qualify as 
causal coupling.  
If ongoing feedback loops are involved in both constitutive and non-
constitutive cases, then there are still issues in justifying the move to 
constitution. Just because the feedback loops are more reciprocal, reliable, 
and consistent, doesn’t seem to in itself justify the constitution claim. Why 
wouldn’t the less reciprocal, reliable, and consistent ongoing feedback loops 
also qualify for constitution? Conversely, why don’t both cases simply 
represent causal coupling, even if it is of a particularly strong variety? While 
Alfano and Skorburg go further than Howell in attempting to detail the criteria 
for constitutively extended character, it is still not definitive that their criteria 
support constitution claims, and they would thus require further elaboration 
and defence.  
As with my consideration of Howell, my aim has not been to demonstrate 
conclusive or knock-down objections to Alfano and Skorburg’s handling of 
the C-C fallacy. Instead, I have illustrated that the criteria Alfano and 
Skorburg present for determining constitution, while more detailed than other 
accounts, are nevertheless still open to criticism, and thus still vulnerable to 
the C-C fallacy objection. Additionally, in insisting on a distinction between 
causation and constitution, their account could also be criticised from those 
favouring a more radical view in which the causal-constitutive distinction is 
abandoned. Their strategy for handling the C-C issue can thus be objected to 
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from a number of different directions, and would need to be refined and 
further developed to defend it against such objections.  
 
2.5 The Evasive Manoeuvre  
Having seen some issues with these other strategies for addressing the C-C 
fallacy, I now want to turn to my own strategy: the evasive manoeuvre. In this 
section, I will argue that while interactionism does require some revisions to 
our metaphysical account of character and traits, it does not require the 
causal-constitutive distinction in relation to external factors. This is because 
the distinction does not add any descriptive or explanatory power to the 
account, and is thus not doing any work fleshing out interactionism’s moral 
psychology. The C-C distinction also raises additional and challenges, as 
illustrated in the previous section, thereby creating unnecessary pain for the 
interactionist. As a result of these two points, it is best for interactionism to 
avoid making the distinction altogether.  
This strategy does not mean that I am suggesting that we don’t need to 
make any revisions to traditional models of character and virtue. On the 
contrary: I am supporting interactionism as an alternative to such traditional 
accounts. As discussed in Chapter 1, some of the central claims of 
interactionism include: that moral character crucially depends on person-
situation interactions; the thesis that character and virtue are multiply 
realisable; and the claim that interactionism challenges the person-situation 
dichotomy in favour of the view that person and situation, are, to an extent, 
interdependent. Such claims not only represent the core of interactionism, but 
also highlight features that separate it from other approaches to character, in 
that the focus is on neither the agent, nor the environment, but on their 
dynamic interplay. As was noted earlier, interactionism recognises the 
importance of both situational and personal factors, but it is the interaction 
between them that is primary. This is what separates interactionism from rival 
models like situationism and virtue ethics.  
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Interactionism thus stands apart from other models of character, and 
involves changes and revisions to more conventional accounts of character. 
If it involves a number of changes to traditional models, should one such 
change be making a constitutive claim about the role of external factors in 
character? As I have been discussing in this paper, other proponents of 
interactionism (and related approaches) seem to think so. It isn’t entirely clear 
why this is the case though. These other authors make some interesting 
arguments about distinguishing between causation and constitution, but, in 
my view, they haven’t done enough to justify the need for constitutive claims 
in the first place. Instead, they seem to assume the need for such an approach, 
and then work to unpack its details and address potential criticisms.  
In my view though, such an approach is unnecessary. This is because 
making constitutive claims doesn’t have any impact on a descriptive moral 
psychology of character, which is the focus of this paper. What should matter 
for a descriptive moral psychology of character? As most modern 
philosophers working on the subject have come to argue, it’s vital that such 
an account be empirically adequate: it should fit with, and not be obviously 
contradicted by, our best available empirical evidence about the nature of 
human character. In Section 2.2 I noted that interactionism has emerged as an 
approach to character that provides a compelling alternative to situationism 
and traditional virtue ethics. Interactionism presents an account of character 
that is empirically adequate, and which possesses great explanatory power: it 
provides an excellent framework for explaining and understanding a broad 
range of moral behaviour and moral agents. As a result of such factors, 
interactionism can be seen as an appealing descriptive moral psychology of 
character. 
This brings us back to the question of whether constitutive claims would 
add any explanatory power to interactionism. What is critical for explanation 
is causation. As Lewis (1986, p. 214) notes, if we want to explain something, 
then we need to consider its causal history. Lewis (1986, p. 218) explicitly 
connects causal information with explanatory information: information about 
the causal history of an event is the explanatory information about that event. 
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Alfano (2013b, p. 239) follows Lewis in this account of explanation, but in 
relation to character and virtue specifically. He notes the tradition of viewing 
character traits and virtues as explanatory, and agrees with Lewis that 
explanatory power depends on causation (Alfano 2013b, p. 240). As such, for 
virtues and character traits to figure into an explanation of behaviour, they 
should play a causal role in that behaviour, or at the very least be correlated 
with the behaviour (Alfano 2013b, p. 240). In short, what is essential for the 
explanatory power of a moral psychological theory of character is causation.  
If causation is the vital ingredient for explanatory power, then constitutive 
claims amount to an additional layer of metaphysical detail that isn’t adding 
anything to the descriptive moral psychology. Sprevak (2010, p. 361) notes 
how the choice between a causal claim and a constitutive claim has no impact 
on explanatory power: 
“Psychological theories can, at negligible cost, be given either a causal 
gloss, or a constitutive gloss. If, in a particular case, psychology 
chooses to favour one gloss, the other is still available via a trivial 
transform, and the reasons for a preference for one over the other 
appear to be more likely to be idiosyncratic and accidental rather than 
tied to tracking the truth.”  
This highlights not only that the further step of a constitutive claim is 
unnecessary, but also that the choice between calling a case causal coupling 
and calling it constitutive extension is ultimately rather arbitrary as far as 
explanatory power is concerned.  
Given that the constitution claim isn’t adding any explanatory power, it 
seems as though it is adding unnecessary complexity to our account of 
character. Rupert (2009, p. 18) makes a similar point when endorsing his 
embedded cognition approach over extended cognition: 
“If two theories embrace structurally equivalent explanations (with or 
without the same labels), but one of those theories simply tacks on 
commitment to an additional kind of entity, of no causal significance, 
then the relative simplicity comparison is straightforward.” 
78 
 
This is does not mean that I am taking a particular side in the debates over E 
cognition (i.e. that I am in favour of embedding). My point is a more general 
one: an interactionist framework that doesn’t make constitutive claims is 
simpler and more elegant than similar accounts that do make such claims, 
because those claims are add-ons that aren’t contributing anything substantial 
to the account, like explanatory power. If the kind of interactionist framework 
I am proposing and an alternative model like Alfano and Skorburg’s both 
accept the same kinds of explanations about character and moral behaviour, 
but their account makes an additional metaphysical claim that mine does not 
(that has no impact on the explanation), then we should prefer my option by 
virtue of greater theoretical elegance and simplicity.  
Let’s focus things down to the core of the issue. If what matters for a 
compelling descriptive moral psychology of character is empirical adequacy 
and explanatory power, then the causation vs. constitution question is 
irrelevant. Instead, what the issue comes down to is the choice of explanatory 
framework, which we can view as a debate between two rival frameworks 
that Sprevak (2010, p. 361) calls: “internal self-sufficiency (INT)” and 
“external dependence (EXT).” Sprevak is presenting these as explanatory 
frameworks for cognitive science and understanding the mind, but they serve 
my purposes as well, so I have adapted them to apply to character.  
(INT) Character and character traits “are largely self-sufficient, and 
can be studied largely in isolation from environmental props” 
(Sprevak 2010, p. 361). 
(EXT) Character and character traits “depend intimately on 
environmental resources, and should be studied within the context of 
those resources” (Sprevak 2010, p. 362).  
Clearly interactionism is a variety of EXT rather than INT. I have noted that 
interactionism has potential as an explanatory framework for moral character. 
Claims about constitution and the debate between causal coupling and 
constitutive extension have no bearing on such explanatory frameworks 
though. They do not provide new information or greater explanatory power, 
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and do not drive our choice between these rival frameworks. As a result, 
interactionism does not need to make constitutive claims about the role of 
external factors in character, and can thus leave them aside.  
In sum then, my evasive manoeuvre strategy is, firstly, concerned with the 
descriptive moral psychology of character. Other things being equal, a 
simpler, more elegant theory is preferable – the more moving parts, the harder 
they are to justify. Adding claims about constitutive extension into the mix 
increases complexity and requires further justificatory steps. This could be an 
acceptable price to pay if the result was greater explanatory power and a better 
descriptive account of character. As I have noted though (and as will be 
discussed in greater detail in Section 2.6), these constitutive claims do not 
provide such explanatory advantages. What matters is the psychological 
significance of the external factors and the interactions between agents and 
environment, not metaphysical hair-splitting over which cases are 
constitutive and which are merely causal. Given that the constitutive claims 
require so much extra justification, the burden of proof is on proponents of 
extended character to show why such claims are necessary for an empirically 
adequate moral psychology of character. Barring such compelling support for 
constitutive claims, we seem far better off with a more general account like 
the EXT position outlined above, rather than wading into the waters of the C-
C fallacy debate.  
 
2.5.1 Illustrative Examples  
To further flesh-out this argument, it will be useful to consider some 
illustrative examples. We can start by examining Howell’s (2016) example of 
a long-time user of antidepressants. Howell (2016, p. 54) describes a case of 
someone who has been effectively using antidepressants for years, and in 
which this usage makes the person much more compassionate. While using 
antidepressants, the person is “more likely to help others, less likely to be 
brusque or insulting, and likely to be far less aloof.” Howell then notes that if 
this person went on vacation and forgot their antidepressants, they would be 
less compassionate during that trip, but that wouldn’t lead us to suggest that 
80 
 
they weren’t compassionate at all. Instead, we can say in this case that the 
individual’s virtue is extended to include the antidepressants (Howell 2016, 
p. 154). For Howell then, the virtue of compassion that the agent in this case 
has is partially constituted by their use of antidepressants.  
Clearly, in this case the agent’s use of antidepressants is playing a role in 
their character, specifically in their trait of compassion. Howell and I could 
agree on this point. The antidepressants figure into the explanatory story, in 
that they help to explain why the agent is compassionate most of the time, and 
their absence helps to explain the agent’s lack of compassion while on 
vacation. Considering the antidepressants would also aid us in prediction, as 
their presence affects the likelihood of compassionate behaviour. The 
antidepressants thus seem to play an important part in the agent’s character.   
All of this though can be captured by an interactionist account: the agent’s 
ongoing interactions with external factors (the antidepressants) are critical to 
their character. Whether such interaction involves mere causal dependence or 
constitution though is irrelevant: it is a further claim that isn’t adding anything 
to the moral psychological picture of character. Whether the agent’s 
engagement with the antidepressants is causal or partially constitutive makes 
no difference to how we explain, understand and predict their behaviour. 
Howell’s claim of constitutive extension is thus unnecessary, because it is 
getting into abstract metaphysical territory that doesn’t have direct bearing on 
questions of moral psychology. As established in the previous section, this 
extra claim also makes him open to additional objections. As his case of the 
agent on antidepressants can be adequately explained without the constitution 
claim, it thus seems as though it should be abandoned.  
We next turn to a real-world case: the Milgram experiments. 
Interactionism can offer an effective explanation for the results of the 
Milgram experiments: the specific and unusual circumstances of the 
experiment separated the participants from their normal social and 
environmental connections and engagements. This can explain the behaviour 
of the participants in the study: their character was dependent upon 
interactions with social and environmental factors. With these factors 
81 
 
removed, their character traits were crippled, resulting in their surprising and 
harmful behaviour. Interactionism thus offers a compelling alternative 
explanation of the results of the Milgram experiments to the situationist view 
that the situational factors are running the show and that character traits are 
minimal or non-existent.  
If interactionism provides a good explanation of the Milgram results, does 
its explanatory power require or depend on a constitutive claim? It is hard to 
see how it could. Howell (2016, p. 155) makes a similar argument about the 
Milgram experiments, but his is in service of his argument for constitutively 
extended virtue. This constitution claim though, doesn’t add anything to the 
explanatory account of the Milgram experiments over my interactionist 
account. Whether we conceptualise the external factors as playing a causal or 
a constitutive role in the agent’s character makes no difference to the 
explanatory picture, because the fact that a particular external factor is 
partially constitutive isn’t adding any new information to our explanation of 
the agent’s character compared to a version where the external factor is 
merely causally coupled to the agent. As long as the external factors are 
playing some kind of causal role in the agent’s character, then this is enough 
as far as explanation goes. Again then, we can see that the constitutive claim 
is unnecessary for a compelling and empirically adequate descriptive moral 
psychology of character.  
 
2.6 Objections to the Evasive Manoeuvre  
2.6.1 Constitution Claims are Necessary for Descriptive Moral 
Psychology  
A potentially strong objection to the evasion strategy I have been 
recommending is that the constitutive claim isn’t just potentially beneficial, 
but actually in some way critical or necessary for an interactionist account of 
character. We can build such an objection by drawing on and adapting 
Palermos’ (2014) work on extended cognition. Drawing on dynamical 
systems theory, Palermos gives both an account of the criteria for determining 
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constitution, and also provides arguments in support of the explanatory value 
of constitution claims. It is this latter point that is of particular concern to me, 
as it creates potential problems for my evasion strategy. Palermos (2014, p. 
32-33) posits that when two systems are engaged in ongoing interactions with 
each other, this can sometimes give rise to properties that can’t be attributed 
to any of the individual systems. As a result, we would need to think that there 
is a single coupled system made up of the individual interacting systems. Such 
a coupled system would involve dense feedback loops between its component 
systems, making it difficult to “decompose systems in terms of distinct inputs 
and outputs from the one to the other” (Palermos 2014, p. 33).  
Palermos’ (2014, pp. 32-33) point is then that such coupled systems 
represent an additional entity, which is constituted by its “interdependent 
components.” Additionally, this postulation of coupled systems would be 
doing explanatory work, because it would account for the properties that arise 
from the interactions between the systems “which we would otherwise be at 
a loss how to account for” (Palermos 2014, p. 32). Applied to character and 
virtue, the argument would be that ongoing interactions between an agent and 
the environment would produce a coupled system, which would be their 
character trait or virtue. On Palermos’ reasoning about coupled systems, such 
a trait would then be partially constituted by the external factors involved in 
the system. Furthermore, this constitution claim would also be doing 
explanatory work, because it would be accounting for the properties of the 
coupled system that couldn’t be attributed to the sum of the agential and 
environmental contributions alone. This would thus represent a strong 
objection to my evasion strategy, as it claims that constitutive claims could 
be explanatorily necessary when it comes to the descriptive moral psychology 
of character.  
Palermos (2014, p. 31) develops this argument through the example of a 
blind agent engaging with a tactile visual substitution system (TVSS). The 
continuous mutual interactions between the agent (A) and the TVSS produce 
tight feedback loops, and give “rise to new systemic properties (such as the 
new quasi-visual experiences produced, or new possibilities for interaction 
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with the environment),” and these properties cannot be attributed to either A 
or TVSS alone. Instead, they require the postulation of the coupled system, 
ATVSS, rather than continuing to treat each sub-system as distinct entities. 
Cases such as this may thus show the explanatory necessity of postulating 
coupled systems, and of making constitutive claims.  
My central point in response to this objection is that it is unclear why close 
interactions between multiple systems would demand the postulation of a 
further entity, and why this would add explanatory value. Such cases could 
seemingly also be explained by tight, continuous reciprocal causation, and 
thus cashed out in terms of causal dependence rather than constitution. 
Additionally, even if the individual systems (agent, social setting, 
environmental factors) are interdependent and difficult to pull apart, this 
doesn’t make the postulation of a further coupled system constituted by these 
components necessary for explanation. It’s true that the complexity of the 
interactions might require highly detailed analysis and fine-grained modelling 
to produce a good explanatory account, but this doesn’t mean that a further 
claim about constitution would give greater explanatory power. A framework 
of causal dependence could do an equally effective job of explanation, 
without the need for constitutive claims. Connecting back to my argument 
from the previous section, it seems as though both options would be able to 
give the same explanation, with the former then beating out the latter because 
of its simplicity.  
This argument is further supported by Sprevak’s (2010) discussion of 
extended cognition and explanatory power. Sprevak (2010, p. 358) notes the 
potential advantage of sometimes considering “sensory input, internal state, 
behaviour output cycles as single explanatory units.” Treating such cycles or 
loops as single explanatory units echoes Palermos’ discussion of coupled 
systems. Sprevak (2010, p. 358), however, argues that “treating entire 
sensorimotor loops as single explanatory units is compatible with holding that 
the input and output sections of the loops are non-mental, albeit 
psychologically significant.” It is thus possible to “obtain whatever 
explanatory benefits are to be gained by appealing to whole loops as single 
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explanatory units, without being committed to sensorimotor loops being 
100% mental in all their parts” (Sprevak 2010, pp. 358-359). Again, applied 
to character, even if we treat agent-environment interactions as involving a 
coupled system or single explanatory unit, this does not require us to treat all 
the parts of the system as being virtuous, or as part of the character or trait in 
question.  
Returning to Palermos’ TVSS example then, we may object to his claim 
that the coupled system is necessary, but let’s assume that is the case for now. 
Even if this is so, and we get explanatory benefits from postulating ATVSS 
rather than treating A and TVSS separately, this doesn’t mean that the 
external factor (the TVSS) is itself mental. Based on Palermos’ analysis, the 
TVSS certainly is playing a psychologically significant role, but that isn’t 
enough to show that it should qualify as mental. As Sprevak (2010, p. 358) 
writes, “being psychologically significant is not sufficient to make a state 
mental…the causes and effects of mental states are often not mental 
themselves, and yet are still significant in psychological explanations.” The 
postulation of the coupled system of ATVSS is what is doing the explanatory 
work in Palermos’ example, not the constitutive claims about the TVSS. 
Given that we can get the same explanatory result without the need for the 
constitutive claims, the burden is on Palermos to illustrate why such claims, 
and not just the proposal of the coupled system, are explanatorily necessary.  
As a result of all this, Sprevak (2010, p. 359) argues that there is no 
explanatory difference between the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition 
(HEMC), and the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC): “A cognition 
scientist could swap between HEC and HEMC with negligible net change in 
explanatory value.” Furthermore, this also misses the point of what’s critical 
for explanatory power. In regard to extended cognition, what gives it an 
explanatory edge is the claim that psychology needs to include features 
outside the agent’s brain, because of their significance in cognition and 
action. But this point can also be accepted by an embedded cognition theorist. 
What separates them is the further claim that such external factors aren’t just 
psychologically significant, but are themselves mental (Sprevak 2010, p. 
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359). This claim though, is adding no additional explanatory power. HEC and 
HEMC thus disagree about the bounds of cognition and the extent of mental 
states, but when it comes to explanatory power, there are no substantial 
differences.  
I want to turn now to look at another example of this kind of objection. In 
a recent paper, Skorburg (2019) has argued for the specific importance of 
constitutive extension claims when it comes to virtue. Skorburg (2019, p. 
2334) first highlights the widespread agreement that “virtues are comprised 
of cognitive and affective processes,” before noting that there are “well-
developed arguments in the extended mind literature” that both cognitive and 
affective process can extend beyond the individual. As a result of these 
premises, it thus seems that we should question the “default internalism” 
about virtues, and take seriously the idea of extended virtue (Skorburg 2019, 
p. 2346). In contrast to Palermos, Skorburg is making the case that extension 
claims are important for not just cognition, but for understanding and 
explaining virtue and character as well.  
I’ll begin my reply by noting that Skorburg’s argument hinges on the 
“well-developed” arguments in favour of extended cognitive and affective 
process. He acknowledges that extended mind theorists were initially met 
with a range of objections, such as the C-C fallacy, before highlighting the 
many replies that have been made in the literature. He highlights Palermos’ 
account of feedback loops as being a prime example of an approach to 
extended cognition that can overcome such objections (Skorburg 2019, p. 
2335). As I have just argued though, drawing on Sprevak, there are 
compelling reasons to doubt whether the constitutive extension claims in 
Palermos’ account are adding any explanatory power. Thus, while there have 
been many responses by proponents of extended cognition to objections like 
the C-C fallacy, it is hardly a settled matter that they have effectively and 
completely overcome them.  
Skorburg (2019, p. 2340) also draws on a number of examples which, he 
argues, demonstrate the “epistemic gains to be made by adopting an extended 
systems perspective” on things like emotion regulation, but also for cognition 
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and emotion more generally. This feeds into his argument about the similar 
kinds of epistemic gains to be made by going extended when it comes to 
virtue as well. For example, Skorburg (2019, p. 2339) considers how research 
on Transactive Goal Dynamics reveals the advantages that taking an extended 
position gives us for explaining and predicting the behaviour and motivations 
of romantic partners. He quotes Fitzsimons et al. (2015, p. 648), who write 
that: “Ultimately, we suggest that relationship partners are best 
conceptualised not as mostly independent goal pursuers who occasionally 
influence each other, but instead, as interdependent parts of one self-
regulating system.”   
Similarly, Skorburg draws on Varga’s (2016) work on emotion regulation 
in infants and caregivers. He notes that, as the interactions between the infant 
and caregiver are so tight and coordinated, “the process of emotion regulation 
in the infant extends to include the caretaker” (Skorburg 2019, p. 2339). 
Furthermore, this “process of emotion regulation…is not de-composable into 
simple child inputs and caretaker outputs,” and we thus have reason to see it 
as a genuine case of constitutive extension (Skorburg 2019, p. 2339). 
Skorburg takes examples such as these to be extended systems, and posits that 
we get epistemic advantages by treating them as such. That is, 
conceptualising such cases as involving extension is taken to offer benefits 
for explaining and understanding the phenomena involved. Once again then, 
the worry is that there are explanatory benefits to be gained from an extended 
approach, which would be missed by my evasion strategy.  
In response to these examples, I’ll begin by noting that this argument still 
does not provide enough support for the necessity of constitutive claims, or 
the epistemic payoffs of those claims. As was the case with the TVSS 
example though, let’s assume for now that we do need to propose coupled 
systems in cases such as these to get the full explanatory picture. Again, what 
is crucial then is that it would be the coupled system doing the explanatory 
work, not the constitutive claims about the external factors. Take the example 
of Transactive Goal Dynamics with romantic partners. There is no doubt that 
the external factor (the partner) is playing a psychologically significant role. 
87 
 
Furthermore, the evidence presented by Skorburg suggests it may even be 
necessary, at least in some cases, to consider the partners as a coupled system 
rather than purely as independent agents. What still needs justification 
though, is why claims that the external factors are themselves mental (or 
virtuous) are necessary for explaining and understanding the phenomena. As 
was the case with the TVSS example, these cases show that it may be 
necessary to postulate coupled systems, but this can be accommodated by the 
broad EXT framework I mentioned in Section 2.5. The constitutive claims 
are where the problems arise, yet they are doing no extra work to justify their 
high price. Given that these claims add complexity and require significantly 
more support, while also offering no clear benefit, the burden of proof is still 
on proponents of extended character to illustrate why they are necessary, over 
and above the postulation of coupled systems.   
In all of this I am not trying to suggest that extended cognition is a failed 
project. My claim is more modest: when it comes to virtue and the moral 
psychology of character, extension claims are not adding any explanatory 
power over strong causal dependence, and are thus unnecessary. While there 
are “well-developed arguments” in favour of extended cognition, as Skorburg 
points out, the debates over the nature of cognition and the mind are ongoing 
ones, without a clear and canonical resolution. What I have been trying to 
show is that there are plausible reasons for doubting the added explanatory 
power of extension claims when it comes to virtue. Couple this reasonable 
scepticism of the value being added by extension with the very real 
difficulties and objections that arise with extension claims, and it seems 
unnecessary to make this further metaphysical step. I am thus unpersuaded 
by Skorburg’s argument that extension claims are necessary for virtue.  
To sum up and conclude my response to this objection, we can break things 
down in the following way: one issue is whether external factors need to be 
considered in a framework for explaining character and virtue, while a 
separate, second issue is whether such external factors should themselves 
count as virtuous or as constituting the virtue. These are not the same issue. 
My concern is with the first issue, as I am focused on descriptive moral 
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psychology, which the second issue has no bearing on. This is because, as I 
have been arguing throughout this paper, this question of constitution makes 
no difference to the explanatory power and descriptive accuracy of our moral 
psychology of character. The objection that constitutive claims would make 
a difference because they would add explanatory value doesn’t hold up, as we 
could get the same explanatory picture with just causal coupling. As a result, 
the evasion strategy is not defeated by this objection.  
 
2.6.2 Normative Implications of Evasion vs. Extension   
The final objection I will consider relates to the possible normative 
consequences of my evasion strategy. As I have noted, my focus is on 
descriptive moral psychology, but, despite this, there may still be a worry that 
by stopping short of constitutive extension claims, there will be problematic 
consequences for the normative dimensions of interactionism. In particular, 
the issue that arises is whether constitution claims could play an important 
evaluative (rather than just explanatory) role. For example, questions arise 
concerning the implications of interactionism for thinking about 
responsibility. If interactionism posits a crucial role for external influences 
and agent-environment interactions, then we might wonder whether this 
leaves any place for individual responsibility for character. The worry then 
would be that making the move to extension could help clear up this issue, 
and by avoiding extension claims my account produces a more muddled 
evaluative picture.7 
In proposing an interactionist approach, my suggestion is not that the 
individual is no longer important to understanding character and behaviour, 
or that the individual simply dissolves into the web of interactions. As I noted 
earlier, interactionism maintains a strong role for individuals, who are an 
active and purposeful part of the equation. Additionally, interactionism also 
posits that people often possess coherent traits, and that traits can be more 
 
7 Thank you to an anonymous referee from The Journal of Philosophical Research for 
highlighting this concern.  
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consistent and robust than situationists allow. There is thus still an important 
role for personal factors and the individual in the interactionist picture of 
character, and it still makes sense to talk about (at least partial) individual 
responsibility for character.  
In focusing on agent-environment interactions, interactionism does, of 
course, raise a range of interesting normative questions. For example, as 
Alfano (2014, pp. 84-86) notes, if we allow that virtues can be realised in 
different ways with varying levels of input from personal, social, and asocial 
environmental factors (as interactionism does), then we might wonder 
whether some means of realising virtue are preferable to others. If a particular 
person’s honesty is heavily reliant on environmental supports, while another 
person’s is less reliant on such factors, then we might think the latter’s 
honesty is more praiseworthy. Fully exploring such normative implications 
lies beyond the scope of this paper. The central point though is that 
interactionism preserves a role for responsibility for one’s character, and it is 
unclear why additional constitutive extension claims would better clarify this.  
Let’s now consider a more pressing variety of this objection. Carter and 
Palermos (2016) consider some of the normative implications of extended 
cognition, and argue in favour of the view that, in cases in which a person’s 
cognition extends to incorporate an external artefact, such as a smartphone, 
damage to that artefact should be viewed as a kind of assault, rather than 
merely as property damage. Thus, if the proponents of extended cognition are 
on the right track, our ethical and legal thinking will need to be revised to 
account for these cases of “extended personal assault” (Carter & Palermos 
2016, p. 542). Furthermore, this could help to do justice to the common 
intuition that there is a special kind of importance to the devices we are deeply 
involved with, and that makes them more than mere property (Carter & 
Palermos 2016, p. 543). Directed towards my account, the worry is then that 
by leaving constitutive extension claims out of the picture, interactionism 
won’t properly recognise the normative importance of such external artefacts, 
and thus wouldn’t properly account for certain kinds of harms that intuitively 
seem important.  
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In response to this, I’ll begin by noting that, as Carter and Palermos (2016, 
p. 549) themselves acknowledge, a central premise of their argument is that 
extended cognition is true. In particular, they point to feedback loops as 
crucial for supporting cases of extension. As I argued in the previous sub-
section though, there is reason to doubt that such feedback loop-based 
extension claims are adding any explanatory power. Additionally, for this to 
be a compelling objection to my argument, it isn’t enough that extended 
cognition is true – it also requires that extended virtue be true. As I have been 
arguing throughout the paper though, there are compelling reasons to be 
sceptical of moving virtue in the direction of an extended approach.  
Crucially, it also again seems that extension claims are an unnecessary 
addition for the argument Carter and Palermos are trying to make.  They write 
that: 
“…whenever an individual’s mental power and faculties rely for their 
operation on continuous mutual interactions between some of the 
individual’s organismic faculties and some artifact of the individual’s, 
we have sufficient indication that the relevant person—and the 
individual’s legal and ethical rights against personal assault—should 
be extended to include the artifacts involved.” (Carter & Palermos 
2016, pp. 554-555).  
I agree with them on this claim but disagree that an extended account is 
needed to support it. As I have been arguing, we can give recognition to the 
importance of ongoing interactions with our environments and other agents 
without the need for constitutive extension. In these kinds of cases, if an agent 
is sufficiently dependent on some external artefact, then that seems enough to 
justify rethinking of it in ethical and legal terms as more than mere property. 
Once again then, extension claims are an unnecessary further step. 
Interactionism is thus able to account for these kinds of normative cases and 





This paper has argued that interactionism is not threatened by the C-C fallacy 
objection. It began by noting how a number of contemporary philosophers 
working on character have drawn connections between their accounts and 
work on 4E cognition in the philosophy of mind. This raises concerns that 
their accounts may be open to the C-C fallacy objection. In response to this, 
I then proposed my own strategy for addressing the C-C fallacy: the evasion 
strategy. I argued that interactionism does not require a constitutive claim 
about the role of external factors in character, and thus does not need to draw 
a distinction between causal coupling and constitutive extension. This allows 
my brand of interactionism to escape the C-C fallacy, as it is not making 
potentially false constitutive claims to begin with. As a result, interactionism 
is better off not making constitution claims, and thereby avoiding this 
particular metaphysical minefield altogether. This evasion strategy thus 
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The Replication Crisis and Moral Character  
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the implications of the replication crisis in psychology 
for philosophical work on moral character and virtue. The replication crisis 
has cast doubt on a range of psychological evidence and raised broader 
questions about psychological methodology and theory. While there has thus 
far been some consideration by philosophers of the general nature of the crisis 
and its broad implications for the philosophy of science, there is another 
crucial area that has received very little attention: the implications of the crisis 
for work on the nature of character and virtue. Philosophical work on virtue 
has become increasingly empirically engaged in recent years, as considerable 
debate has arisen concerning the implications of psychological evidence for 
philosophical theories of character and virtue. If there are potential problems 
with that evidence, as the crisis seems to suggest, then it seems crucial to 
consider and evaluate the replication crisis in greater detail to properly 
determine its implications for philosophical work on virtue. It is the aim of 
this paper to do just that. After considering the core issues of the crisis and 
evaluating the evidence, I will ultimately argue that the interactionist 
approach to moral character emerges as the most promising approach to 
character in light of the replication crisis. The final section of the paper then 
considers some broader methodological implications of the replication crisis 
for future work in philosophical moral psychology.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
There has recently been significant discussion about the so-called ‘replication 
crisis’ (or replicability crisis) in psychology and the social sciences. The crisis 
involves a range of methodological issues with empirical work in psychology. 
In particular, the results of a number of important and influential studies have 
been called into question, raising broader questions about the implications 
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that these issues have for both psychological theory, and, more generally, 
psychology’s scientific status. While this crisis has been the subject of 
significant and ongoing debate in psychology, it also has critical implications 
for philosophical work that makes use of psychological evidence. While there 
has thus far been some consideration by philosophers of the general nature of 
the crisis and its broad implications for the philosophy of science, there is 
another crucial area that has received very little attention: the implications of 
the crisis for work on the nature of character and virtue. Philosophical work 
on virtue has become increasingly empirically engaged in recent years, as 
considerable debate has arisen concerning the implications of psychological 
evidence for philosophical theories of character and virtue. If there are 
potential problems with that evidence, as the crisis seems to suggest, then it 
seems crucial to consider and evaluate the replication crisis in greater detail 
to properly determine its implications for philosophical work on virtue. It is 
the aim of this paper to do just that.  
I begin by presenting some background details on the replication crisis in 
general, and by reviewing the core issues at play. I then provide an overview 
of the recent situationist challenge in philosophical work on virtue, and the 
subsequent character-situation debate. Of particular importance here is the 
recent emergence of interactionist approaches to character as competitive 
alternatives to their virtue ethical and situationist rivals. With the scene set, 
and the players established, I move on to consider the evidence emerging 
from the replication crisis concerning psychological work on character, and 
the implications of this evidence for philosophy. Section 3.4 specifically 
considers the implications for philosophical theorizing about character, and 
argues that interactionism emerges as the most promising approach to 
character in light of the replication crisis. Section 3.5 then considers some 
more general methodological implications for future research in 
philosophical moral psychology. Ultimately, I hope to show both the 
importance of embracing further empirical engagement and cooperation 
between psychologists and philosophers, and that interactionism provides the 
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ideal framework for pursuing such future work on the moral psychology of 
character and virtue.  
 
3.2 The Replication Crisis in Psychology  
Issues with replication and reproducibility are not new to psychology. Even 
in the early stages of psychology’s development into a formal discipline in 
the late 19th and early 20th Centuries there were already studies being done on 
the reproducibility or various experiments and findings. As psychological 
methods, tools, and instruments became more developed and refined during 
the 20th century, this interest in replication increased, both for “advancing and 
refining theory,” and also for demonstrating the reliability of an effect 
(Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 203). As such efforts increased, and as 
the organization and meta-analysis of psychological research increased, 
confidence in psychology’s scientific legitimacy and reliability also increased 
(Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 203). 
While concerns with replication have a long history, the present 
“replication crisis” has primarily developed in the last decade, with many 
psychologists pointing to 2011 as “the watershed year for the replication 
crisis” (Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 204). There were a number of 
reasons for this, including the publication during that year of questionable 
research in prestigious journals; the revelation of Diedrik Stabel’s research 
fraud, which included fabricating data in many of his published studies; and 
the publication of Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn’s (2011) ‘False Positive 
Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows 
Presenting Anything as Significant in Psychological Science,’ which 
highlighted a range of questionable research practices (QRP) in psychology 
(Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, pp. 204-205).  
The combination of these and related events and issues created a 
“collective challenge to the credibility of psychological science,” and 
growing concerns about the reliability and reproducibility of psychological 
results (Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 205). Subsequent broader 
investigations into replication only exacerbated these concerns. For example, 
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the investigation by the Open Science Collaboration (2015) that attempted to 
replicate 100 studies, but reported a replication success rate of only between 
36% and 47%, understandably raised some alarm bells. This has resulted in 
greater concern with replication and research practices than ever before, and 
with numerous other studies aiming to reproduce various results and effects.  
Further studies and evidence added to these concerns about psychological 
methodology. For example, the Many Labs project (Klein et al. 2014, Klein 
et al. 2018), which conducted large-scale, multi-lab replication studies of a 
variety of well-known psychological effects and experiments, found that a 
number of them failed to replicate successfully. Similarly, a number of other 
psychological theories and constructs have been cast into doubt by failed 
replication efforts, including ego depletion (Hagger et al. 2016), the facial 
feedback hypothesis (Wagenmakers et al. 2016), social priming (O’Donnell 
et al. 2018), and the “infirm words” priming effect (Doyen et al. 2012). These 
failed replications, when coupled with other issues such as QRPs, and 
publishing practices that reward novel findings (which may pressure 
researchers to engage in QRPs) and discourage negative findings and 
replications, has resulted in the current widespread concern about whether 
psychology has been undermined by this crisis of failed replications and bad 
practices (Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019).  
While many have expressed concern about psychology’s replication crisis, 
there is no consensus on the scale of the crisis, or even if we should be talking 
about a crisis at all. For example, Smith, Smith and Smith (2017, p. 285) argue 
that replication “currently exists to a sufficient degree for those findings that 
are of interest to the field.” They note that while there are some issues in 
psychology, such as with false positives, psychology cannot be said to be in 
a crisis, and any issues can be addressed “through positive steps rather than 
punitive ones,” and through “an ethic of honest reporting” (Smith, Smith & 
Smith 2017, p. 285). On a different but still positive note, Rodgers and Shrout 
(2018, p. 134) posit that the replication crisis has resulted in “positive self-
examination” within psychology that is helping to grow the discipline, and 
assisting in the “development of new and innovative methodologies.” In 
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contrast to these positive views, others, such as Pashler and Harris (2012, p. 
531), argue against claims that the replication crisis is overblown, and insist 
on the need for “systematic reforms in scientific practice” within psychology.  
I will not attempt to resolve such debates in this paper. Instead, what I am 
concerned with is that there have been replication failures and other 
methodological issues with at least some of the psychological evidence. The 
existence of such problems is enough to raise concerns philosophers should 
care about, so determining whether these issues are worthy of being called a 
crisis will not be the focus of this paper, although I will use the term 
“replication crisis” throughout as shorthand for the methodological concerns 
discussed in this section. What I instead want to investigate is the nature and 
implications of these methodological issues in relation to philosophical 
research. Philosophers have become increasingly interested in empirical 
engagement in recent years, and psychological evidence has helped to inform 
philosophical work on a range of different topics. If some of the psychological 
evidence used by philosophers has now been undermined, then this calls into 
question the philosophical work that has drawn on this evidence. An area of 
particular concern in this regard is the recent empirically inspired work on 
moral character and virtue, which will be the focus of the remainder of this 
paper.   
 
3.3 Recent Developments in Virtue Theory  
Before considering the evidence and implications from the replication crisis 
in more detail, I first want to review some of the recent developments in 
philosophical work on character, in order to establish the relevance of the 
crisis to such work. The recent debates between virtue ethicists and 
situationists have received significant attention in the literature, and I will not 
attempt to describe them in detail here. Instead, I want to provide a snapshot 
of the current state-of-play and leading approaches, and to detail a distinction 
between different kinds of situational influences, as this distinction is crucial 
to my analysis of the implications of the crisis in Section 3.4.  
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Recent debates over the nature of character were initially sparked by 
philosophical situationists, such as John Doris (1998, 2002) and Gilbert 
Harman (1999). Taking inspiration from empirical evidence and the 
situationist tradition in psychology, philosophical situationists challenge the 
idea that people had robust, global character traits that were consistent across 
situations. They argued that the evidence suggested actual human traits were 
far more frail than this, and that situational factors played the primary role in 
determining behavior. For this reason, the traditional virtue ethical view of 
character is not empirically adequate, and should be abandoned in favour for 
a moral psychology that focuses on the power of situations. 
It’s important to note that while situationists have drawn on a broad range 
of evidence that highlights numerous kinds of situational variables that 
influence behavior, we can draw distinctions between different kinds of 
situational influences. Alfano (2013, p. 40) proposes a helpful taxonomy of 
situational factors that distinguishes between “bad reasons” and “situational 
non-reasons.”1 Bad reasons include things like temptations to act in ways that 
we know are, all-things-considered, problematic. As Alfano (2013, p. 41) 
notes, temptations are easily accounted for by virtue ethicists, as they “slot 
nicely into their scheme of virtue, continence, incontinence, and vice,” and 
thus have not figured much in the situationist critique.  
A more interesting variety of bad reason is what Alfano (2013, p. 41) calls 
“situational demand characteristics.” Demand characteristics are a more 
subtle kind of temptation to act on bad reasons, that “either give people bad 
reasons without their realizing it or induce them to attend too much to bad 
reasons and too little to good reasons” (Alfano 2013, p. 41). A well-known 
example of a demand characteristic is the bystander effect, in which people 
become less likely to help someone in need if there are other people present 
(see, e.g., Darley & Latane 1968; Latane & Darley 1970). In bystander effect 
 
1 Alfano (2013, pp. 50-53) also discusses a third category: “non-moral individual 
differences.” As he himself notes though, the influence of such factors is harder to pinpoint, 
and the evidence in favour of them much more limited. Due to this, I will leave this category 
out of my discussion.  
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cases, the sense of responsibility to help is diffused as the number of people 
present who could help increases, because each individual now knows that 
there are others who may help instead. Additionally, the presence of multiple 
potential helpers also affects the ways in which individuals construe the 
situation, as the inaction of others can lead them to thinking that this may not 
be a situation that calls for help (Alfano 2013, p. 42). The influences involved 
in bystander effect cases thus cause people to focus too much on bad reasons, 
without their knowledge of this happening, which is why they are more 
difficult to avoid than conventional temptations.  
The evidence illustrating the power of demand characteristics raises 
potential difficulties for virtue ethics, as it shows situational forces to be both 
more influential than is often though, and much harder to detect. As Alfano 
(2013, p. 43) notes though, improving our understanding of demand 
characteristics can help us to recognize their influence. In doing so, we can 
turn them into regular temptations. They may still be difficult to overcome 
(as many temptations are), but this could still be potentially accounted for by 
virtue ethical frameworks, although more recognition of the power of 
situations would still be required.  
This brings us to situational non-reasons, which create the real threat to 
virtue ethical approaches. Non-reasons, as the name suggests, do not even 
give agents a particular reason for action. Instead, they are “merely causal 
influences on moral conduct, and yet they are hugely and secretly influential” 
(Alfano 2013, p. 44). Some categories of non-reasons include priming effects, 
framing effects, mood elevators and depressors, and ambient sensory stimuli, 
such as light and temperature levels. Examples include the effects of ambient 
sound levels on aggression and helping behavior (Donnerstein & Wilson 
1976; Matthews and Cannon 1975), the impact of ambient light levels on 
honesty (Zhong, Bohns & Gino 2010), and the effect of physical warmth 
(from a warm beverage or heat pack) on prosocial behaviour (Williams & 
Bargh 2008).  
As I argued in Chapter 1, non-reasons present a particular and difficult 
challenge to virtue ethical accounts, because they lay outside of the traditional 
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virtue ethical framework. Unlike bad reasons, which can cause agents to act 
poorly by acting on the wrong reasons, non-reasons are seemingly morally 
irrelevant, and are not actively deliberated upon by the agent, yet can still 
influence behaviour. The evidence for non-reasons suggests “not that people 
easily succumb to temptation, but that non-temptations play a surprisingly 
large role in moral conduct” (Alfano 2013, p. 44). Evidence for these kinds 
of influences thus shows that the virtue ethical model – involving as it does 
responsiveness to reasons – cannot account for some important aspects of 
human moral psychology.  
The evidence for the importance of both bad reasons and non-reasons type 
influences challenges virtue ethicists by calling into question the empirical 
adequacy of their accounts of moral psychology. A range of responses have 
been made to this challenge. One of the most popular is the rarity response, 
which claims that virtue was always supposed to be something rarely 
achieved in practice. As a result, evidence that virtue is rare doesn’t 
undermine the virtue ethical framework after all. While this response does 
address some of the situationist evidence, it still fails to properly account for 
the surprising influence of non-reasons, which don’t fit in with the virtue 
ethical focus on reasons-responsiveness. In contrast, other virtue ethicists 
have taken issue with the evidence itself and questioned whether it actually 
does undermine their accounts (see, e.g., Sabini & Silver 2005; Sreenivasan 
2008). It is important to note though that there is now widespread recognition 
of the importance of situational factors in psychology, even by personality 
psychologists who have traditionally emphasized the individual as the 
primary determinant of behaviour (Tracy, Robins & Sherman 2009, pp. 1213-
1215). Thus, even if these virtue ethicists are right and there are issues with 
some of the evidence, or perhaps with how that evidence has been utilized by 
situationist philosophers, there is still a mass of evidence illustrating the 
importance of situational influences. Further to this, I will show in the next 
section why this evidence still creates problems for the virtue ethical position.  
Despite the compelling evidence in favour of situationism, there is also 
good reason to think that situationism itself goes too far. For example, while 
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the influence of personal factors on behavior is limited, Funder and Ozer 
(1983) famously claimed that the influence of situational factors was also 
limited, and perhaps only a little more influential than personal factors. As a 
result, there is reason to think that the power of situations and the power of 
personal factors may be “roughly on par” (Alfano 2013, p. 77). Additionally, 
there is also support for the importance of personal factors from the so-called 
“aggregation solution” (Alfano 2016, p. 129). For example, Epstein (1983) 
notes that when we consider data about the behavior of an individual over 
time, and aggregate it across different situations, a greater degree of reliability 
and consistency is observed. In a more recent article, Jayawickreme et al. 
(2014, p. 298) surveyed a range of recent evidence supporting the importance 
of personality traits, but ultimately conclude in favour of an integrated 
approach: “in light of the totality of the evidence presented, psychologists 
across the field have accepted the evidence and concluded that both situations 
and persons are powerful.” Due to evidence such as this, situationists may 
have been overstating their case by suggesting that situational influences are 
the main drivers of behavior.  
It is thus widely recognized in contemporary psychology that both 
personal and situational factors play an important role in behavior. What thus 
seems clear is that we need an approach to character that recognizes the 
importance of personal, social, and environmental influences on behavior, 
and the dynamic and reciprocal ways in which they influence and shape one 
another. This is where interactionism enters the picture, as it provides us with 
just such an account. Interactionism emphasizes the dynamic interplay 
between personal and situational variables, and makes such interactions its 
focus. These interactions are ongoing and multidirectional, as “situations 
affect persons, who subsequently affect these situations”, and so on (Endler 
1982, p. 217). Interactionism posits an important role for both personal and 
situational factors, but is most interested in the ways in which they interact, 
as this is crucial for understanding personality and behavior. It is also 
important to note that in recognizing that the interactions between agent and 
environment can be dynamic and variable, interactionism posits that character 
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traits can be realized in different ways. One person’s trait of courage might 
be primarily driven by their personal factors, while another person’s courage 
may involve more environmental and social supports. Such traits can thus be 
said to be multiply realizable (Alfano 2014, p. 84-85). 2 
Interactionism has a long history in psychology and has become the 
dominant approach to personality among psychologists, and is usually seen 
as the logical resolution to the debates between personality theorists and 
situationist social psychologists. More recently, a number of philosophers 
(e.g. Alfano 2013, 2016; Skorburg 2017; 2019) have come to endorse 
interactionism as being the logical next step for philosophers as well, arguing 
that it represents the best fit with the empirical evidence, and that it can help 
us to move past the debates between virtue ethicists and situationists.  
While interactionism stands as a promising way of thinking about 
character and virtue, it has not yet become a dominant approach in 
philosophy, despite some claims that “everyone’s an interactionist” (Mehl et 
al. 2015, p. 62). This is firstly because there has thus far been limited work 
done on interactionism by philosophers, and there is thus a need for the further 
development of the interactionist position in philosophy. The other reason it 
can’t be said to be the dominant framework is because there continues to be 
advocacy for both situationist (Vargy 2018) and more traditional virtue 
ethical (West 2018) accounts of character. The debate over the nature of 
character is thus still a live one.  
This continued debate has had an important methodological upshot, in that 
it has created a trend towards empirical engagement in philosophical moral 
psychology. While some have resisted this trend, most have embraced it, and 
drawing on empirical evidence from psychology is now common among 
 
2 As Alfano (2014, p. 85-86) notes, and as I mentioned in Chapter 1, interesting normative 
questions arise in relation to this multiple realisability claim. For example, we may specify 
that for someone’s trait to count as virtuous, it may need to meet a minimum threshold of 
contribution from their personal attributes, and thus not be overly reliant on social and 
environmental supports. While interesting, fully exploring these implications is work for a 
different paper.  
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philosophers working on virtue. Such a methodological approach has many 
potential benefits, in that it allows philosophers to develop richer and more 
psychological realistic moral psychologies, which can, in turn, also help guide 
work in normative ethics, such as questions about the demandingness of 
moral theories. There is thus potentially much to be gained, by both 
philosophers and psychologists, from greater engagement and collaboration 
between the disciplines, which I will explore in more detail in Section 3.6. 
In light of this empirical shift, it becomes clear why the issues with 
replication in psychology should be of great concern to philosophers. 
Philosophers working on character have not only been engaging with 
psychology more, but have also been relying on psychological evidence for 
the development of approaches like situationism and interactionism. The 
replication crisis thus presents a clear threat to such work, for if the evidence 
supporting these approaches is called into question, these frameworks may 
similarly be undermined. While philosophers have given some attention to 
the replication crisis in general, there has been very little consideration of the 
implications for work on character and virtue specifically, which this paper 
will hope to remedy somewhat.  
 
3.4 Implications of the Crisis for Moral Character  
Having set up the replication crisis and its relation to recent debates in 
philosophy over the nature of character, I now want to investigate the 
implications of the crisis for work on character in detail. What is of particular 
interest is whether the more empirically engaged approaches to character that 
have been developed in response to the situationist challenge, such as 
interactionism, are troubled or undermined by the replication crisis. I will 
seek to show that while there are issues with some of the psychological 
evidence, it has not all been undermined, and there is still good support for 
the importance of situational factors. Further to this, I will also sketch out a 
variety of reasons why interactionism remains the best way of approaching 
character, even in light of the replication crisis.  
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We’ll start with the bad news. There have been replication issues with a 
number of studies relevant to work on moral character. This includes some of 
the evidence supporting the power of situational factors, such as some of the 
evidence for situational non-reasons. As I mentioned in Section 3.2, some 
priming effects have failed to replicate in subsequent studies. For example, 
the Many Labs project (Klein et al. 2014), found that a number of priming 
effects either replicated poorly, or not at all. Similarly, O’Donnell et al. (2018) 
and Doyen et al. (2012) conducted replication studies for priming effects, and 
also found a failure to replicate.  
There have also been replication problems with another well-known non-
reasons type effect. I previously mentioned the findings by Williams and 
Bargh (2008) that physical warmth can influence prosocial behavior. As they 
write: “experiences of physical temperature per se affect one’s impressions 
of and prosocial behavior toward other people, without one’s awareness of 
such influences” (Williams & Bargh 2008, p. 607). This study represents a 
clear example of a morally irrelevant, ambient feature impacting behaviour 
without the agent’s conscious awareness, and thus seems like a good example 
of a situational non-reason. Yet subsequent replication studies by Lynott et 
al. (2014) and Chabris et al. (2019) were unable to replicate the results of the 
original study.   
In addition to these issues with non-reasons type situational influences, 
there have also been problems with some of the evidence for the better known, 
bad reasons situational factors. The Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney, 
Banks & Zimbardo 1973; Zimbardo et al. 1973), one of the most famous 
psychological experiments in history, is frequently pointed to as an extreme 
example of the power of situations, and was a favourite example of 
situationists in philosophy. Aside from ethical concerns over the nature of the 
experiment, subsequent investigation has also revealed a range of other 
methodological concerns, including issues with data collection, and with the 
‘guards’ in the experiment being specifically instructed on how to treat the 
‘prisoners’ (Le Texier 2019). These issues have cast significant doubt on the 
striking and provocative findings of the experiment.  
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Based on these examples, we can see that there may be reason to question 
the power of situational influences, especially when it comes to non-reasons. 
The replication crisis thus may have taken the sting out of the situationist 
challenge. Depending on one’s perspective though, all of this might not be 
such bad news after all. For the virtue ethicist, these examples could be taken 
as proof that the situationists did overstate their claims, and that virtue ethics 
isn’t threatened by the evidence after all. As noted earlier, some virtue 
ethicists responded to the initial situationist challenge by making arguments 
criticizing the empirical evidence. The new evidence arising from the 
replication crisis could support similar arguments to counter the situationist 
threat. Alternatively, the virtue ethicist may take these developments as a sign 
that they can justifiably ignore psychology, at least for now. As Alfano (2018, 
p. 117-118) notes, earlier responses to situationism sometimes took such an 
approach, arguing either that “the empirical evidence is in principle 
irrelevant” to virtue theory, or that the specific kinds of evidence cited by 
situationists are irrelevant to virtue theory. Again then, the replication crisis 
may be taken as justification for such approaches, given that some evidence 
has been cast into doubt.  
As Alfano (2018) argues though, virtue ethicists would be better off taking 
the former, empirically-engaged response in light of the replication crisis, 
rather than the latter approach of withdrawing from or ignoring psychology. 
Part of the reason for this is the general importance of psychological realism. 
Flanagan (1991, p. 32) argues that the majority of ethical traditions are 
committed to psychological realism to some extent, and seek to meet at least 
a minimal standard, which he formulates as the Principle of Minimal 
Psychological Realism (PMPR): 
“Make sure when constructing a moral theory of projecting a moral ideal 
that the character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are 
possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures like us.” 
Further to this, virtue ethics has traditionally been particularly concerned with 
psychological realism, both in the sense that virtue ethicists frequently make 
descriptive claims about moral psychology, and also that the Aristotelian 
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tradition has always emphasized the importance of practice, and the actual 
cultivation of virtuous traits, rather than a purely theoretical understanding of 
virtue. To remain separated from or uninterested in the empirical evidence 
thus seems problematic in light of such aspirations.  
More than this though, the virtue ethicist should take the empirically 
engaged response because things seem to be shaping up in their favour. 
Evidence supporting personal factors, such as personality traits, has thus far 
not been as troubled by replication issues as the evidence for situational 
influences. In terms of the evidence for situational factors, Alfano (2018, p. 
119) notes that the best supported situational influences tend to be those that 
“provide reasons for thought, feeling, and action.” As a result, while virtue 
ethics may be in need of some revisions, the core account of human agency 
offered by virtue ethics hasn’t been undermined, because it is able to account 
for these kinds of reason-giving situational influences (Alfano 2018, p. 119). 
If the replication crisis does show non-reasons to be out of the moral 
psychological picture, then virtue ethics may turn out to be empirically 
adequate after all, and be the best framework for future philosophical work 
on the moral psychology of character.  
I want to argue to against this line of thinking, and to instead show that 
interactionism remains the better fit with the empirical evidence.3 To do this, 
I’ll begin by noting that that there is still support for the existence of non-
reasons. There has been good support for priming, for one thing. For example, 
in contrast to the previously mentioned failed replication of the “infirm 
words” priming effect by Doyen et al. (2012), there have been two successful 
replications of this effect by Cesario, Plaks and Higgins (2006) and Hull et al. 
(2002). Additionally, a meta-analysis of 167 studies conducted by Cameron, 
Brown-Iannuzzi and Payne (2012, p. 330) found that “sequential priming 
 
3 It is worth noting that interactionism and virtue ethics need not be incompatible. Some 
traditional approaches to virtue ethics, such as Aristotelianism, already contain some 
interactionist elements, and with a suitable amount of revision we could derive a fully 
interactionist virtue ethics. My point here is that virtue ethics is not interactionist enough, and 
it is still troubled by the empirical evidence, especially the influence of non-reasons.  
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tasks were significantly associated with behavioral measures,” and that “these 
results generalized across a variety of study domains and methodological 
behaviors.” There is thus still a broad range of support for priming effects, 
and we shouldn’t be too quick to dismiss them on the basis of a few failed 
replications.  
Similarly, the issues with Williams and Bargh’s (2008) work on 
temperature and prosocial behavior that I mentioned before is not a settled 
matter either. To begin with, there has been a successful conceptual 
replication of the study by IJzerman and Semin (2009), which has itself been 
replicated by Schilder, IJzerman and Denissen (2014). Further to this, Bargh 
and Melnikoff (2019) also highlight related studies showing the ability of 
physical warmth to prime social warmth, as well as neuroscientific evidence 
supporting this phenomenon. Bargh and Melnikoff (2019) also note some 
methodological reasons that the previously mentioned replication by Chabris 
et al. (2019) may have failed, such as differences in the temperature of the 
beverage between the original study and the replication. While further 
investigation may be necessary, there is thus still good suggestive support for 
the influence of these kinds of situational non-reasons as well.  
As well as this evidence for non-reasons, there has also been replication 
support for situational demand characteristics. For example, Milgram (1963, 
1974) repeated his famous experiments on obedience, one of the most 
frequently cited situationist examples, and replicated its results reliably 
(Pettigrew 2018, p. 968). With some adjustments made in response to ethical 
concerns, Doliński et al. (2017) were also able to produce results similar to 
Milgram’s original studies. Alfano (2013, p. 42) highlights support for 
another well-known situational factor, the previously mentioned bystander 
effect, which has been well-supported by a range of related studies (Latané & 
Nida 1981; Schwartz & Gottlieb 1980).  
As a final point of response to the replication crisis, we can note that 
replication failures in and of themselves do not prove the phenomena or effect 
in question do not exist, and there may be other factors at play. Vargy (2018, 
p. 280) notes: “Given the complex nature of social and motivational 
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behaviours, it is natural to expect priming effects to exhibit significant 
variations due to individual differences and minor variables in the 
experimental context,” and that we thus shouldn’t jump too quickly to 
conclusions in response to replication failures. In a different vein, Doris 
(2015, pp. 46-47) posits that responses to evidence of priming effects may 
have been coloured by the incredulity bias, which “presumes that if a study 
reports a surprising finding, there must be something fishy.” Finally, the 
authors of the second Many Labs report (Klein et al. 2018), which found a 
number of replication failures, note that “the failures to replicate do not 
necessarily mean that the tested hypotheses are incorrect,” and that further 
investigation and study is needed to better explore particular effects and 
phenomena. We thus shouldn’t take a failed replication as immediate proof 
against a particular experiment or hypothesis.  
In making the points in this section, I have not been trying to show that the 
replication crisis is a non-issue, and that there are no issues with the relevant 
evidence. Clearly there are methodological problems in psychology, 
including issues with some of the evidence related to character and moral 
behavior. What I have tried to show though is that when it comes to evidence 
for the power of situations, not all the relevant studies have failed to replicate, 
and some of it has actually replicated quite well. There is thus still quite a 
large mass of evidence supporting the existence and surprising influence of 
both situational bad-reasons and situational non-reasons.  
As a result of all this, we can see that despite some replication problems, 
there is still compelling evidence for both situational demand characteristics, 
and situational non-reasons. When taken together with the evidence 
supporting the role of personal factors, we can see that it is still important to 
give proper consideration to both personal and situational factors. Crucially, 
we can see that there is still support for at least some non-reason type 
situational factors, which means that there are still significant problems for 
virtue ethics, as its framework cannot properly incorporate such morally 
irrelevant influences on moral behavior. In contrast to virtue ethics and 
situationism, interactionism is able to properly account for and explain this 
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full range of personal and situational factors. It thus remains a highly 
compelling framework for character, as it possesses greater explanatory 
power than its rivals.  
In addition, empirical evidence continues to support interactionism’s 
appeal as a framework for understanding and predicting behavior (Fleeson 
2007), and there is also a range of evidence supporting interactionist 
interpretations of various kinds of moral behavior (see, e.g., Walker, Frimer 
& Dunlop 2010; Romer, Gruder & Lizzardo 1986; Jayawickreme & Di 
Stefano 2012). Interactionism is also widely acknowledged as the dominant 
framework for personality and character in psychology (Hill & Lapsley 2009; 
McAdams 2006). There is thus still significant empirical support for the 
interactionist position.  
Ultimately, it is my contention that despite some replication issues, 
interactionism still represents the best fit with the empirical evidence, and is 
not undermined by the ongoing replication crisis. Virtue ethicists may take 
the crisis as good news, and perhaps even as a sign that they can return to the 
earlier, less empirically engaged approaches to virtue theory that were 
dominant before the situationist challenge. As I have argued though, there is 
still good support for the power of situations, so if the virtue ethicists were to 
carry on with business as usual and ignore this evidence, their account would 
be empirically inadequate. In showing how interactionism can cope with the 
replication crisis, I hope to have further highlighted interactionism’s appeal 
as an account of character, and its advantages over its rivals.  
  
3.4.1 Is Interactionism Held Hostage by the Evidence?  
I want to turn now to a potential worry about interactionism that is amplified 
by the present state of flux in the evidence, which we can call the ‘hostage to 
the evidence objection.’ The worry is that if we pitch interactionism’s chief 
selling point as being its empirical adequacy, and that it provides a better fit 
with the evidence than its rivals, then it might become hostage to the evidence. 
That is to say, if interactionism’s fit with the empirical evidence is its only (or 
at least its main) selling point, then if there were to be a significant change in 
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the evidence and the prevailing empirical view, the rug could be pulled out 
from under the interactionist and leave them with very little to go on. Given 
the ongoing crisis and instability in psychology and questions over the 
empirical evidence, this seems to be a particularly pressing issue. As a result 
of such ongoing questions over the evidence, we might not want our approach 
to character to be entirely dependent on such evidence.  
To press this objection, a critic might contend that because, in the previous 
section, I argued that interactionism seems best positioned given how it fits 
with the evidence, that I am placing my argument on shaky foundations. If 
problems were to arise with that evidence, or new evidence were to emerge 
that overturned the prevailing view, then interactionism would need to fall 
back on some other desirable attributes. If the evidence forms the entire basis 
of its appeal as a theory of character though, then the interactionist would 
have nothing else to fall back to. While this could be a general concern or 
worry for theories of character, it seems particularly concerning in light of the 
ongoing crisis in psychology. The concerns over various existing kinds of 
evidence, coupled with the potential for new kinds of evidence to arise (given 
psychology’s relative immaturity as a scientific discipline) mean that there is 
a genuine concern over whether the interactionist might be going awry by 
making themselves so dependent on the evidence.  
To address this concern, I first want to begin by acknowledging that, at 
least to a certain extent, it is necessary for interactionism to be dependent on 
the evidence. This is because, in so far as interactionism aims at being an 
account of the descriptive moral psychology of character that is 
psychologically realistic, it will always be beholden, at least to an extent, to 
the evidence that informs our best understanding of the psychological 
properties of human agents. Even if we are only interested in a minimal sense 
of psychological realism, such as Flanagan’s (1991) PMPR, we would still 
need to meet basic requirements about proposing models of character and 
moral agency that are actually attainable by human agents. The systematic 
observations of human behavior presented in psychological evidence would 
then be one of the primary ways we can determine if we are meeting such 
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requirements. Thus, unless we were content with abandoning psychological 
realism all together, our theorizing about the moral psychology of character 
will always need to be tied to the best available empirical evidence, at least 
to some extent.  
In addition to this though, I will also make a few points about 
interactionism’s advantages beyond just giving the best fit with the empirical 
evidence, to show how it has some insurance against new developments in 
relation to the empirical evidence, and thereby dispel the worry over it being 
held hostage to the evidence. Firstly, we can note that interactionism, as a 
theoretical framework for character, possesses great explanatory scope and 
power. It doesn’t focus narrowly on either persons or situations, but instead 
seeks to give proper attention to both, always with an eye to the ways they 
interact with and influence each other. In casting such a wide net, it seeks to 
capture the full richness of character and moral psychology, and to properly 
consider them in their environmentally situated contexts. While the true 
measure of its explanatory power will be dependent on the empirical 
evidence, its broad scope sets it apart from rivals that tend to focus on one 
side of the person-situation equation at the expense of the other.  
Related to this first point, interactionism also has great flexibility and 
adaptability. Interactionism has broad scope, in that it properly recognizes 
both personal and situational influences on behavior, and the varied ways in 
which they can interact with each other. This makes it better positioned to 
adapt to future shifts and developments in the empirical evidence. For 
example, if, contra my arguments in Section 3.4, it turned out that a lot of the 
evidence supporting the power of situations had been undermined, this 
wouldn’t necessarily also undermine interactionism. The interactionist may 
need to revise their account of the role of situations, but unless new 
developments in the evidence somehow showed situations had almost no 
influence on agents, or that the interactions between the agent and the 
situation were unimportant, the interactionist ship would not be sunk. In 
contrast, this kind of undermining of the evidence would cast significant 
doubt on situationist accounts of character. The same can be said if we 
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reversed the case and new evidence emerged that showed personal factors to 
be less important in moral behavior than previously thought. This would 
create significant problems for the virtue ethicist, but could be accounted for 
by interactionism.  
As I noted earlier, moreover, interactionism allows for character traits to 
be realized in different ways, with varying levels of input from environmental 
and personal factors. If it turned out that personal factors only played a 
significant role in the character or a very small number of people, or, 
conversely, that personal factors were the drivers for character for most 
people, then interactionism could account for either development. As I argued 
above though, interactionism, like any account interested in psychological 
realism, will always be somewhat dependent on the evidence, and this 
flexibility thus wouldn’t be limitless. What I have tried to show though is that 
interactionism possesses a great deal of flexibility, and is thus well-equipped 
to handled future changes or shifts in the evidence.  
The final point I will make in response to the hostage to the evidence 
objection is that it also applies to situationists and virtue ethicists. Provided 
they are interested in some degree of psychological realism for their accounts 
of character, virtue ethicists and situationists will also be held hostage by the 
evidence. Given that empirical evidence was the main driver of the 
development of situationism in philosophy, it would be a very strange move 
for the situationist to abandon psychological realism. As I discussed earlier 
though, some virtue ethicists have taken the approach of suggesting their 
accounts are unfalsifiable, or that they don’t need to be empirically adequate, 
so they might insist that they are not held hostage by the evidence after all. 
As I also argued earlier though, this seems to be a problematic move, given 
that virtue ethics often takes its descriptive richness to be a key selling point, 
and that virtue ethicists traditionally have placed a great deal of importance 
on the practical elements of moral development. Furthermore, many virtue 
ethicists have now noted the need for empirical adequacy, thereby making 
themselves hostage to the evidence as well.  
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Due to these factors, the hostage to the evidence objection also applies to 
virtue ethics and situationism. Further to this though, because interactionism 
has great scope and flexibility as a theory of character, it is actually better 
able to handle this objection than its rivals, and for that reason, we can see 
that the hostage to the evidence objection is actually a more serious threat to 
situationism and virtue ethics than it is to interactionism. Thus, while this 
objection may persist, interactionism has theoretical resources and 
advantages beyond its fit with the empirical evidence, and this results in it 
being able to handle the hostage to the evidence objection better than its 
rivals.  
 
3.5 Methodological Implications for Work in Philosophical 
Moral Psychology 
In this final section I want to consider some broader, methodological 
implications of the replication crisis for philosophy work on character, and 
moral psychology more generally. The main line of thinking I will seek to 
address goes something like this: the replication crisis raises serious questions 
about psychology’s scientific status, and the legitimacy and usefulness of its 
evidence. While I agree that the ongoing replication problems in psychology 
show the need for greater care and caution in the use of psychological 
evidence in philosophical theorizing, I will seek to demonstrate in this section 
why the best response is further engagement and collaboration with 
psychology, rather than withdrawing from empirical engagement in favour of 
more traditional philosophical methods.  
I’ll start by considering this worry in relation to work on character in 
particular. In the previous section, I noted that issues with the evidence for 
non-reasons might make the virtue ethicist think that their account was 
empirically adequate after all, before going on to show why this attitude 
would be problematic. Now I want to consider the possibility that the 
replication crisis might make the virtue ethicist (and other philosophers 
working on character) skeptical of empirical engagement in general. The 
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character-situation debate arose directly in response to empirical evidence. 
Now that such evidence has been called into question, philosophers working 
on character may wonder if it was just a lot of fuss over nothing. As a result, 
empirical engagement may not be that important after all, and we could return 
to pre-debate ways of doing philosophical work on character, which were 
“largely divorced from empirical psychology” (Snow 2010, p. 2). This could 
be taken two ways. The first would be a response of delaying action: we 
should hold off from further use of psychological evidence until psychology 
has got its house in order. The second is a more extreme version: empirical 
engagement for philosophical theorizing about character is a misguided 
endeavor, and we should focus instead on other methodological approaches.  
Related to this second option, the virtue ethicist might insist that the 
empirical evidence is irrelevant to virtue theory, or that their theory of virtue 
is in some sense unfalsifiable, as was seen in some earlier contributions to the 
character-situation debate (Alfano 2018, pp. 117-118). In any of these 
responses just discussed, the ultimate result is a withdrawing from 
engagement with psychology, either temporarily, or permanently.  
The same worry could be expanded to apply more generally to the use of 
psychological evidence in other philosophical work on moral psychology, and 
also to other areas of philosophical research that draws on psychology, such 
as the philosophy of mind. Engagement with psychology and empirical 
evidence has become commonplace in many areas of philosophical inquiry. 
The replication crisis may show that this trend is misguided though, and that 
again we should either hold off on our engagement with psychology for now, 
or perhaps turn to other, less empirically engaged philosophical methods 
instead. 
In response to this worry, we can start by noting that there is some merit 
to this line of thinking. Some philosophers have been too easily impressed by, 
and too quick to draw implications from, evidence that is limited in scope, or 
that was methodologically suspect. There is thus a legitimate need for a more 
cautious and critical approach to empirical engagement, one that doesn’t leap 
to drawing drastic conclusions too readily.  
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This doesn’t show that we should be withdrawing from empirical 
engagement with psychology though. This is firstly because there is good 
support for and replication of some of the evidence, as I argued in the previous 
section. In addition, a range of other studies have successfully replicated, 
while others still require further investigation and replication. Given the 
positive signs of successful replication though, coupled with the wealth of 
psychological studies that are conducted with exacting and precise 
methodologies to begin with, we can take a positive outlook on the chances 
of successful future replication studies. Thus, while the crisis raises legitimate 
concerns and shows that more analysis and replication is needed, there is also 
reason to think that the scale and breadth of the problems is at least somewhat 
overblown (Smith, Smith & Smith 2017).  
Additionally, while replication problems and suspect methodologies do 
raise justified worries, the crisis is not an entirely negative thing. As I noted 
in Section 3.2, some psychologists argue that the crisis is helping to generate 
greater interest in psychological methodology, and fostering greater self-
analysis and rigour, the development of new methodologies, and greater 
interest in replication studies to better support claims and theories (Rodgers 
& Shrout 2018). This last point is important, given that psychology journals 
have traditionally shown limited interest in publishing replication studies, so 
the replication crisis is helping to shift these publication practices in favour 
of more replication (Wiggins & Chrisopherson 2019, p. 207). These positive 
developments thus illustrate that the replication crisis may be a healthy sign 
of psychology’s scientific maturation, as it refines its methodological tools, 
and better supports its claims and theories.  
Taken together, the fact that there is a wealth of good psychological 
evidence, and that psychology as a discipline is rapidly responding to existing 
issues, moving away from engagement with psychology in philosophy would 
be an unnecessary step and an overreaction. Indeed, philosophers could play 
a role in assisting psychologists to move past this crisis. As Morawski (2019) 
notes, the crisis doesn’t just raise methodological concerns, but also questions 
about psychology’s underlying philosophical and theoretical approaches, 
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such as conceptual questions about what constitutes a ‘crisis’ and 
‘replication,’ and also about psychology’s epistemological and metaphysical 
commitments. Philosophers could play a role in helping psychologists 
address such questions.  
Benefits run both ways though: as I have noted at various points, 
psychological evidence usefully informs philosophical work on moral 
character, and a range of other topics. Greater engagement and collaboration 
between philosophy and psychology could thus also lead to the gathering of 
valuable new empirical evidence. For example, the work conducted by 
Bollich et al. (2016) featured an interdisciplinary team of philosophers and 
psychologists (including John Doris) and developed an innovative method of 
investigating everyday moral behaviour. Similarly, Mark Alfano, one of the 
primary proponents of interactionism in philosophy, has recently done 
worked (Alfano et al. 2017) with a team of psychologists and philosophers to 
investigate intellectual humility. Such work highlights the benefits of greater 
collaboration between philosophy and psychology.  
Ultimately, I have tried to show in this section that philosophers should 
not jump to drastic conclusions in response to the replication crisis. While the 
crisis has drawn attention to the need for cautious and critical engagement, 
there is still a broad range of useful and well-supported psychological 
evidence, and a range of benefits to be gained from further engagement with 
psychology. Withdrawing from empirical engagement would thus be a 
mistake. Further to this, as I argued in the previous section, interactionism as 
a philosophical approach to character has the best fit with the empirical 
evidence, even in light of the replication crisis. Interactionism also remains 
the dominant approach to personality in psychology. It is thus ideally 
positioned to guide future collaborative work between philosophers and 
psychologists that investigates the nature of character and moral behaviour.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper has argued in favour of a response to the replication crisis that 
recognizes the issues and challenges involved, while also arguing that this 
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should not cause us to abandon engagement with empirical psychology in 
the philosophy of character. I have attempted to show that interactionism is 
capable of weathering this replication storm better than its rivals, and is an 
excellent framework for guiding future work on moral character. The paper 
began by reviewing the replication crisis in psychology, and some reasons 
why, despite the limited attention it has received in the philosophical 
literature, it should be of great interest to both philosophers in general, and 
to those working on virtue theory in particular. I then considered the recent 
debates over the nature of character in the philosophical literature, and how 
the replication crisis poses a potential challenge to empirically-driven 
approaches to character, such as situationism and interactionism. In 
response to this, I set about reviewing the evidence concerning replication 
and other methodological issues with the psychological evidence relating to 
character. While some of the evidence is troubled by replication problems, 
there is also support for the influence of both bad-reasons and non-reasons 
type situational effects.  
 For these reasons, I have argued that it is problematic to simply write off 
the situational evidence as completely undermined, as not all the evidence 
has methodological problems, and some of it has been well supported and 
replicated. As such, it would be problematic for philosophers to revert back 
to less empirically engaged approaches to moral psychology, as there is still 
good evidence that challenges traditional virtue ethical accounts. As a result, 
interactionism still seems like the best fit with the empirical evidence, and 
the best framework for guiding future work and adapting to future 
developments in the empirical evidence, owing to its greater explanatory 
power and theoretical flexibility. In the final section of the paper I tried to 
illustrate the need for further engagement by philosophers with the 
empirical literature, and for greater collaboration between philosophers and 
psychologists, which could have great mutual benefit. While the replication 
crisis may show the need for greater caution and precision when it comes to 
drawing implications for philosophical theorizing from empirical 
psychology, this doesn’t mean that such efforts are not worthwhile, or that 
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the recent interactionist trend in philosophy was misguided. Interactionism 
still stands as the framework of character that has the best fit with both 
psychological theory and the empirical evidence, and is thus best positioned 
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Chapter 4   
Virtue, Well-Being, and Interactionism 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to investigate some of the implications of situationism 
for philosophical thinking about well-being, and in particular for perfectionist 
approaches to well-being. Given the deep connection between virtue and 
well-being for perfectionism, the situationist threat to conventional models of 
virtue also raises doubts over perfectionist accounts of well-being. In this 
paper I will present two situationist challenges that undermine Aristotelian 
perfectionism. I will then introduce and motivate a shift towards a different 
version of perfectionism: interactionist perfectionism (IP). In showing that 
this interactionist version of perfectionism can counter the two main 
challenges from situationism, I will demonstrate that perfectionism can 
survive this empirically motivated critique, and remains an appealing and 
viable way of approaching well-being.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to investigate some of the implications of situationism 
for philosophical thinking about well-being, and in particular for perfectionist 
approaches to well-being. Given the deep connection between virtue and 
well-being for perfectionism, the situationist threat to conventional models of 
virtue also raises doubts over perfectionist accounts of well-being. While the 
situationist challenge to Aristotelian virtue ethics has received significant 
attention, the issues it raises for thinking about well-being have received far 
less consideration. More pointedly, while some authors (Haybron 2014) have 
highlighted the threat that situationism poses to Aristotelian accounts of well-
being, there have been no substantive efforts to show how this challenge can 
be answered.  
In this paper I will present two challenges to perfectionism that arise from 
the situationist literature and show how they undermine Aristotelian 
130 
 
perfectionism. I will then introduce and motivate a shift towards a different 
version of perfectionism: interactionist perfectionism (IP). This strategy of 
using interactionism to address these challenges to perfectionism is new to 
the literature, and provides a superior choice compared to other strategies 
derived from the character-situation debate, such as the rarity response. In 
showing that this interactionist version of perfectionism can counter the two 
main challenges from situationism, I will demonstrate that perfectionism can 
survive this empirically motivated critique, and remains an appealing and 
viable way of approaching well-being.  
 
4.2 Well-Being, Perfectionism, and Aristotelianism  
Before considering some of the specific details of perfectionist theories of 
well-being, I first want to clarify the conceptual terrain. Well-being and 
happiness are often used synonymously, in both public discourse and the 
philosophical literature. Yet many philosophers also seek to draw distinctions 
between the two. Drawing on Haybron’s (2008, p. 29) illuminating account, 
we can note that: “The concept of well-being is a normative or evaluative 
concept that concerns what benefits a person, is in her interest, is good for 
her, or makes her life go well for her.” Happiness can be used in the same 
sense as this, but it is more commonly used in a purely psychological sense 
to refer to “some broad and typically lasting aspect of the individual’s state 
of mind: being happy” (Haybron 2008, p. 30). This psychological sense of 
being happy also needs to be kept separate from the temporary emotional or 
mood sense of “feeling happy,” as happiness involves long-term 
psychological experiences, as opposed to just short-term feelings of happiness 
(Haybron 2008, p. 30). Broken down this way, we thus have two distinct 
concepts in this discussion: one which concerns what it is for someone’s life 
to go well for them (well-being), and one which involves an appealing long-
term psychological state (the most common view of happiness) (Haybron 
2008, p. 32).  
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Other concepts of importance in the literature are flourishing, eudaimonia, 
and welfare. Eudaimonia being the term originally used by Aristotle, and 
generally thought of as conveying something like the definition of well-being 
outlined above. Similarly, welfare and flourishing are also most commonly 
used in the same way as well-being, and together with ‘well-being,’ are 
generally seen as the best ways of translating eudaimonia into English. Using 
the distinction made above between well-being and happiness, we can see 
why many have argued that Aristotle had no theory or conception of 
happiness at all, but only a theory of well-being (Kraut 1979, p. 167; Haybron 
2008, p. 32). This is because Aristotle was concerned with what makes 
someone’s life to go well for them, and not with their lasting psychological 
state. While this may be disputed, what’s critical for my purposes in this paper 
is that I am focused on what it is for someone’s life to go well for them, rather 
than with purely psychological states. It is for this reason that I will discuss 
‘well-being’ throughout the rest of the paper, rather than ‘happiness.’   
In this paper I will focus on perfectionist theories of well-being, which are 
those that take perfection to be a “fundamental or ultimate constituent of well-
being” (Haybron 2007, p. 2). For perfectionists, perfection is often a matter 
of maximising one’s capacities or nature, but can be thought of more broadly 
as involving excellence or virtue, which “includes, but certainly is not limited 
to, moral virtue” (Haybron 2007, p. 2). Perfectionist theories of well-being 
are far from being dominant in the contemporary literature, but they have 
recently seen a resurgence in interest.1 In particular, Aristotelian theories of 
well-being, which fall under the perfectionist banner, have been growing in 
interest and influence and have become “chief competitors in discussions of 
well-being” (Haybron 2007, p. 1). Aristotelian perfectionism is the most 
popular variety of perfectionism, and it is thus worth discussing in a bit more 
detail.  
What is critical for Aristotelian approaches is that “well-being consists in 
a life of virtuous activity” (Haybron 2014, p. 252). As Aristotle 
 




(Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a16-17) writes: “human good turns out to be 
activity of the soul in conformity with excellence, and if there are more than 
one excellence, in conformity with the best and most complete.” Summarising 
Aristotle, Kraut (1979, p. 170) notes that “Aristotle thinks that the most 
eudaimon individual is someone who has fully developed and regularly 
exercises the various virtues of the soul, both intellectual and moral.” 
Furthermore, it is critical to Aristotle’s view of well-being that it takes place 
over the course of “a complete life. For one swallow does not make a summer, 
nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man 
blessed and happy” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a18-20). Finally, it is also 
important to note that Aristotle takes external goods (such as friendship) to 
play an important role in supporting the “active life of virtue,” and in making 
it possible to achieve things (Annas 1993, p. 367). For Aristotle, “Happiness, 
then, is an actively virtuous life which has available to and for it an adequate 
supply of external goods” (Annas 1993, p. 368).  
Drawing on these ideas and others from Aristotle and Aristotelian 
theorists, Haybron (2007, pp. 2-4) distils the Aristotelian perspective on well-
being into three central claims. The first of these claims is “welfare 
perfectionism,” which is the claim that “well-being consists, non-derivatively, 
at least partly in perfection: excellence or virtue – or, in the Aristotelian case, 
excellence or virtuous activity,” (Haybron 2007, p. 2). The second central 
claim endorsed by Aristotelians is externalism. Internalism, which is closely 
related to subjectivism, holds that an agent’s well-being depends on their 
features as an individual, rather than as a member of their species or culture 
of group. What matters for well-being for internalists depends on what a 
particular individual is like, and has nothing to do with what any other 
individuals or groups are like (Haybron 2007, p. 3). Aristotelians oppose 
internalism, and instead hold an externalist view because their theories 
“ground well-being in facts about the species,” rather than focusing on the 
features of particular individuals (Haybron 2007, p. 3). The final central claim 
of Aristotelian theories of well-being is “welfare eudaimonism,” which posits 
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that well-being is a teleological affair that involves the “fulfillment of our 
natures” (Haybron 2007, p. 3).  
Perfectionist theories in general, and Aristotelian perfectionism in 
particular, are growing in interest, and also hold considerable intuitive appeal 
(Braddock 2010). The emergence in recent years of empirically informed 
criticisms of conventional accounts of virtue poses a serious threat to 
perfectionists though, given their emphasis on the necessity of virtuous 
activity to well-being. My aim is to show that perfectionism can overcome 
this challenge, but not in its usual Aristotelian form. The following sections 
will explore the situationist challenge to virtue ethics, and how this creates 
two serious challenges for Aristotelian perfectionism that are difficult to 
overcome. In the final section of the paper I will then illustrate how my 
alternative perfectionist account, interactionist perfectionism, can more 
effectively address these challenges, and thereby defend perfectionism from 
the situationist assault.  
 
4.3 Situationism and Challenges to Aristotelian theories of 
Well-Being 
The character-situation debate has been discussed at length by numerous 
others, and will no doubt be familiar to most, so I will not delve into it in great 
detail. A quick review, though, should serve to set up the discussion and 
argument to come. Philosophical situationism, which emerged in the 1990s, 
was inspired by much earlier work in psychology. Psychological situationists, 
who came into prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, had challenged the 
prevailing person and trait-focused views of personality, and instead 
emphasised the importance of situational factors as determinants of 
behaviour. An important early inspiration for this trend was Hartshorne and 
May’s (1928) extensive study of honesty and dishonesty amongst a group of 
over 10,000 school children. Their investigation challenged conventional 
ideas of cross-situational consistency - that people possessed personality traits 
that were consistent over both time and varying situations - and instead 
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suggested that behavioural variance had more to do with situational forces. 
Later experiments lent support to this situationist view, and sharpened the 
challenge to traditional views of personality and traits. Examples of some of 
these experiments include: the infamous “Stanford Prison Experiment” 
conducted by Philip Zimbardo and colleagues (Zimbardo et al. 1973; Haney, 
Banks & Zimbardo 1973); Isen and Levin’s (1972) work on helping 
behaviour; Darley and Batson’s (1973) Princeton Theological Seminary 
study on helping behaviour; Darley and Latane’s (1968, 1970) research on 
the “bystander effect” and the “diffusion of responsibility”; and Milgram’s 
(1963, 1974) studies on obedience. Research such as this presented a strong 
challenge to conventional accounts of personality and behaviour, and drove a 
new approach in which “situational factors are seen as the most powerful 
determinants of behaviour” (Krahe 1992, p. 29). 
Unsurprisingly, philosophers eventually began to take note of this 
evidence and its possible implications for philosophical theories of character 
and moral psychology. This trend was anticipated at an early stage by 
Flanagan (1991), but was primarily driven into the philosophical mainstream 
by the work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. Harman (1999, pp. 316-317) 
drew attention to evidence of the “fundamental attribution error,” which 
posits that  people regularly overemphasise the importance of personal factors 
as determinants of behaviour, and underemphasise the importance of 
situational influences. Harman (2000, p. 223) also made the more radical 
proposal that the empirical evidence offers no reason for supposing that 
people have character traits at all, and that we might be better off with 
jettisoning all notions of character from our thinking about psychology. 
Harman was thus the most radical and provocative of the philosophical 
situationists.2  
Doris (1998, 2002) is more restrained than Harman, and provides a more 
developed situationist account. Rather than attacking character broadly 
 
2 It is important to note though that Harman’s view is qualified somewhat, in that he is 
talking about character and traits as they are normally conceived. Additionally, in later 
work (see Merritt, Doris & Harman 2010) Harman’s approach is no longer quite so radical.  
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conceived, Doris (2002, p. 22) specifically targets “globalist” accounts of 
character, which are those that hold that character is both consistent across 
varying situations, and stable over time in similar situations. He contends that 
empirical evidence fails to support the globalist picture of character, and 
instead shows that the powerful influence of situational factors means that 
character lacks consistency, although it can be stable. The globalist model of 
character is thus empirically inadequate (Doris 2002, p. 23). The reason this 
argument is troubling for Aristotelian virtue ethicists is because they endorse 
a globalist picture of character and virtue, which by situationist lights is an 
empirically inadequate and psychologically unrealistic model of virtue. This 
is particularly worrying for Aristotelians, given their traditional practical 
focus on character development and a descriptively rich and accurate moral 
psychology.  
The situationist critique generated significant debate and further research. 
Many sought to reject the situationist conclusions in order to defend 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, and they devised a variety of strategies for doing 
so.3 One of the most popular of these was the rarity response or rarity reply.4 
Put simply, this response argues that empirical evidence of the rarity of virtue 
is not concerning for virtue ethicists, as virtue is supposed to be a rare 
achievement in practice. The rarity reply thus attempts to defuse situationism 
by positing that Aristotelian virtue ethics is compatible with the empirical 
evidence. Other strategies including abandoning a globalist account of traits 
to focus on virtuous actions or local virtues (see, e.g., Adams 2006; Hurka 
2006); and arguing that the situationist interpretation of the empirical 
evidence is flawed, and that the evidence may actually support traditional 
globalist accounts of virtue rather than undermine them (see, e.g., Sreenivasan 
2002, 2008; Sabini & Silver 2005; Russell 2009; Snow 2010).  
 
3 Alfano (2013b) provides a useful classification and analysis of the primary strategies 
adopted for responding to situationism.   
4 For examples of theorists who endorse or discuss the rarity response, see, e.g., Miller 
(2003); Athanassoulis (2000); Kamtekar (2004); Kupperman (2001); Kristjansson (2008); 
and Wielenberg (2006).  
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While these strategies for responding to situationism have some 
advantages, they didn’t go far enough to defeat situationism. Situationists, in 
turn, made their own replies to these strategies. For example, Alfano (2013a, 
pp. 78-79) has argued that accounts such as Snow’s and Russell’s, which rely 
on the cognitive-affective personality system (CAPS) view of traits, cannot 
save virtue ethics, because the CAPS model of traits does not match up with 
an Aristotelian one. In a different vein, Merritt, Doris and Harman (2010) 
have argued that additional issues persist for the Aristotelian, including 
concerns over their accounts of agency and rationality. In short, the character-
situation debate has received no clear resolution, and remains an ongoing area 
of research and debate.  
As this debate has developed, a variety of alternative approaches – 
standing outside of both the situationist and traditional virtue ethical camps – 
have emerged. The most prominent and promising of these is interactionism. 
Interactionism also takes a cue from earlier developments in psychology, in 
which interactionism developed as a resolution to the debate between 
situationist social psychologists and traditional trait-focused personality 
psychologists. In contrast to these two traditions, interactionism posited that 
the “the personality vs situation issue was a pseudo issue” (Endler 1973, p. 
301). Summarising the interactionist approach in psychology, Krahe (1992, 
p. 70) writes that “actual behaviour is a function of a continuous process of 
multidirectional interaction or feedback between the individual and the 
situations he or she encounters.” This interactionist approach has been 
developed in philosophy in recent years by a number of scholars, such as 
Mark Alfano, who argues for an interactionist approach to character that 
recognises it is “partly due to features of the agent, partly due to features of 
the situation, and partly due to the interaction between the two” (Alfano 2016, 
pp. 130-131). This interactionist trend can also be seen in the work of Howell 
(2016) and Skorburg (2017). These philosophers draw on interactionist 
psychology to propose new, interactionist models of character in philosophy, 
that stand in contrast to both situationism and traditional virtue ethical 
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accounts.5 Interactionism holds great promise as a research paradigm for 
work on character. In Section 4.6 I will return to interactionism to see if it can 
help to defend perfectionism from situationist challenges. 
In the following sections I will evaluate two challenges to perfectionist 
accounts of well-being that arise out of the character-situation debate. There 
are additional criticisms of perfectionist theories in addition to these 
challenges derived from situationism, but these will not be considered in this 
paper. I will focus on these situationist threats for two reasons. Firstly, 
because they are relatively new, and have thus far received limited attention 
in the literature. Secondly, because these challenges are particularly worrying 
for the perfectionist, in that they threaten to undermine the practical and 
naturalist nature of many perfectionist theories, in particular Aristotelian 
ones, by calling into question the psychological realism of their accounts. 
Situationism thus poses a pressing threat that needs to be adequately 
addressed. Given that Aristotelianism is the most influential and popular 
brand of perfectionism about well-being, the next two sections will focus on 
Aristotelian theories and how they are challenged by situationism. Section 4.6 
will then introduce my own alternative perfectionist account to show how it 
can more effectively deal with these challenges.  
 
4.4 The Direct Challenge 
The first challenge from situationism to Aristotelian theories of well-being 
that I will consider is what I will call the “Direct Challenge.” It is so named 
because it takes the conclusions of situationists about Aristotelian virtue 
ethics, and directly applies them to theories of well-being. In essence, 
situationists of all stripes challenge Aristotelian accounts of virtue and 
character traits, and posit that very few people, if anyone, actually possess 
 
5 While interactionism differs from both situationism and traditional or Aristotelian virtue 
ethical accounts, it has points of overlap with both. My own view, as will be made clear 
during the paper, is that interactionism can support a revised virtue ethical approach, but 
such an approach has key differences from traditional Aristotelianism.  
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traits of the kind featured in Aristotelian models. As has been noted, 
Aristotelian theories of well-being hold that well-being crucially depends on 
virtuous activity and possession of the virtues. The direct challenge is thus: if 
situationists are correct that almost no one possesses the Aristotelian virtues, 
and possession of such virtues is essential to well-being, then it follows that 
almost no one achieves well-being. This places Aristotelians in a bind, for 
any theory of well-being that posits that no one or almost no one is ever able 
to achieve it would be deeply unappealing. 
We can flesh out the details of this challenge by returning to the work of 
Doris and Harman. As noted earlier, Doris challenges the globalist view of 
virtue, and contends that the empirical evidence illustrates that most people 
don’t have global character traits. This is because we could expect the 
widespread possession of global traits to be accompanied by widespread 
behavioural consistency, yet when we turn to the empirical evidence, we 
discover that “systematic observation does not reveal pervasive behavioural 
consistency” (Merritt, Doris & Harman 2010, p. 358). The vast majority of 
people don’t have global traits; at best, they have “local” traits which are 
driven by particular situational circumstances (such as honest-with-spouse) 
and not consistent across situations (although they can be stable over time in 
the same situation). Situationists like Doris do not rule out completely that 
someone could have Aristotelian virtues, but it is nevertheless unlikely for 
people to develop such traits, and it would only be a vanishingly small 
percentage of the population (if any) that possessed them. Thus, if having 
global character traits is necessary for well-being on the Aristotelian view, 
and the vast majority of people don’t have such traits, then the vast majority 
of people don’t have well-being.  
This kind of situationist challenge to Aristotelian theories of well-being, 
while closely linked to the situationist challenge to virtue ethics, also has 
some important points of separation. Indeed, as Haybron (2014, p. 242) notes: 
“the implications of situationist research may be weightier in the case of well-
being than for virtue.” A key reason for this is that some options for answering 
the challenge to virtue ethics seem less appealing when used to defend 
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Aristotelian theories of well-being, necessitating the need for new strategies. 
As I noted earlier, a popular response for defending Aristotelian virtue ethics 
from situationism is the rarity response, which posits that the fact that virtue 
is rare is not an issue for Aristotelian theories. This strategy seems less 
attractive in the case of well-being. When it comes to virtue, perhaps we can 
accept that few people are able to achieve perfect virtue, but that the virtuous 
person can still serve as a useful ideal for moral development and action 
guidance. The suggestion that well-being is rare to non-existent though is a 
far more distressing conclusion. As Haybron (2014, p. 242) puts it, “Even if 
we grant the rarity of virtue, this seems a bitter pill to swallow.”  
One option for responding to this challenge is a modified version of the 
rarity response strategy I discussed in Section 4.3. As I pointed out just above 
though, the rarity response strategy initially seems like a poor option, as rare 
well-being is more worrying than rare virtue. This is why I will propose a 
nuanced version of the strategy, to see if it can save the day against 
situationism. The central idea of this variant is that it sees both virtue and 
well-being as taking place on a scale between extremes, with most people 
falling somewhere in the middle of the scale, rather than at either end. This 
idea is, of course, not a new one, as it features in both Aristotle’s own writings 
on virtue, and in some of the rarity responses made to the situationist 
challenge to virtue ethics, such as those of Miller (2003), Lott (2014), and 
Kristjansson (2008).   
For this approach, the core idea is that while the character of most people 
would fall short of perfect virtue, they would nevertheless still have a certain 
degree of virtue, and thereby still have a certain degree of well-being. Perfect 
virtue would only be necessary for perfect well-being. If I am less than 
perfectly virtuous, this wouldn’t mean that I lack well-being altogether, it 
would simply mean that I have less than perfect well-being. In introducing 
this kind of granular scale this version of the rarity response aims to avoid the 
concern over the basic rarity response that it consigns well-being to a very 
small (or non-existent) portion of the population. While perfect well-being on 
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this account is still rare, other, still desirable states of well-being would be 
much more wide-spread.  
Haybron (2014, p. 252), after noting the issues with using the basic rarity 
reply to defend theories of well-being, also discusses this kind of strategy. He 
notes that this mode of reply does seem initially appealing, because it allows 
for some variance in character, and doesn’t set the bar for well-being at 
absolute perfection. Nevertheless, Haybron (2014, p. 252) thinks this 
response is still problematic, because “Aristotle presumably does not demand 
perfection of the virtuous, but he does appear to set a fairly high bar.” 
Haybron (2014, p. 253) thinks that even though Aristotelians can 
acknowledge some degree of variance, and even some input from situational 
factors, the bar remains too high because we need a firm, individual 
disposition, that hasn’t been “propped up by extensive scaffolding.” Given 
that empirical evidence illustrates the importance of such scaffolding, it thus 
seems like the Aristotelian is not only still setting a high bar, but an 
unrealistically high bar.  
It is not entirely clear that Haybron’s criticism renders this strategy 
ineffective. While the bar for perfect virtue and perfect well-being does 
remain high, the bars for other levels of virtue and well-being would be lower, 
and thus the theory might have broader appeal. If the goal is thus to strive 
after perfect virtue and approximate it as best we can, and if such strivings 
produce benefits and are worthwhile, then falling short of perfection may not 
be so worrisome. Badhwar (2009, p. 272) takes this to an extreme and 
suggests that achieving perfect global virtue may be impossible, but 
nevertheless, “virtue is a worthy and attractive ideal to try and approximate.” 
Such “approximationist” arguments have also been made by others, such as 
Athanassoulis (2000), Kupperman (2001), and Zagzebski (1996).   
The main issue with such approaches is not that the approximationist 
strategy itself is necessarily misguided, but that the psychological account of 
character involved is still a misguided one. The virtue ethicists can take heart 
from the fact that there is greater evidence to support the role of character in 
behaviour than situationists allow. There is a worry though that this could 
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lead to a “business as usual” approach that ignores situationism altogether. 
While there is evidence supporting the role of character, there is also 
undeniable evidence of the power of situations, which goes beyond the extent 
assigned to them by Aristotelian approaches. It is thus not enough to 
acknowledge that virtue is rare and propose a scale of virtue or an 
approximationist approach, because this leaves out our new understanding of 
the varied and powerful effects of situational inputs. To retain the traditional 
model then, despite the acknowledgement of rarity, would still leave the 
Aristotelian with an empirically questionable account of character. 
The central worry is thus not that we might not achieve the perfection of 
our natures, because, as the approximationist has it, aspiring for the perfection 
is still worthwhile and beneficial. The worry is instead that our conception of 
how to perfect our natures is misguided, because it is still relying on an 
excessively individualist account of virtue, rather than a robustly 
interactionist one. Even if our goal is to approximate virtue, rather than fully 
achieve it, this endeavour should still be guided by the best available evidence 
about moral psychology. As I have noted though, though, the traditional 
Aristotelian picture is an incomplete one, and is thus unsuitable for guiding 
such efforts. Unless the Aristotelian is willing to revise their account in an 
interactionist direction in light of this, they will still be subject to this 
objection. These issues demonstrate the inadequacy of the modified rarity 
response and the approximationist approach, and highlight the threat that the 
Direct Challenge poses to Aristotelian perfectionism.   
 
4.5 The Rational Control Challenge  
In this section I will turn to an additional challenge arising from the 
situationist literature, one that relates to rationality.6 As well as raising doubts 
over conventional ideas about character traits, the evidence situationists draw 
on also creates broader doubts about the level of practical rationality that 
 
6 For more on issues with rational control and epistemic situationism, see Alfano (2012), 
Olin & Doris (2014), and Merritt, Doris & Harman (2010).  
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human agents possess. This again causes trouble for Aristotelians, because 
their accounts assume that people have a great deal of individual agency and 
rational control over their actions. More pointedly, virtue on the traditional 
Aristotelian model requires practical wisdom, and a great deal of control over 
one’s actions. Without this high level of rational control, virtue would be 
unattainable. If the empirical evidence does undermine the picture of human 
agents as possessing a large degree of rational control, then this casts doubt 
on our ability to develop the virtues, and thereby casts doubt on our ability to 
develop well-being in the perfectionist sense.   
Haybron (2014) discusses this challenge as a clash between two views, 
which he calls Rational Control (RC) and Situational Determination of 
Behaviour (SDB). RC is the more traditional and familiar view, which holds 
that “human action is under the command of rational or controlled processes” 
(Haybron 2014, p. 244). While this view does allow for a role for certain kinds 
of automatic and subconscious processes, ultimately the idea is that rationally 
controlled processes “run the show, with automatic processes helping to 
execute reason’s commands” (Haybron 2014, p. 244). This can be contrasted 
with SDB, which claims that “what we do is ineliminably shaped by 
contextual influences in ways that are not governed by rational processes” 
(Haybron 2014, p. 242).  
Haybron sees SDB as creating a problem for Aristotelian theories of well-
being because Aristotelian theory is committed to a fairly strong ideal of RC. 
This strong RC claim is also part of the problem with Aristotelian accounts 
of virtue, but it applies more broadly than this as an issue with general human 
rationality. It is thus not enough to just revise our model of virtue, because 
we will still not be free of the problem. As Haybron (2014, p. 254) writes:  
“The worry here is not that people aren’t virtuous enough to count as 
virtuous; it’s that Aristotle’s ideal of human agency, and in turn his ideal 
of human flourishing, seems incompatible with the way human beings 
actually function.”  
The idea then is that people lack the level of rational control over their lives, 
and more specifically over decisions concerning their well-being, that 
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Aristotelian theories assume they have. Aristotelian theories are thus taken to 
be fundamentally mistaken about human rationality and psychology, and to 
thereby present a skewed picture of human well-being, and a misguided and 
excessively individualist account of how people can pursue their own 
flourishing. Furthermore, if this claim is correct and we do lack such rational 
control, then we will be incapable of developing Aristotelian virtues, and thus 
incapable of living the kind of life of virtuous activity necessary for achieving 
well-being.  
 
4.6 Interactionism   
In light of these problems with Aristotelian accounts, what is needed to save 
perfectionism is an alternative perfectionist account. My proposal for such an 
account is interactionist perfectionism (IP). In Section 4.3 I noted that 
interactionism has emerged in recent years as a promising approach to 
character that stands as an alternative to both Aristotelian virtue ethics and 
situationism. It is the attractiveness of the interactionist conception of 
character that inspires my proposed shift to interactionist perfectionism. Like 
Aristotelian accounts of well-being, IP supports the central welfare 
perfectionism claim that well-being consists, at least partly, in virtue or 
excellence. In contrast to Aristotelian theories though, IP conceptualises 
virtue in specifically interactionist terms, rather than the traditional globalist 
model of Aristotelians.  
Like situationism, interactionism recognises the important role that 
environmental factors play in character and moral behaviour. In contrast to 
situationism though, it also posits a greater role for personal factors in the 
equation. Furthermore, interactionism also recognises that situational factors 
are themselves limited, and that the correlation between situational factors 
and a particular behavioural outcome is roughly on par with the correlation 
between personal factors and that behavioural outcome (Funder & Ozer 
1983). What is most critical for interactionism though is not that both personal 
and situational factors are important, but that the interaction between them is 
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what is most vital for character and behaviour. As Endler (1983, p. 160) 
writes: “behaviour is a function of a continuous multidirectional process of 
person-by-situation interactions.”   
Interactionist Perfectionism is also solely focused on the perfectionist 
claim about the necessity of virtue for well-being, and thus jettisons some of 
the additional claims and elements of the Aristotelian system, such as the 
strongly individualist conception of agency, and the welfare eudaimonism 
claim. These changes from the traditional Aristotelian model give us a theory 
that is more empirical viable and psychologically realistic. They also provide 
a perfectionist account capable of overcoming the two situationist challenges 
that undermine Aristotelian perfectionism.7  
 
4.6.1 Responding to the Direct Challenge  
IP has resources for responding to the situationist challenges that Aristotelian 
versions of perfectionism lack. Let’s begin by returning to the Direct 
Challenge. Earlier, I illustrated that the evidence presented by situationists 
raises serious doubts about the Aristotelian account of character, and that this 
thereby creates worries about their account of well-being by making it a 
seemingly impossible goal. What is thus needed is an account of character 
that fits better with the empirical evidence, while also being more realistic 
and achievable, to address the high bar concern that I flagged earlier. IP’s 
interactionist account of character does just this.  
Interactionism presents a conception of character that is compatible with 
the best available empirical research. In recognising both personal and 
situational factors, and the complex interplay between them, interactionism 
 
7 Aristotelianism is itself a broad label, and some Aristotelians may thus be willing to accept 
my IP account as falling within the Aristotelian camp, while others may reject it as too 
radically different. In either case, my intent is not to debate what should and shouldn’t count 
as an Aristotelian theory, but instead to offer an account that can respond to the situationist 




holds great explanatory power. As I argued in Chapter 1, this explanatory 
power is further improved by the interactionist claim that character and virtue 
are multiply realisable. By this I mean that interactionism allows that a 
particular trait can be realised in different ways through varying levels of 
input from personal, environmental, and social factors. One individual’s 
honesty could involve a great deal of input and support from environmental 
factors, while another’s might be primarily maintained by their personal 
factors (Alfano 2014). This allows interactionism to account for a broad range 
of cases, including rare cases of strongly individual virtue (which situationism 
struggles to explain), and also for cases in which behaviour is heavily driven 
by situational factors (which presents problems for the traditional virtue 
ethical account). This broad explanatory power means that interactionism 
isn’t only empirically adequate, but perhaps superior to its rivals like 
situationism and virtue ethics. Additionally, interactionism has become one 
of the most influential approaches to personality in psychology, and thus has 
great scientific credence (McAdams 2006, pp. 142-155). In short then, 
interactionism is a completely viable framework for character given the 
empirical evidence, and is thus untroubled by situationist concerns about 
empirical adequacy.  
Interactionism also posits a more robust model of character than 
situationists allow for. This is partly due to the recognition that interactionism 
gives to the importance of personal factors in character, rather than focusing 
on situations and consigning personal features to the sidelines. More 
importantly though, it is also because when environmental exchanges are 
properly taken into account, we can see character as more consistent than 
situationists claim. Crucial to this is the notion of ‘coherence,’ which is an 
alternative way of thinking about consistency, in that it incorporates the 
individual’s interpretation of the situation into the definition of consistency 
(Krahe 1992, p. 15). In some approaches, consistency is measured in relation 
to the objective or nominal features of the situation, such as the spatial and 
temporal features, and the human subjects involved. Such descriptions of 
situations are thus “largely independent of the perspective of an individual 
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observer” (Krahe 1992, p. 205). Assessments of consistency are then made 
based on whether an agent’s actions are consistent across situations classified 
in such objective terms into the same type.  
In contrast to this, interactionism uses coherence as its notion of 
consistency, rather than objective consistency. Rather than analysing an 
agent’s actions in relation to objective descriptions of the situation, the 
interactionist instead incorporates the individual’s interpretation of the 
situation into the situation description. The focus is thus on the psychological 
features of a situation, rather than its objective features (Mehl et al. 2015, p. 
632). The assessment of coherence is then made based on a whether an 
agent’s actions are consistent across situations they have interpreted in the 
same way, such that their behaviour represents an “inherently lawful 
expression of the individual’s personal qualities and cognitive activities” 
(Krahe 1992, p. 16). Since the objective and psychological descriptions of 
situations can vary from each other, an individual may look inconsistent in an 
objective sense, while showing consistency (and coherence) when assessed 
in relation to the psychological features of the situations.   
Coherence allows for “both stability and change of behaviour so long as 
they follow a systematic and hence individually predictable pattern” (Krahe 
1992, p. 16). When we consider consistency in terms of coherence, we 
observe much greater individual consistency in behaviour and character than 
if we only consider the objective features of situations (see, e.g., Krahe 
1992; Snow 2010). It is important to note that this emphasis on coherence 
also separates interactionism from Aristotelian and other traditional virtue 
ethical approaches to traits. This is because such approaches also seem to 
rely on an objective notion of consistency. For the interactionist, someone 
could possess the trait of compassion if they are reliably disposed to act 
compassionately in situations they have interpreted as requiring compassion. 
As Alfano (2013a, p. 79) notes though, this isn’t enough for virtue as 
traditionally conceived: “But of course compassion isn’t (just) a matter of 
helping when you feel that someone needs or deserves help; it’s a matter of 
helping when someone does need or deserve help.” This is another example 
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of the Aristotelian approach setting an excessively high bar. Considering 
consistency in terms of coherence thus differentiates interactionism from 
Aristotelianism, while also showing character traits to be more robust and 
widespread than either situationists or Aristotelians seem to allow.  
The multiple realisability of traits for the interactionist also highlights 
how good character is more achievable under interactionism than 
Aristotelianism. For the Aristotelian, one needs to develop strong and robust 
individual virtues. As I noted earlier though, interactionism allows that 
virtue can be realised in different ways: some possess very strong personal 
factors that drive their virtues, while others may possess weaker personal 
factors, but receive more positive support from environmental inputs. The 
class of virtuous traits is thus much larger for the interactionist, because it 
includes both the more traditional virtuous traits, as well as virtues more 
reliant on situations. Attaining good character thus seems a much more 
realistic goal, which helps to dispel worries that perfectionist theories of 
well-being, in making virtue necessary for well-being, have thereby made 
well-being rare or impossible.  
One might worry that in making character so closely related to 
environmental factors, interactionist character might be too dependent on 
circumstantial luck in terms of receiving positive environmental influences.8 
It’s true that poor situational influences still create difficulties for 
developing character, but this is also the case for Aristotelian approaches.  
Additionally, interactionism offers further resources to assist us in our 
pursuit of virtue and well-being, and to help us overcome issues with 
circumstantial luck. It provides insights into the vast range of situational 
inputs that can influence us, and into the dynamic ways in which these 
factors interact with the personal factors of individual agents. Such insights 
not only allow us to identify and avoid potential pitfalls and influences that 
could lead us astray, but also to identify positive situational supports that we 
can make use of to improve our character. We can even take steps to 
 
8 There are further questions to be asked about moral luck in relation to interactionist 
character, but they are beyond the scope of this paper to fully address.  
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positively shape and influence situations in our favour, or, in Alfano’s 
(2013a, p. 80) terms, to be “situation-producers” rather than just “situation-
consumers.” Such insights and strategies provide a range of ways of 
pursuing and sustaining virtue, and again show good character to be a more 
realistic goal for interactionists.  
In sum, interactionism can help defend perfectionism from situationist 
challenges relating to traditional accounts of traits and virtue. Interactionism 
presents a model of character that is empirically adequate, and thus handles 
situationist concerns about psychological realism. It also demonstrates that 
virtue is a more common and realistic goal for people than both situationism 
and the rarity response allow. Thus, in presenting a model of virtue that is 
both more reflective of actual human psychology, and also a distinctly more 
realisable achievement, interactionism can allow perfectionism to overcome 
the Direct Challenge from situationism.  
 
4.6.2 Responding to the Rational Control Challenge 
Let’s now turn back to the Rational Control Challenge. Assuming that 
Haybron is correct about the situationist evidence undermining strong 
accounts of RC, does this necessarily undermine perfectionist theories of 
well-being? I noted earlier that Aristotelian accounts are troubled by this 
objection, but this need not be the case for IP. To begin with, Haybron 
distinguishes between different degrees of both RC and SDB. A strong ideal 
of RC fits the traditional ‘captain of the ship’ model, in which the vast 
majority of our actions are under our control and “reflect our own judgement 
and will” (Haybron 2014, p. 245). In contrast, moderate and weak versions of 
RC posit, respectively, that “control is substantial, but limited,” and that 
“rational control is the exception rather than the rule” (Haybron 2014, p. 245). 
Similarly, SDB can also be divided up into weak, moderate and strong 
variants, with weak positing a small role for situational influences, all the way 
up to strong, which claims that “human behaviour is largely and ineliminably 
determined by situational influences” (Haybron 2014, p. 245).   
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Haybron (2014, p. 246) argues that the evidence presented by situationists 
challenges at least the strong form of RC by showing the power of situational 
influences to undermine rational control, and thereby provides support for 
either moderate or strong SDB. It would seem to me that moderate SDB 
presents the best fit with the evidence. As I noted in the previous section, there 
is evidence to suggest that situationists overstate their case, and that the 
influence of situational factors on behaviour doesn’t exceed the influence of 
personal factors to any great extent. Moderate SDB thus seems a better fit 
than strong SDB. This is important, because moderate SDB is not actually 
that threatening. As Haybron (2014, p. 245) defines it, moderate SDB is the 
view that: 
“situational influences ineliminably play a substantial, or large, role in 
determining human behaviour. Rational or other internal processes may 
still play the lion’s share of the role in determining how we live, but a lot 
of the story involves situational influence.”  
What’s clear from this description is that the moderate form of SDB still 
allows quite a lot of play for rational control. It seems to be compatible with 
at least the weak form of RC, and possibly a moderate form as well. While 
Aristotelians may rely on a strong conception of RC, interactionists are not 
tied to such an account. For IP then, a moderate or weak form of RC could be 
acceptable, if it proves the best fit with the empirical evidence. As a result of 
this, IP is not susceptible to the Rational Control objection in the same way 
that Aristotelians are, because IP is not reliant on an outdated conception of 
human agency.  
In addition, the situationist findings aren’t all doom and gloom for 
proponents of rational control: they also point to new ways of improving and 
utilising rational control by enhancing our understanding of how we interact 
with situational influences. Alfano (2013a, pp. 79-81) notes how we could 
use our knowledge of social psychology to better understand both our own 
personal makeup, and the ways in which we are affected by situational 
factors. We could then use this information to select situations conducive to 
virtuous behaviour, while avoiding situations likely to lead us astray. In 
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addition to situation selection, we could also make active efforts to shape and 
change the situations we find ourselves in, including major efforts such as 
designing our environments to support virtue (Alfano 2013a, p. 81). The idea 
then is that, even though we have acknowledged the importance of situational 
factors, we can exercise our rational control in ways such as these to attempt 
to control such factors in aid of our own ends. This kind of situational 
engagement and reliance may not be acceptable for the Aristotelian, but it is 
perfectly fine for IP. Interactionists are thus free to draw on insights from 
situationism to explore ways for improving rational control in aid of the 
pursuit of both virtue and well-being.  
We have now seen that IP can effectively response to both the Direct 
Challenge and the Rational Control Challenge. These two challenges, which 
emerge from the situationist literature and are supported by substantial 
empirical evidence, present a strong threat to perfectionist theories of well-
being. As I have outlined, this threat creates significant problems for 
Aristotelian perfectionist theories, and casts doubt on their appeal as an 
approach to well-being. In contrast, Interactionist Perfectionism can 
overcome these challenges. In doing so, it illustrates that perfectionism can 
survive this situationist threat, and remain a viable option for thinking about 
well-being. IP can thus serve as a promising research agenda for future work 
on character and well-being.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This paper has set out to defend perfectionism against the threat posed by 
situationism. I have argued that the most popular variety of perfectionism, 
Aristotelianism, is susceptible to challenges arising from situationism relating 
to both the Aristotelian model of traits, and to the Aristotelian account of 
agency and rational control. As a result, Aristotelianism seems ill-equipped 
to defend perfectionism against situationism. I then argued that an alternative 
perfectionist account need not suffer the same fate as Aristotelianism, and 
introduced IP as such an account. I then demonstrated that IP can effectively 
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counter both the Direct Challenge and the Rational Control Challenge, and 
thereby showed that perfectionism can survive the threat from situationism. 
Additionally, the shift towards interactionism also makes for a more 
empirically compelling perfectionism, and point to new avenues for future 
research on the cultivation of interactionist virtues and their role in well-
being. In short then, my interactionist perfectionism holds much promise for 
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Environmental Virtue Ethics: An Interactionist 
Defense   
 
Abstract 
This paper will investigate some new opportunities for environmental virtue 
ethics (EVE) and argue in favour of a shift to make EVE more interactionist. 
EVE has developed into one of the more popular and influential approaches 
in the environmental ethics literature. It faces a potential threat though, from 
the situationist challenge, which has plagued mainstream virtue ethical 
accounts in recent years. I will argue that EVE can overcome this challenge 
by taking a more interactionist approach to character – one that recognizes 
the importance of both personal and situational factors, while emphasizing 
the interactions between them. I will argue that interactionism not only allows 
EVE to answer the situationist challenge, but that it also meshes nicely with 
existing aspects of EVE approaches, and that this interactionist shift is thus a 
logical next step for EVE that produces a variety of benefits.  
 
5.1 Introduction  
This paper will investigate some new opportunities for environmental virtue 
ethics (EVE) and argue in favour of a shift to make EVE more interactionist. 
EVE has developed into one of the more popular and influential approaches 
in the environmental ethics literature. It faces a potential threat though, from 
the situationist challenge, which has plagued mainstream virtue ethical 
accounts in recent years. I will argue that EVE can overcome this challenge 
by taking a more interactionist approach to character – one that recognizes 
the importance of both personal and situational factors, while emphasizing 
the interactions between them. I will argue that interactionism not only allows 
EVE to answer the situationist challenge, but that it also meshes nicely with 
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existing aspects of EVE approaches, and that this interactionist shift is thus a 
logical next step for EVE that produces a variety of benefits.  
The paper begins with some brief background on EVE, including its 
development, core claims, and the advantages that make it an appealing way 
of approaching environmental ethics. I will then move on to highlight how 
situationism challenges EVE. I will first consider this as a broad challenge: if 
situationism challenges the virtue ethical approach to character, and EVE, as 
a sub-category of virtue ethics, also endorses the same kind of approach, then 
the situationist challenge will also apply to EVE. In addition to this though, I 
will also consider the idea that situationism may be particularly threatening 
to EVE. This is derived from Kasperbauer (2014), who argues that there is 
specific empirical evidence about environmental behaviours that suggests 
situational factors are the driving force, and that we should thus take an 
environmental situationist approach rather than an EVE one. Situationism 
may thus present a challenge to EVE that goes beyond its general challenge 
to virtue ethics, and thereby require a unique strategy of response. I will then 
introduce the interactionist approach to character, and outline how it provides 
both an empirically-adequate moral psychology of character, and an effective 
way of answering situationism. After considering how interactionism can 
answer the general situationist threat to EVE, I will illustrate how it can also 
enable EVE to effectively respond to the specific challenge presented by 
Kasperbauer. In the final section, I will then explore a range of additional 
connections between interactionism and EVE, and highlight the further 
benefits to be gained from EVE taking an interactionist approach.  
 
5.2 Environmental Virtue Ethics   
While environmental concerns have a long history in philosophy, EVE has 
only recently emerged in the latter half of the Twentieth Century as a specific 
approach to environmental ethics. Philosophers such as Hill (1983), 
Wensveen (2000), Cafaro (2004), and Sandler (2007) have drawn on virtue 
ethics to emphasise the importance of thinking about character and 
flourishing in relation to our interactions with the environment. As Cafaro 
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(2010, p.4) writes: “EVE now appears to be a vital part of the environmental 
philosophy landscape.”   
Some environmental ethicists seek to build their accounts around 
environmental virtue, while others instead recognise virtue as one of a variety 
of concerns in a broader environmental ethic. In either case, consideration of 
environmental virtue has a range of advantages. For example, EVE is often 
thought to present a more positive outlook on our relationship with the 
environment than some other approaches to environmental ethics. This is 
because it emphasises the connections between nature and human flourishing, 
and it presents a “positive, aspirational vision in which humans and nature 
flourish together” (Cafaro 2010, p. 4). This approach can thus be seen as more 
positive than fear or duty-based justifications for environmental action, or, at 
the very least, can act as a positive complement to such justifications (Cafaro 
2010, p. 4).  
Kawall (2018, p. 660) also highlights this positive nature, noting that EVE 
taps into the idea that “engagement with the world around us can enrich our 
lives profoundly,” and that developing virtues such as curiosity, wonder, and 
open-mindedness can help us to appreciate nature and pursue positive 
engagements with the environment. Similarly, Sandler (2007, p. 50) argues 
that the environment gives us opportunities for moral, intellectual, physical 
and spiritual growth, as well as providing us with aesthetic and recreational 
goods. Kawall (2018, p. 661) sums up this outlook nicely when he writes that:  
“EVE is well positioned to capture the insight that a good 
environmental life is not simply a matter of denial and burdens, but 
instead an active life where moral, epistemic, and aesthetic virtues 
enable our appreciation of and engagement with nature, contributing 
to our flourishing as individuals.” 
Environmental virtue ethicists thus aim to properly recognise the 
interdependence of agent and environment, and to do justice to the rich and 
varied nature of human relationships with the environment.  
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It is also worth noting that environmental virtue theory also makes 
distinctions between different categories of environmental virtues. Sandler 
(2007, pp. 42-43), for example, distinguishes between three different 
categories of environmental virtue, which are further fleshed out by Kawall 
(2018, p. 662). The first of these is environmentally responsive virtues, which 
are those that directly respond to environmental entities or concerns, and 
include virtues such as reverence for life, respect for nature, and wonder. The 
second category is environmentally justified virtues, which are those “that are 
justified (as virtues) at least in part by environmental considerations” (Kawall 
2018, p. 662). Examples of these include simplicity and temperance, as they 
can be environmentally justified in terms of their capacity to reduce our 
environmental impact. The final category is environmentally productive 
virtues, which refers to virtues that can help us take environmental action and 
promote environmental issues, such as courage and perseverance (Kawall 
2018, p. 662). As Sandler (2007, p. 43) writes: “There is thus a plurality of 
ways environmental considerations are implicated in the virtues, including 
and beyond environmental entities being morally considerable. EVE is thus 
interested in a broad range of character traits and moral behaviour concerning 
the environment, including both the environmental dimensions of more 
traditional virtues, as well as thinking about new virtues specifically related 
to the environment.   
In sum, philosophers have drawn on virtue ethics to broaden and enrich 
their thinking about the environment, up to the point of developing fully-
fledged EVE accounts of environmental ethics. EVE theorists have made a 
significant contribution to the development of environmental ethics in recent 
years, and present a unique outlook within the field of research. Despite 
EVE’s appeal and prominence, it faces a potentially serious threat from 
situationism, a threat that should be considered seriously not only by 





5.3 The Situationist Challenge to EVE  
 
5.3.1 Situationism  
Having outlined some of the key features of EVE, I now want to sketch the 
situationist challenge, and illustrate how it poses a threat to EVE. 
Situationism developed in philosophy in the 1990s as a challenge to some 
conventional ways of thinking about moral psychology in general, and virtue 
in particular. Flanagan (1991) presented some initial arguments to this effect, 
before Doris (1998, 2002) and Harman (1999) developed the situationist 
position in more detail and kicked off the character-situation debate in 
philosophy. This new debate echoed the earlier person-situation debate in 
psychology, which philosophical situationists took inspiration from. In 
psychology, situationist theorists had challenged personality theorists by 
arguing that the features of a situation played a greater role in influencing the 
behaviour of an agent than the agent’s own personality traits did. This work 
was driven by a range of experimental evidence, including Milgram’s (1974) 
famous work on obedience, and the evidence of the bystander effect (Latane 
& Darley 1970; Darley & Latane 1968).  
While some of the situationist evidence highlighted morally relevant 
features of the situation that could influence people into acting for bad 
reasons, there was also evidence that morally irrelevant and subconscious 
features of the situation could also be have surprising impacts on behaviour. 
Rather than influencing an agent to act on bad reasons, such factors do not 
even give the agent particular reasons for actions. These kinds of influences 
have been fittingly described as “situational non-reasons” by Alfano (2013, 
p. 44). Examples include the effect of ambient light levels on honesty (Zhong, 
Bohns & Gino 2010), and the influence of ambient sound levels on aggression 
and helping behaviour (Matthews and Cannon 1975; Donnerstein & Wilson 
1976).  
Evidence for the importance of situational influences on behaviour was 
used by philosophical situationists to argue against traditional accounts of 
character traits and virtues. Doris (2002, pp. 22-23) for example, argues 
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against “globalist” accounts of character, which are those that construe 
“personality as an evaluatively integrated association of robust traits.” While 
Doris allows that character traits can be stable over time, he rejects the 
stronger claim made by globalists that such traits are also consistent across 
varying situations. This is because the empirical evidence does not show the 
existence of such consistency, and thus “globalist conceptions of character 
are empirically inadequate” (Doris 2002, p. 23, emphasis in original). 
Harman (1999, p. 316) makes similar situationist arguments, but also takes 
them in a more radical direction. He also argues that the empirical evidence 
raises problems for conventional views of character, going so far as to claim 
that: “we must conclude that there is no empirical basis for the existence of 
character traits.” Importantly, both Doris and Harman argue that the models 
of character they are criticizing are the same models that are generally 
endorsed by virtue ethicists. As Harman (1999, p. 327) writes “Character 
based virtue ethics may offer a reasonable account of ordinary moral views. 
But to that extent, these ordinary views rest on error.” Situationism thus 
presents a strong challenge to the moral psychology of virtue ethics.  
The worry arising from situationism is not just that virtuous traits might be 
uncommon, as this is something that the virtue ethicist can probably accept.1 
The more serious concern is that the general picture of moral psychology 
presented by virtue ethics is flawed, and doesn’t properly reflect real human 
agents. For example, virtue ethical accounts of character stress the importance 
of practical reason, and of responding to situations in appropriate ways and 
for the right reasons. As I discussed earlier in Chapter 1 though, non-reasons 
do not supply stimuli for the agent to reason about though, and “provide no 
reason for the conduct they induce” (Alfano 2013, p. 50). The virtue ethicist 
will thus have a hard time fitting such situational influences into their 
psychological framework.  
From a strong situationist position then, there is a genuine concern about 
whether human beings can even realise the kinds of psychological features 
 
1 Such acceptance is seen in the “rarity response” made to situationism (see, e.g., 
Kristjansson 2008; Miller 2003; Kamtekar 2004).  
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described by virtue ethicists. As Doris and Stich (2005, p. 121) put it: “the 
available systematic empirical evidence is compatible with virtue being 
psychologically impossible, and this suggests that the impossibility of virtue 
is a possibility that has to be taken seriously.” Based on such claims, we may 
take it that virtue ethics lacks psychological realism, which would be a serious 
flaw for an ethical theory, as we generally want such theories to advocate 
character traits and behaviours that are achievable by “creatures like us” 
(Flanagan 1991, p. 32).  
While there have been a variety of replies to situationism from virtue 
ethicists, there is now widespread recognition in psychology of the 
importance of situational factors as influences on behaviour, even among 
personality theorists, who historically had opposed situationism in 
psychology during the person-situation debate. This is not to say that 
character is dead (and I will argue against such a view in the next section), 
but rather that an empirically adequate moral psychology of character needs 
to make proper room for situational influences.  
 
5.3.2 The Situationist Challenge to EVE  
While I will argue in the next section that situationists overstate some of their 
claims, let us assume for the argument in this paper that situationism is at least 
partially true: situational factors play an important role in moral behaviour, 
and their influence is more powerful and surprising than has traditionally been 
recognized. What I now want to consider is the application of this situationist 
challenge to EVE. Given that EVE takes direct inspiration from virtue ethics, 
it is not hard to see how the situationist threat would also apply to EVE. 
Situationists contend that the empirical evidence illustrates that people lack 
the kinds of robust and consistent character traits that virtue ethics has 
traditionally thought people to have, and that virtue ethics is thus empirically 
inadequate. If EVE makes similar claims about moral psychology to virtue 
ethics, then it would also be subject to this objection. We can thus fairly 
straightforwardly apply the situationist challenge to EVE: situationism claims 
to have shown that virtue ethical moral psychology is inadequate, and thus, 
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insofar as EVE endorses a similar moral psychological picture, it is also 
empirically inadequate and lacking in psychological realism. Environmental 
ethics, like general normative ethics, should thus be revised in situationist 
terns.  
We can develop this challenge by considering some of the claims made by 
environmental virtue ethicists. To begin with, Kasperbauer (2014, p. 473) 
notes that EVE theorists often make claims about the need for “behavioural 
adequacy.” This refers to the connection between an environmental ethic and 
the production of pro-environmental behaviour; between someone holding 
environmental values and actually acting on those values to address 
environmental challenges and issues. Environmental virtues thus need to help 
produce pro-environmental actions. As Kasperbauer (2014, p. 473) writes: 
“In order for environmental virtue theories to be adequate, they must actually 
translate into pro-environmental behaviors. They must promote 
environmental virtues that have real effects on the environment.” 
Proponents of EVE also make claims about virtue that echo those of 
mainstream virtue ethicists. For example, many environmental virtue ethicists 
either explicitly endorse, or at least take inspiration from, neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethics (Kawall 2018). Similarly, Shaw’s (2005, p. 99) account of EVE 
echoes standard conceptions of virtue when he writes that “virtues are stable 
propensities to excel or character habits that are instilled into us from our 
early years and for as long as we are capable of moral growth.” Environmental 
virtue ethicists also make claims about the consistency of environmental 
character traits. As Kasperbauer (2014, p. 476) notes, while there isn’t 
widespread agreement in EVE on how broad and robust character traits are, 
a variety of environmental virtue theorists do highlight the importance of 
consistency and suggest that virtues are fairly robust.  
Based on these points, we can now clearly see how situationism applies to 
EVE. Environmental virtue ethicists take direct inspiration from virtue ethics, 
and also make similar claims about the nature of character traits. This 
challenge to EVE is developed in more detail by Kasperbauer (2014). He 
notes that the claims about behavioural adequacy made by environmental 
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virtue ethicists are often quite strong, such that: “Behavioral requirements are 
central to some theories of virtue, but have a particularly significant role in 
environmental theories” (Kasperbauer 2014, p. 473). For example, he cites 
Sandler’s (2007, pp. 107-108) argument that in order for an environmental 
ethic to be adequate, it must be effective at producing action and solutions in 
relation to environmental problems, and thus has an essential practical 
dimension in addition to its theoretical one. Based on these kinds of claims 
made by Sandler and other EVE theorists, Kasperbauer (2014, p. 482) takes 
EVE to place great emphasis on practical outcomes, and to often require a 
“high degree of behavioural adequacy.” For this reason, proponents of EVE 
should be concerned about situationism, yet situationism has received very 
little attention in the environmental ethics literature thus far.2 
In addition, Kasperbauer cites a range of empirical evidence that highlights 
the power of situational factors to influence environmental behaviours. For 
example, he discusses an experiment done by Schultz and colleagues (2007), 
which Kasperbauer calls the “Smiley Faces” experiment. This experiment 
measured the energy consumption rates of Californian households, before 
providing the households with information on energy consumption rates in 
their area, and with how their consumptions rates compared with others, while 
continuing to track their energy consumption. The experiment found an effect 
of social conformity: after the initial information had been distributed, 
households who consumed less than average started to increase their 
consumption, while households that consumed more than the average 
decreased their consumption (Schultz et al. 2007). Importantly, some 
households also received extra feedback in the form of smiley faces on their 
informational flyers – a smiley face for those who consumed less energy than 
the average, and a frowny face for those who consumed more. These smiley 
and frowny faces made an important difference: in contrast to the households 
that didn’t receive the faces, those who received smiley faces maintained their 
lower consumption rates (rather than increasing them like in the other group), 
 
2 Exceptions to this are Cafaro (2015), Kawall (2018), and Sandler (2007), although none of 
these develop their responses to situationism in great detail.  
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while those who received a frowny face decreased their consumption to a 
great degree than the high-consumers from the other group. Kasperbauer 
(2014, p. 477) takes these results as indicative of the power of situations: “The 
take-home point of this experiment is that trivial social feedback can 
significantly alter people’s normal energy consumption.” 
Kasperbauer (2014, p. 482) also presents evidence to suggest that 
“Proenvironmental values and attitudes rarely lead to pro-environmental 
behaviors.” He discusses a meta-analysis by Hines and Colleagues (1987) 
which reports that the average correlation between environmental concern 
and behaviour to be 0.35. Kasperbauer (2014, p. 483) notes that correlations 
lower than 0.30 are generally considered unreliable, and that because this 
correlation is only a little higher than that benchmark, it doesn’t “hold much 
hope for getting pro-environmental behaviors out of pro-environmental 
knowledge, values, attitudes, or intentions.” In addition to these low 
correlation estimates, Kasperbauer also points to the influence of various 
implicit biases, such as the single action bias, which refers to the phenomenon 
in which an individual loses motivation after taking a single action, even 
though they know that further actions may be necessary to achieving the 
desired goal. Kasperbauer suggests that such biases play a surprisingly 
important role in affecting environmental behaviour, and provide further 
support for his situationist account.  
Based on this evidence, Kasperbauer argues that environmental 
behaviours are primarily driven by situational forces and non-trait-like 
psychological factors like implicit biases, and that character traits and virtues 
should not be our focus. He ultimately concludes that, while people possess a 
range of values and beliefs in relation to the environment:  
“The problem, according to situationists, is that human psychology 
does not function in the right sort of way for these values and beliefs 
to help the environment to a sufficient degree, regardless of one’s 
virtues or degree of excellence. In order to achieve many of the goals 
of environmental ethics—the most fundamental of which are certainly 
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worth retaining—we must look elsewhere than the virtues” 
(Kasperbauer 2014, p. 487).  
Through consideration of these arguments we can see that situationism is 
potentially a very strong objection to EVE, which threatens its viability as a 
framework for environmental ethics. Answering this challenge will thus be 
crucial to demonstrate that EVE still has an important role to play in 
environmental ethics, and in our endeavours to tackle the pressing 
environmental challenges of our age.  
 
5.4 Interactionism and Saving EVE  
With the threat that situationism poses to EVE established, I now want to 
discuss the interactionist approach to character, as it is my contention that 
interactionism can save EVE from situationism. I’ll begin by sketching some 
of the key elements of the interactionist account of character, before showing 
why interactionism provides a more empirically adequate approach to 
character than situationism. The following section will then consider 
Kasperbauer’s argument against interactionism’s ability to save EVE, before 
showing how interactionism can overcome this objection.  
 
5.4.1 Interactionism  
In Section 5.3 I discussed how situationist philosophers took inspiration from 
situationist psychology and the person-situation debate. The interactionist 
approach to character also takes inspiration from psychology, in particular 
from the way that interactionism in psychology has helped to resolve the 
debates between personality theorists and situationists in favour of an 
interactionist resolution. Interactionist psychologists criticized both 
situationist and personality theorists for focusing too much on one side over 
the other, and for treating person and situation as independent from each 
other. As Raush, Dittman and Taylor (1959, p. 373) write: “Which is more 
important for behavior, the individual personality or the situation? The 
question is a meaningless one. Neither component can be uncoupled from the 
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other.” Interactionists recognize that both personal and situational elements 
are important determinants of behaviour, while also highlighting the dynamic 
and reciprocal nature of the interactions between person and situation. Rather 
than a simple, one-way process, such as the situation influencing the person, 
and this producing behaviour, interactions are often multi-directional, with 
the situation influencing the person, who influences their situation, and so on. 
In stressing the importance of dynamic interactions, and recognizing the close 
ties between person and situation, interactionists argued against the person-
situation debate and claimed that it revolved around a “pseudo issue” by 
attempting to pit persons against situations (Endler 1973, p. 301).  
Walter Mischel, who’s early work in the 1960’s was an important driver 
of situationism in psychology, has since recognized the flaws of the person-
situation debate, and praised the interactionist shift in psychology: 
“Especially noteworthy is that these developments bridge the classic 
partitioning most unnatural and destructive to the building of a 
cumulative science of the individual—the one that splits the person 
apart from the situation, treating each as an independent cause of 
behavior” (Mischel 2009, p. 289).  
As Funder (2006, p. 22) writes, the idea that “behavior is a function of an 
interaction between the person and the situation” had become a truism by the 
1980s, and “Nowadays, everybody is an interactionist.” Interactionism has 
thus established its place as the dominant approach to personality and 
behaviour in psychology.  
In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued for an interactionist 
approach to character and virtue, and supported the idea that interactionism 
could resolve debates over the nature of character in philosophy in a similar 
way to how it has resolved debates about personality in psychology. Skorburg 
(2019, p. 2346), for example, argues that philosophers need to recognize the 
widespread interactionist consensus in psychology. Similarly, Alfano (2016, 
p. 130) has argued that “personality and context both contribute to the 
explanation and prediction of behaviour – including moral behaviour,” and 
thus that “character should be recast in interactionist terms.” Skorburg and 
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Alfano have further developed their interactionist accounts in a range of other 
works (see, e.g., Skorburg 2017; Alfano 2013, 2014; Alfano & Skorburg 
2016). While some philosophers continue to argue for both situationist 
(Vargy 2018) and traditional virtue ethical (West 2018) approaches, Alfano 
and Skorburg present strong arguments for the appeal of an interactionist 
approach to character. When coupled with the interactionist consensus in 
psychology, interactionism makes a strong case for being the best framework 
to guide future philosophical work on character and moral psychology.  
I will explore interactionism in more detail below in service of my 
argument against situationism, but for now the two key takeaways are: firstly 
that interactionism is the dominant approach in psychology, and secondly that 
it recognizes the importance of both situational and personal variables as 
influences on behaviour. This second point is crucial, as by positing an 
important role for personal factors, interactionism points the way to both 
countering situationism, and to preserving an important role for character in 
our theorizing about environmental ethics.  
 
5.4.2 Answering the Situationist Challenge  
In arguing against situationism, my strategy will not be to show that 
situational factors are unimportant, as they are a crucial part of the moral 
psychological picture. Instead, I want to show why situations are not running 
the show (as has sometimes been made out by situationists), because personal 
factors, and person-situation interactions, are also critical to understanding 
character and moral behaviour. I will thus not be critiquing particular 
situationist experiments or arguments, as I will instead present evidence to 
illustrate the importance of interactions and personal factors, and thereby 
show that strong situationist accounts are unjustified.  
Let’s start with the importance of personal factors. A key source of support 
comes from aggregation. The central idea here is that the correlation between 
a personality or character trait and a single behaviour can be quite low, 
making prediction difficult. When we aggregate our assessment over multiple 
situations or measurements though, we frequently see a greater correlation 
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between the trait and behaviour, and thus more consistency. Epstein (1983) 
was an important proponent of this idea in psychology, arguing that 
aggregation illustrated that personality was more reliable than was often 
supposed by situationist psychologists. More recently, Jayawickreme et al. 
(2014, pp. 292-293) survey a range of evidence that illustrates that by 
aggregating across situations, we can see a greater correlation between traits 
and behaviours. Traits thus still have an important role to play in moral 
psychology.  
In addition to this support for personal factors, it’s also important to note 
the limitations of situational factors. Funder and Ozer (1983) take as their 
starting point the situationist contention that the correlation between a 
particular trait and a behavioral outcome (which is sometimes called the 
personality coefficient) rarely exceeds .30-.40. After reviewing a number of 
prominent situational effects though, they found that the correlation between 
a particular situational factor and a behaviour also tends to average around 
.40, suggesting that, rather than running the show, the influence of situations 
is actually quite similar to the influence of personal factors. Similarly, 
Richard, Bond Jr. and Stokes-Zoota (2003, p. 337) conducted a broad meta-
analysis involving over 25,000 studies with 8 million participants, and found 
that “situational effects are similar in magnitude to personal effects,” with the 
former having an average effect size of .22, and the latter of .19. As a result, 
not only are personal factors important influences on behaviour, they may be 
as important as situations (or at least roughly on the same level). 
Crucially, the above studies illustrate that, even taken together, persons 
and situations do not fully explain behaviour. Furthermore, if we only 
consider person and situation as independent variables, our prediction and 
explanation of behaviour may be quite limited. This is because interactions, 
and the way in which person and situation influence each other, are missing 
from the account. Situationists are not only mistaken in overemphasising 
situational variables, but also for missing the importance of interactions. As 
Alfano (2013, p. 77) writes:  
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“It may be that those toeing the situationist line have taken it for 
granted that if dispositions explain N percent of behaviour then 
situations explain (100 – N) percent. This is emphatically not the case. 
What neither explains independently must be attributed to their 
interaction, to a third factor, or to randomness.”  
As such, interactions are a vitally important piece of the puzzle that is missing 
if we only consider personal factors and situational factors, and this is part of 
the reason that interactionism has now become the leading approach in 
psychology. Of course, some situationists had interactionist elements in their 
accounts, and some, such as John Doris (see Mehl et al. 2015) have come to 
endorse interactionism themselves. This acceptance of interactionism is 
missing from Kasperbauer’s account, and, as well shall see in the next section, 
he actually makes an argument against interactionism. The key point for now 
though is that, even if we consider both personal and situational factors, this 
is still not enough, as we need to also recognise interactions to develop a 
proper account of character and moral behaviour that reflects the empirical 
evidence from psychology.  
Based on these arguments, we can see that situationists have overplayed 
their hand, as both personal factors and interactions are crucial to 
understanding character and moral behaviour, and situations are not as 
influential as has sometimes been claimed. This doesn’t mean though that 
traditional virtue ethical approaches have been entirely vindicated though, as 
interactionism also acknowledges the important influence of situational 
factors. Despite this, interactionism does assign personal factors an important 
place, and can thus be used to defend EVE, as I will detail more in the next 
section.  
 
5.5 Situationism Strikes Back    
Based on the preceding argument, it may look as though interactionism can 
fairly neatly counter the situationist threat to EVE. There is still more work 
to be done though, as Kasperbauer develops a number of points in support of 
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his situationist argument against EVE that require further consideration. In 
particular, he makes an argument against interactionism that amplifies the 
threat of his situationist assault. While he doesn’t discuss interactionism 
explicitly, he does refer to the fact that psychologists have noted that 
“personality traits and situational factors interact to contribute to behavior,” 
and that this presents a counter-argument to situationism’s emphasis on 
situations as the main drivers of behaviour (2014, p. 483, n. 41). Such a claim 
clearly fits with the kind of interactionist argument I have just made in 
response to situationism. Kasperbauer (2014, p. 483, n. 41) though thinks that, 
while he agrees with this interactionist point, it also doesn’t affect his 
argument for two reasons, which are that:  
“(1) environmental virtue theory demands a relatively large correlation 
between traits and behaviors, and (2) I am presenting other, independently 
persuasive, evidence to suggest that pro-environmental behavior is 
primarily due to situational factors.” 
As a result, interactionism may not be able to save EVE after all. The evidence 
that Kasperbauer cites and the arguments he builds on that evidence may 
show that even if situationism has been supplanted by interactionism when it 
comes to interpersonal character, it may still hold when it comes to 
environmental behaviour and character.  
My strategy for responding to this argument will be to first counter (1) by 
showing that an interactionist EVE changes our view of the relationship 
between traits and behaviours, and to then defuse the threat posed by the 
evidence he refers to in (2) by showing why an interactionist approach to 
environmental behaviours is superior to Kasperbauer’s situationist one.  
Before diving into my own response though, I first want to touch on 
Kawall’s (2018) response to Kasperbauer, which, to my knowledge, is the 
only existing response to Kasperbauer in the EVE literature. Kawall (2018, p. 
667) notes Kasperbauer’s citing of evidence illustrating the power of 
situations to influence environmental behaviours, but suggests that “We 
should question whether the individuals whose environmental behaviors are 
so easily swayed by trivial circumstantial factors are in fact environmentally 
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virtuous.” Further to this, he argues that most people have received 
significantly less training in environmental virtues than in interpersonal 
virtues, and he questions the environmental knowledge and commitments of 
the participants in the studies Kasperbauer discusses (although Kawall does 
not discuss these studies in any detail). Ultimately, he concludes that the 
studies cited by Kasperbauer may not actually tell us anything interesting 
about environmental virtues, as “We have good reason to expect 
environmental virtue to be particularly rare,” given our comparative lack of 
training in it compared to interpersonal virtues (Kawall 2018, p. 667).  
Kawall’s argument is an interesting one, and his point about the lack of 
environmental knowledge and training in environmental virtues highlights 
the need for developing new ideas for moral education in relation to EVE, 
which is an issue that I will return to in Section 5.6. In not offering specific 
criticism of Kasperbauer’s evidence though, Kawall cedes too much ground 
to situationism. We can do a better job of defending EVE by critiquing 
Kasperbauer’s use of the evidence, and by taking an interactionist approach 
instead, which will be the aim of the remainder of this section.  
 
5.5.1 The Consistency Question 
In order to answer (1), I’ll start by referring back to the arguments I made in 
the previous section about the importance of personal factors as determinants 
of behaviour. As I noted there, character traits are more important than 
situationists like Kasperbauer make out, and we can see greater consistency 
in character when aggregating across situations. As such, the relationship 
between traits and behaviours is stronger than Kasperbauer suggests. I will 
present a range of evidence for the importance of personal factors in pro-
environmental behaviour in the next sub-section, but for now we can note that 
the importance of character traits is a promising starting point for answering 
(1).  
In addition to this, interactionism also takes a different view about the 
nature of traits and the relationship between person and situation to the one 
Kasperbauer seems to endorse. As I noted in Section 5.4, interactionists 
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emphasise the close ties between person and situation and the difficulty of 
pulling them apart, making person and situation interdependent. As Alfano 
and Skorburg (2019, p.442) note, for interactionism:  
“traits are construed as dependent on the environment, context, or 
situation. The dependence in question can be developmental: it may 
be difficult or impossible to acquire a virtue absent certain contextual 
supports or in the face of certain contextual impediments. The 
dependence can be structural: it may be difficult or impossible to 
manifest a virtue absent certain contextual supports or in the face of 
certain contextual impediments. The dependence may even be con-
stitutive: it may be difficult or impossible to have a virtue absent 
certain contextual supports or in the face of certain contextual 
impediments.”3 
This view about traits and virtues being dependent on the environment 
changes how we perceive Kasperbauer’s claim about the need for a close link 
between traits and behaviours, and his criticism of the existence of such a 
link. In considering traits in this way, we allow that situational factors can 
play an important role in supporting traits, not just during initial stages of 
development, but also as ongoing supports for maintaining those character 
traits.  
Overall then, for the interactionist, situations can support traits, and 
thereby support the production of behaviours, and it is thus not a strongly 
individualist view in which the trait is entirely sustained by internal features 
of the agent. As discussed earlier, personal factors are more influential in 
producing behaviour than Kasperbauer seems to suggest, but in allowing for 
a broader view of traits, in which situational influences can support character, 
we will see even more of a correlation between traits and behaviours. 
 
3 As I argued in Chapter 2 though, interactionism is better off without constitutive claims. 
The general point about traits being dependent on context and situation remains a crucial 
one though, even if it isn’t taken as far as constitutive extension.  
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Additionally, individuals can also act to better utilize situations to support 
themselves, which I will discuss in more detail in Section 5.6.   
A worry with this shift in our account of character traits is that it could be 
taking us too far away from EVE. This view about traits might be fine for 
interactionists, but it could be too different from the models of character and 
virtue endorsed by EVE, and thus be unpalatable to EVE theorists. 
Kasperbauer might therefore reply to my point by asserting that this different 
view of traits could be an acceptable one, but that it is not the view endorsed 
by EVE, and thus it is not capable of saving EVE from his challenge. 
Fortunately for my purposes, there are existing interactionist elements in 
the EVE literature, which highlight the compatibility of interactionism and 
EVE. Cafaro (2015, p. 439) notes that when it comes to developing and 
improving character, we need to take consideration of “all possible levels of 
intervention—personal, familial, social and environmental.” Further, in 
comparison to mainstream virtue ethics, he writes: “Because it is built around 
the idea that environmental conditions can help or hinder human flourishing, 
environmental virtue ethics starts off with a less heroic, individualistic 
conception of virtue” (Cafaro 2015, p. 439). Due to this, Cafaro thinks that 
EVE may even be able to help mainstream virtues ethics in responding to 
situationism. While Cafaro doesn’t explicitly mention interactionism, his 
emphasis on the important contributions that environment and context make 
to virtue has a definite interactionist ring to it. We can thus see points of 
overlap between EVE and interactionism, which gives me reason to think that 
at least some EVE theorists would be happy accepting the interactionist 
account of character I have been proposing. In doing so they can also help 
better defend EVE against situationism.   
EVE can thus accept the idea that context and situation play an important 
role in character and virtue, just as situationists like Alfano and Skorburg 
suggest. This changes our view about the “correlation between traits and 
behaviors” that Kasperbauer mentions, as this interactionist account allows 
for situational factors to play an important role in helping (rather than just 
hindering) the development and sustenance of virtues. When coupled with the 
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previously discussed evidence for the importance of personal factors, we have 
an effective reply to (1), both because traits are stronger and more consistent 
than Kasperbauer allows (I will also discuss more evidence specifically in 
relation to pro-environmental behaviour and traits in the next sub-section), 
and because EVE is compatible with the interactionist view that situational 
factors can play a key role in supporting traits in the production of moral 
behaviour.  
  
5.5.2 Countering the Evidence for Situationism in Environmental 
Behaviour  
This brings us to (2), which is based on the evidence that Kasperbauer cites 
that I discussed in Section 4.The key concern with this evidence is the 
possibility that it might show that while interactionism may hold true for 
interpersonal virtues, perhaps, when it comes to environmental behaviours, 
situations are the primary drivers, and thus we should take a situationist view 
rather than an interactionist one. This recalls Kawall’s point that I discussed 
earlier about people having less training in environmental virtues than 
interpersonal ones; given this is the case, perhaps it isn’t surprising for 
situations to be more influential? Additionally, I have argued that an 
interactionist approach to EVE can accept that situations play an important 
role in determining behaviour, so again we might wonder if this evidence does 
pose a significant threat.  
While interactionism does recognize the role of situations, it does so as 
part of a broader framework in which persons and interactions are also 
crucial. It would thus be an issue if Kasperbauer’s evidence showed situations 
to be dominant, as this would undermine my interactionist defense of EVE. 
Kasperbauer seems to take the evidence to show just this. He argues that 
because situational factors and “non-trait like psychological processes” are 
the primary drivers of environmental behaviours, we “cannot rely on virtues 
to produce pro-environmental behaviors,” and that “our expectations for 
environmental virtue theory must be extremely low” (Kasperbauer 2014, p. 
486). On the basis of these claims, he makes the strongly situationist 
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conclusion that environmental ethics should shift its attention away from 
virtues, and “focus instead on the role of situations” (Kasperbauer 2014, p. 
486).  
The good news is that there is a variety of evidence for the importance of 
personal factors in influencing environmental behaviour, which helps to 
counter Kasperbauer’s argument. For example, Steg and Vlek (2009) 
surveyed a wide range of psychological evidence concerning environmental 
behaviours with the intent of investigating the best ways to encourage pro-
environmental behaviour. They note that a range of studies illustrate the 
connections between moral and normative concerns and pro-environmental 
behaviour. An example of this is that there is compelling evidence that 
individuals who “subscribe to values beyond their immediate own interests, 
that is, self-transcendent, prosocial, altruistic or biospheric values” have a 
higher likelihood to engage in pro-environmental behaviours (Steg & Vlek 
2009, p. 311). They also cite evidence showing that an individual’s level of 
environmental concern is also connected to their actions in relation to the 
environment. Crucially though, Steg and Vlek (2009, p. 312) also 
acknowledge the importance of situational factors, and highlight the need to 
understand “contextual factors, motivational factors, and the interaction 
between them” in order to produce effective behavioural interventions aimed 
at promoting pro-environmental behaviour. Steg and Vlek thus show, by 
drawing on a range of evidence, firstly that personal factors matter and have 
an important role to play, and secondly the importance of also consider 
person-situation interactions, which fits perfectly with the interactionist 
account I am advancing.  
Similarly, a meta-analysis of 56 data sets spanning different countries by 
Klöckner (2013) also highlighted the important role that personal factors, 
such as intentions, habits, and personal norms, play in environmental 
behaviour. Klöckner (2013, p. 1035) notes that people holding environmental 
values and an ecological worldview, and who possess environmental 
knowledge and an understanding of the impacts of their actions, are more 
likely to feel a sense of moral obligation towards the environment, which can 
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produce pro-environmental behaviour. Again though, Klöckner (2013, pp. 
1035-1036) also highlights the role that social norms and expectations play 
in pro-environmental behaviour, and suggests that a combination of both 
improving oneself through habit change and self-efficacy, and enacting 
contextual change to increase social support, is the best way to achieve 
improvements in pro-environmental behaviour. Klöckner’s analysis thus also 
supports an interactionist approach to environmental behaviour.  
Another source of support comes from a study done by Brick and Lewis 
(2016) on the effect of personality traits on environmentally positive 
behaviour, with a particular focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
They found that personality traits were important predictors of emissions-
reducing behaviours, particularly the traits of Conscientiousness and 
Openness. Again though, they also recognise the importance of situations, 
writing that: “the effects of personality on behavior may be expressed 
differently based on cultural and social context” (Brick and Lewis 2016, p. 
653). Ultimately, they conclude strongly that both personal and situational 
factors are important, again in line with my interactionist account:  “Stable 
individual differences and social influence processes are both important for 
understanding and changing behaviors that affect the natural environment… 
and core personality is a robust, reliable individual difference associated with 
environmental behavior” (Brick and Lewis 2016, p. 654).  
These studies are just some of those illustrating the importance of personal 
factors in environmental behaviour, as a range of further studies also support 
this claim.4 On the basis of this evidence, we can see that there is strong 
support for the claim that personal factors and traits play an important role in 
environmental behaviour. As I have noted throughout though, situational 
factors are clearly important too, and Kasperbauer’s suggestions that we give 
careful consideration to the ways in which situational factors influence us, 
and to the ways in which we could use situations to our advantage, are good 
 
4 For further evidence supporting both the importance of personal factors and the benefits 
of an interactionist approach, see Pavalache-Ilie & Cazan 2018; Poškus 2018; Yu & Yu 
2017; and Steg et al. 2014.  
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ones. The key point though is that situational factors are not dominant or 
primary in the way Kasperbauer claims. Personal factors are highly important 
too, as are the various ways in which person and situation interact. As such, 
we can reject (2), and should recognise that interactionism is the best 
approach for understanding environmental behaviour and environmental 
virtue. Further, as I discussed in 5.5.1, and as I will flesh out more in the next 
section, interactionism and EVE are compatible approaches, making this 
interactionist shift one that proponents of EVE can readily accept. Ultimately 
then, I have shown that interactionism can protect EVE from situationism, 
and that interactionist EVE is a superior approach to Kasperbauer’s 
situationism for pursuing future work on environmental ethics and virtue.  
 
5.6 Interactionism and EVE 
Now that I have established how interactionism can save EVE from 
situationism, I will turn to explore some further connections and points of 
overlaps between interactionism and EVE in this section. In doing so, I will 
firstly seek to highlight the compatibility of the two approaches, and the 
appeal of an interactionist EVE. I will also consider some ways in which this 
combination is mutually beneficial: how it can help us to increase our 
awareness of the factors that can hinder pro-environmental behaviour, as well 
the ways we can use this awareness to aid in developing and sustaining 
character.  
 
5.6.1 Connections between Interactionism and EVE  
In Section 5.5.1 I discussed Cafaro’s account of environmental virtue as 
recognizing the importance of situation and context, and his argument that 
EVE thus doesn’t have a strongly individualist sense of virtue. I now want to 
both expand on this, and to highlight some other EVE accounts that have 
similar points of sympathy with interactionism. We’ll begin by looking at 
Cafaro’s work more. Cafaro (2015, p. 440) argues that EVE situates virtue 
and goodness within a broader social and environmental context; that our 
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virtue should “contribute to the goodness of larger wholes,” and that our 
individual achievement shouldn’t inhibit the flourishing of others, either 
human or non-human. He cautions against a strongly individualist approach 
to virtue that argues we can remain virtuous no matter what our social or 
environmental contexts are, as such a view can lead to “heroic strivers” who 
want to “cover the world in concrete to shore up an illusory self-importance” 
(Cafaro 2015, p. 440). While EVE does recognise that an important element 
of virtue is helping us to overcome external challenges, EVE theorists also 
“accept that people’s virtues and achievements are not self-generated or self-
perpetuated, but are partly produced by forces beyond their control (Cafaro 
2015, p. 440). Cafaro thus places a strong emphasis on the dependence of 
virtues on social and environmental context, which links up with similar 
claims made by interactionists, like those discussed in Section 5.5.1.  
Another good example of this overlap with interactionism is Kawall’s 
(2018) discussion of EVE. He argues that: “EVE has much to gain from an 
ongoing, deep engagement with social psychology, environmental 
psychology, and related fields” (Kawall 2018, p. 672). One way EVE can 
benefit from engagement with psychology is to develop a better 
understanding of our own limitations; of the biases that causes us to make 
poor choices, and of the situational factors that can lead us astray. Such 
engagement can also aid us in improving our institutions to support for 
environmental action, and to think about the social structures that are 
conducive to virtue. As Kawall (2018, p. 673) writes: “We might also 
consider ways in which social structures of various kinds (from networks of 
friends to more formal institutions) can help to provide circumstances that 
reinforce virtuous behavior.” In placing such emphasis on the importance of 
contextual factors to environmental virtue, Kawall’s account further 
highlights the points of sympathy between EVE and interactionism.  
We can also see interactionist elements in Clowney’s (2014) work on 
individual and collective environmental virtues. Clowney suggests that there 
is a great deal of reciprocity between individual and collective virtues. Our 
own environmental character traits, and the choices we make in response to 
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the environment, can help to shape the groups and societies we belong to. In 
turn, our societal and group engagements can influence our individual virtue: 
“Our group character makes it harder or easier for group members to acquire 
and act in accordance with particular virtues or vices” (Clowney 2014, p. 33). 
As such, our context can play an important role in supporting our character, 
but individuals can also take actions to shape these contextual forces, which 
again meshes nicely with interactionism.  
These examples illustrate the connections between interactionism and 
EVE. Both approaches share a commitment to the importance of context for 
not just acquiring virtue, but also for sustaining it over time. Additionally, 
both EVE and interactionism, when highlighting the importance of context, 
do not just mean social and political context, but also our broader 
environmental and ecological contexts. This separates them from more 
traditional approaches to virtue ethics, such as those in the Aristotelian 
tradition. As Cafaro (2015, p. 440) discusses, Aristotle considered both 
individual virtue, and its relationship to political policies and institutions, in 
the Ethics and Politics respectively, and we can imagine that he “might have 
written a third book on practical ethics, the Ecologics, discussing the proper 
appreciation and management of flourishing ecosystems.” As Cafaro (2015, 
p. 440) notes though, Aristotle did not write such a book, but the work of 
contemporary EVE theorists can be seen as trying to achieve just such a 
project. In highlighting the compatibility of interactionism and EVE, I hope 
to have shown their suitability for the future pursuit of this project.   
  
5.6.2 Building and Sustaining Character  
Exploring the connections between interactionism and EVE can also 
highlight new ideas for thinking about character development. As I have 
discussed, interactionism recognises an important role for situational factors, 
and some of these influences can be surprising and seemingly irrelevant, such 
as the aforementioned situational non-reasons. One way that interactionism 
can thus contribute to EVE is by providing more information on these kinds 
of effects, so that they can be better recognised and responded to. For 
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example, we could avoid situations or influences that tend to lead us astray, 
or favour situations that are conducive to virtuous behaviour.  
Not everything is about situations though, and this isn’t just a static process 
of trying to accommodate fixed situational effects. As mentioned earlier, 
interactionism emphasises that persons and situations influence each other in 
ongoing feedback loops, so we can also think about the ways that we can take 
action to improve and shape the situational forces we engage with. As Alfano 
(2013, p. 80) writes, this involves a shift from just consuming situations, to 
also producing them: “If we think of ourselves not only as situation-
consumers but also as situation-producers, the power of situational influences 
becomes a tool rather than a threat.” In addition to seeking out situations that 
support our virtue, we could thus also aim at actively creating such situations.  
In addition, we could think about this kind of expertise in understanding 
and managing situations as an important skill, or perhaps even as its own kind 
of virtue. Robertson (2018, p. 341) draws on the Confucian tradition and the 
concept of li, or ritual, which he suggests involves both techniques for 
manipulating situations to produce good behaviour, and that, further to this, 
it can also be conceptualized as a virtue that “consists of facility with and 
expertise in these situational manipulations.” It is important to note that, if 
viewed as a virtue, we should avoid viewing this kind of situational expertise 
as a global trait, and it would still need to be conceptualised in interactionist 
terms.5 This general point about developing situational expertise though does 
further illustrate the importance of thinking about the individual as an active 
and intentional agent in the processes of moral behaviour, and not merely as 
a puppet who is constantly manipulated by overwhelming situational 
influences.  
We can also see similar discussions about the reciprocal relationship 
between developing virtue and developing situations in the EVE literature. 
For example, Wensveen (2001, p. 232) argues that “ecosystem sustainability 
 
5 Alfano (2013, p. 81) makes a similar point in response to Sarkissian’s (2010) related 
argument about a Confucian virtue of situational control (de), noting that “like any other 
global trait, de may not be common or even commonly acquirable.”   
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is a necessary condition for the cultivation of a virtue,” and that because 
“genuine virtue” should be concerned with supporting the conditions 
necessary for virtue cultivation, genuine virtue should thus be concerned with 
ecosystem sustainability. We can thus see a reciprocal feedback loop between 
the virtuous agent and the environment, with both contributing to each other. 
Both interactionism and EVE are thus interested in exploring these feedback 
loops between agent and environment, and further investigation into the role 
they can play in environmental virtue is an important area for future research.  
Another area in which collaboration between EVE and interactionism 
could prove beneficial is in helping use to think about specific environmental 
virtues, and how we could develop them. Interactionism could draw on EVE 
theory to develop interactionist accounts of various environmental virtues, 
including both virtues focused on the environment (the previously mentioned 
environmentally responsive virtues), and also the environmental dimensions 
of more traditional virtues (environmentally justified or environmentally 
productive virtues). For example, we could draw on Kawall’s (2003) account 
of reverence for life as an environmental virtue, or Gambrel and Cafaro’s 
(2010) account of the virtue of simplicity, and combine them with 
interactionist moral psychology to give interactionist readings of those 
environmental virtues. Similarly, we could take Bannon’s (2017) account of 
friendship as a guiding ideal for environmental virtue, and connect it to 
Alfano and Skorburg’s (2016) interactionist model of friendship. While 
developing accounts of particular virtues like these is beyond the scope of the 
present paper, it is an interesting area of inquiry for future research. Taken 
together with the other examples of pursuing new ideas about character 
development, as well as the earlier examples of overlap between 
interactionism and EVE, we can see that future collaboration between 
interactionists and environmental virtue ethicists holds much promise.  
 
5.7 Conclusion  
Interest in environmental virtue has increased considerably in the last few 
decades, but EVE’s appeal as an approach to environmental ethics faces a 
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strong challenge from situationism, as has been argued by Kasperbauer. I 
began the paper by discussing some of the relevant background on both EVE 
and situationism, and highlighted that EVE endorses some of the same ideas 
and commitments as mainstream virtue ethics. After considering how 
situationism challenges both virtue ethics in general, and EVE in particular, I 
then introduced interactionism as an alternative approach to virtue, and 
argued that it provides a better fit with the empirical evidence than 
situationism. Situationism can thus be seen as overemphasising the 
importance of situational factors, and as not properly recognising the role of 
personal factors and person-situation interactions as determinants of 
behaviour. I then argued that by positing an important role for personal 
factors, and by connecting with existing elements in EVE theory, 
interactionism is well positioned to counter the situationist challenge to EVE. 
I considered Kasperbauer’s argument that the empirical evidence supported 
situationism about environmental behaviour as an objection to my 
interactionist strategy, before presenting a variety of empirical evidence to 
counter Kasperbauer’s position, and to support my interactionist account. 
Finally, I highlighted some further points of overlap between interactionism 
and EVE, and presented some ideas on how they could be mutually informing 
on matters such as character development. This paper has thus shown firstly 
that EVE can overcome the situationist challenge and that virtue remains an 
important consideration for environmental ethics, and secondly that a 
specifically interactionist approach to environmental virtue is highly 
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General Conclusion  
 
In this short concluding chapter I will aim to bring together the main ideas 
and arguments of the thesis, and consider some implications and 
possibilities for future research. I’ll begin by summarising the main 
conclusions drawn from the thesis research, and by illustrating how the 
thesis has achieved its aims and central research goal. I’ll then discuss some 
possibilities for extending the research done in this thesis, by further 
developing interactionism’s moral psychology, and by investigating its 
normative dimensions. Following this, I will present some other potential 
implications of my thesis work, and some future research directions that 
interactionist theory could take.  
 
I. Main Conclusions of the Thesis 
I began this thesis with the intention to investigate interactionism’s potential 
as an account of moral character, and with the goal of developing and 
advancing the interactionist position in philosophy. In support of this goal, I 
specified three main aims: to further the development of philosophical 
interactionism; to refine the interactionist position and defend it from 
objections; and to explore the implications of interactionism for other topics. 
In pursuit of these aims, I set out in Chapter 1 to develop a clear central 
framework for an interactionist approach to character. I drew on both 
philosophy and psychology to synthesise the key claims of interactionism, 
and to thereby establish the theoretical foundation on which to build the rest 
of the thesis research. I also highlighted recent trends in the area to 
demonstrate that not everyone is an interactionist, before arguing in favour 
of interactionism over some rival approaches.  
Chapter 1 provided a starting point for the rest of the thesis project: an 
account of the moral psychology of character that does justice to the 
empirical evidence, and which enjoys a number of advantages over rival 
virtue ethical and situationist approaches. Like any theory though, 
interactionism is open to objections, which Chapters 2 and 3 then focused 
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on addressing. In these chapters I aimed to build on the core framework 
established in Chapter 1, introducing new details about interactionism, and 
considering counter-arguments both metaphysical and methodological. In 
showing how interactionism can evade the Causal-Constitutive Fallacy 
objection, Chapter 2 helped to refine my account of interactionism, and 
defended it against a concerning metaphysical issue. Chapter 3 continued 
this trend of defending interactionism, but this time from issues relating to 
the replication crisis in psychology, which potentially threatened to 
undermine my interactionist position. In showing why this objection did not 
stick, and why interactionism remains the best fit with the empirical 
evidence even in light of the replication crisis, Chapter 3 played an 
important role in defending the core approach of the thesis, and thereby 
contributed to my second research aim.  
If the arguments up to this point have been compelling, then I have 
shown interactionism to be an appealing approach to the moral psychology 
of character that has a number of advantages over its rivals, and illustrated 
how it can overcome potential objections to stand as a robust and appealing 
framework. With such an approach in hand, I then set about considering its 
implications in other areas, to see if the framework could be put to work in 
making useful contributions to other debates and topics. Chapter 4 
considered the application of the situationist challenge to perfectionist 
theories of well-being, and argued that an interactionist perfectionism could 
overcome this threat. Similarly, Chapter 5 evaluated the challenge posed to 
environmental virtue ethics by situationism, and countered this argument by 
way of interactionism. In these chapters, I drew on the core framework 
established at the outset of the thesis and refined in subsequent chapters, in 
order to demonstrate the broader relevance of interactionism, and to 
illustrate how my research can inform other areas of inquiry.  
As a thesis by compilation, each of the papers included in this thesis were 
developed to be freestanding, and to pursue their own topics and arguments. 
Viewed as a whole though, I think that the thesis presents a clear 
progression between developing a core account, refining and defending that 
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account, and then applying and extending that account. While each of the 
papers can stand on its own, they all contribute towards the pursuit of my 
three main research aims. Furthermore, the chapters also build on one 
another, with the later chapters drawing on and extending the ideas 
presented in the earlier ones. In this way, all the papers featured in thesis 
work in unison towards my central goal of furthering the development of 
interactionism in philosophy. In developing an interactionist account, 
answering objections, and showing new applications of this account, I hope 
to have illustrated interactionism’s appeal and power as a framework for 
approaching research on character; one that is perhaps the best option for 
future research in the area. 
 
II. The Further Development of Interactionism 
Now that I have brought together the main conclusions of the thesis, I want 
to consider some possibilities for future research on interactionism, which 
could build on the work done in this thesis. A first point to note is that 
interactionism could benefit from future collaborative work between 
philosophers and psychologists. In Chapter 3 I discussed the advantages of 
engagement and collaboration between the two disciplines, and noted some 
examples of recent interdisciplinary work on moral character. Future work 
could aim to continue in this trend, with interactionist philosophers and 
psychologists collaborating on both empirical and theoretical work. This 
could allow for the gathering of new evidence, and the formulation of new 
ideas to further develop interactionism’s moral psychology.  
Another avenue for future research is developing interactionist models of 
individual virtues. Alfano and Skorburg (2019) have done work along these 
lines in their account of intelligence as an interactionist virtue. Future 
research could aim to develop similar interactionist accounts for other 
virtues, both moral and intellectual. Doing so would add detail to 
interactionism’s framework, and have the potential to inform a range of 
further ethical topics. It could also point to other avenues for collaboration 
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between philosophy and psychology, as new empirical work could be 
undertaken to investigate the target virtue in detail.  
A promising example for this kind of work would be developing an 
interactionist account of heroism, as there has been some interesting recent 
research that could inform such an endeavour. In their study of heroism, 
Walker, Frimer and Dunlop (2010, p. 907) write that: “exemplary moral 
functioning can take multifarious forms and arises from different sources, 
reflecting divergent person x situation interactions.” Similarly, 
Jayawickreme and Di Stefano (2012, p. 165) take an interactionist approach 
to heroism, and argue that it is driven by a “complex interplay of factors – 
including traits, situations, and communal beliefs.” Future research could 
build on this psychological work to produce a philosophical account of 
interactionist heroism.  
There is also interesting work to be done in developing interactionism’s 
normative dimensions, and considering its implications for other aspects of 
ethical theory. For example, I have previously mentioned that 
interactionism’s claim that character and virtue are multiply realisable raises 
interesting normative questions. As noted in Chapter 2, Alfano (2014) 
discusses how this claim raises questions about whether some means of 
achieving virtue are morally preferable to others. For example, if my trait of 
courage is primarily sustained by personal factors, while another agent’s 
trait of courage is reliant on social and environmental supports, we might 
wonder if I am more deserving of praise. We thus may want to specify that 
an agent’s personal factors must meet a minimum threshold of contribution 
for a trait to count as virtuous. As Alfano (2014, pp. 85-86) writes: 
“Furthermore, the framework allows for the plausible idea that there is a 
kind of asymmetry among the relata that bear virtues. Someone ’s 
personality can only be so weak before we are no longer inclined to call 
him…virtuous, even if that weakness is counteracted by great social and 
asocial strengths.” Conversely, we might think there is something 
praiseworthy about an agent overcoming personal weaknesses through 
skillfully selecting situations conducive to virtue, and by attempting to 
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cultivate social and environmental conditions (insofar as they are able) to 
support their character traits. Such questions could serve to direct future 
work in interactionist theory.  
I have also previously mentioned that interactionism, like situationism, 
raises new questions about moral luck. While this has received some 
attention in the literature, such as Doris’ (2002) discussion of circumstantial 
luck, and more recent work by Herdova and Kearns (2015), the implications 
of psychological evidence for moral luck have not been explored in great 
detail. In particular, investigating the specific implications of interactionism 
for moral luck is an area in need of further exploration. Similarly, Doris 
(2002) also considers the connections between situationism and moral 
responsibility. A range of other authors have also explored the implications 
of psychological evidence for responsibility, including Ciurria (2013), 
Sartorio (2018), Levy (2017), and Piovarchy (2020). Again though, there is 
work to be done in unpacking the implications of interactionism for moral 
responsibility, which would also help to flesh out the normative dimensions 
of the framework. Examples such as the ones discussed in this section point 
to the range of ways in which future research could build on the work done 
in this thesis.  
 
III. Implications and Future Directions  
In addition to these means of furthering the development of interactionism’s 
core descriptive and normative aspects, there is also profitable research to 
be done exploring its implications for a range of other topics. Some such 
implications have already been investigated in this thesis, namely the 
implications for the connections between virtue and well-being, and for 
environmental virtue ethics. Hopefully this work will have illustrated the 
rich potential of interactionism for contributing to other areas of inquiry. I 
will now sketch some further examples of possible future directions for 
interactionist work that was beyond the scope of this thesis to address fully, 
but which nevertheless hold promise for future research.  
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One example of such a line of research is using interactionism as a 
framework for exploring the connections between narrative and virtue. 
Interest in narrative in philosophy has grown significantly in recent years, 
but there has also been longstanding interest in both narrative in general, 
and the moral dimensions of narratives in particular. A range of authors, 
including Nussbaum (1990), Johnson (1993), Rorty (1989), and Goldie 
(2000), have argued in support of the important role that narrative can play 
in character and moral development. Johnson (1993, p. 197), for example, 
writes that our engagements with narratives can “develop our perception of 
character, of what is important in a given situation, and of the subtly 
interwoven threads of our moral entanglements.”  
Interactionism could contribute to this tradition through its moral 
psychological resources, and by considering how narrative might fit within 
its framework. We could investigate basic questions, such as: can narratives 
play a role in character development?; can they support virtue over time?; 
and can they contribute to developing an agent’s moral perception and 
situation sensitivity? We could also investigate some of the more specific 
and particular contributions that interactionism could make; for example, 
could empirical evidence about the ways in which agents and situations 
interact be incorporated into our strategies for using narratives in moral 
education? Along these lines, Engelen et al. (2018) have proposed a strategy 
for moral education that involves combining narratives about moral 
exemplars with ‘nudge’ strategies, and this work could fit nicely within an 
interactionist framework. Relatedly, Berger and Alfano (2016, p. 154) argue 
in support of an interactionist approach to art, in which art could be used to 
educate about both the morally relevant features of a situation, and the 
“drivers of behavior that are morally and socially irrelevant.” There is thus 
valuable research to be done in investigating how narratives can fit into an 
interactionist approach to character, and also how interactionism can 
contribute to work on narrative.  
As I suggested earlier in the thesis, there is also more to be gained from 
exploring the connections between interactionism and E cognition. Chapter 
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2 presented my argument that interactionism evades the C-C Fallacy, but 
this does not mean I think the philosophy of mind has nothing to offer the 
interactionist. E cognition approaches, like interactionism, emphasise agent-
environment interactions, and thus have many points of sympathy and 
overlap. More recently, some proponents of E cognition have explored the 
implications of their accounts in ways that line up nicely with 
interactionism. For example, Colombetti and Torrance (2008, p. 517, 
emphasis in original) propose an enactivist approach to ethics, and write that 
“an important focus for ethical appraisal is the interaction between people.” 
Similarly, Jayawickreme and Chemero (2008, p. 118) draw on ecological 
psychology to propose an account of the “moral analogues of affordances,” 
in which there are tight connections between agent and environment, and 
between virtue and situation, in the perception of possibilities for moral 
behaviour. Future research could aim to explore these connections, 
investigating both what E cognition can contribute to interactionism, and 
what interactionism can contribute to E cognition.   
Interactionism also has implications for a range of other areas, including 
political philosophy, legal theory, and other areas of applied ethics such as 
bioethics, business ethics, and military ethics. I will not attempt to develop 
these connections here, but I hope that the examples in this section have 
illustrated interactionism’s potential to future work in a variety of 
philosophical areas.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
In pursuing this thesis, my main hope was to make a worthwhile 
contribution to the interactionist project in philosophy. In my view, 
interactionism holds great potential as an approach to character, but, despite 
some notable exceptions, has not yet received the attention it deserves in the 
philosophical literature. I have tried to help remedy this somewhat, by 
developing interactionism’s core framework, defending it from objections, 
and applying it to new areas. Ultimately, it is my contention that 
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interactionism provides us with an appealing way of approaching the moral 
psychology of character, and its emphasis on context and agent-environment 
interactions gives us a rich framework for moral character that can 
contribute to a range of other topics and areas of inquiry. Hopefully, the 
work presented in this thesis will have helped contribute to the development 
of interactionism, and more broadly to our understanding of virtue and 
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Please address the remaining comments below, make the below editorial 
changes to your paper, and send the updated version of your paper to me 
as an MS Word attachment at both of my email addresses: 
battaly.heather@gmail.com  and   heather.battaly@uconn.edu 
 
We have time on this. Please get me the paper by July 1. 
 
1.      Please ensure that your paper conforms with our standard formatting. 
The style guidelines for JPR are attached. Especially important are the 
sections on references and quotation marks.  If you have any questions 
regarding style that are not covered in these guidelines, please refer to the 
Chicago Manual of Style. 
2.      Please ensure that your paper has endnotes (not footnotes) and a 
bibliography. Please label those sections 'ENDNOTES' and 'BIBLIOGRAPHY'. 
3.      Please also proof-read your paper, giving it a very close read. 
 
I have attached our Author Agreement. 
 
4. Please complete the Author Agreement, scan it in, and send it to me  as 
an email attachment. In the spot for 'Name', please print your name. 
Underneath that spot, please sign your name. 
 
Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns. 
 
Thank you!  On behalf of the Editors of the Journal of Philosophical 





Prof. Heather Battaly 




Revise and Resubmit Email – Southern Journal of Philosophy 
13-Jun-2020 
 
Dear Mr. Lutman: 
 
I am sorry to inform you that the editorial committee has decided not to 
accept your paper "Virtue, Well-Being, and Interactionism" (Manuscript ID 
SJP-1909-130-OA.R1) in its current form for publication in The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy. 
 
However, once again we do invite you to revise and resubmit. We include 
the referee reports (below), for use in revision. 
 
If the paper is re-submitted, we will consider it as a new submission. 
Although we will attempt to ask the same referees to review the new 
submission (if appropriate), we may need to send it to other referees. 
 
There are two ways to submit your revised manuscript. You may use the link 
below to submit your revision online with no need to enter log-in details: 
 
*** PLEASE NOTE: This is a two-step process. After clicking on the link, you 





Alternatively, please log into https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/sjp and 
enter your Author Center. You can use the revision link or you will find your 
manuscript title listed under "Manuscripts with Decisions." Under "Actions," 
click on "Create a Revision." Your manuscript number has been appended 
to denote a revision. Please DO NOT upload your revised manuscript as a 
new submission. 
 
You will be unable to make your revisions on the originally submitted 
version of the manuscript. Instead, revise your manuscript using a word 
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processing program and save it on your computer. Once the revised 
manuscript is prepared, you can upload it and submit it through your 
Author Center. 
 
When submitting your revised manuscript, you will be able to respond to 
the comments made by the referee(s) in the space provided. You can use 
this space to document any changes you make to the original manuscript. 
In order to expedite the processing of the revised manuscript, please be as 
specific as possible in your response to the referee(s). 
 
If you would like help with English language editing, or other article 
preparation support, Wiley Editing Services offers expert help with English 
Language Editing, as well as translation, manuscript formatting, and figure 
formatting at www.wileyauthors.com/eeo/preparation. You can also check 
out our resources for Preparing Your Article for general guidance about 
writing and preparing your manuscript 
at www.wileyauthors.com/eeo/prepresources. 
 
IMPORTANT: Your original files are available to you when you upload your 
revised manuscript. Please delete any redundant files before completing the 
submission. 
 




Dr. Remy Debes 
Editor, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
 
EDITOR - Comments to Author: This seems like definite progress. I cannot 






Statement of Contribution of Others 
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